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This thesis is primarily an application of the Christian tradition of Just War to the problems 
arising from the basing of US nuclear weapons in South Korea and the development of 
nuclear weapons by the regime in the North. 
 
The Christian theology of Just War has developed over the last two thousand years, adapting 
as first Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, through the break down 
of any enforceable norms in Europe‘s ‗Dark Ages‘, to the emergence of the concept of the 
modern nation state at the end of the Thirty Years Wars in 1648. 
 
Throughout these shifts, two issues have remained constant, although their relative weight has 
changed.  First that a war can only be described as ‗just‘ if it is being waged for legitimate 
reasons, jus ad bellum, and that is waged in a proportionate manner that seeks to separate 
combatants from non-combatants, jus in bello. 
 
Both these ideas were severely weakened in the period of warfare that followed on from the 
American and French Revolutions at the end of the Eighteenth Century.  The new ideology 
of nationalism brought with it the idea of the nation at arms, the armed citizenry, and with this, 
a further blurring of the always weak distinction between soldiers and the wider population.   
By 1945, both the secular and Christian tradition lay in ruins, damaged by the total warfare in 
the twentieth century when anything and anyone who could contribute to the wider war effort 
became a target.  Also, although not the most destructive weapon, this saw the advent of the 
nuclear bomb. 
 
In response, Christian thinkers sought to redefine the concepts of Just War for a nuclear age, 
with the potential for the use of weapons that could destroy all of humanity.  Some saw this 
as the lesser evil, when faced with the victory of a totalitarian political system, and others 
argued that proportionality could be maintained if the size of weapons, or their targeting, was 
such as to minimise wider damage.  On the other hand, many theologians argued that by 
definition they could never be discriminate or proportionate and that their use (or even the 
implied threat of their use) would always fail the precepts of Jus in Bello. 
 
In the modern Korean context, this debate is not abstract, but has real bearing on the practical 
steps being taken by all the main parties.  The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the North 
(the DPRK) has meant that the desire for Korean re-unification has become entwined with 
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how best to resolve the nuclear issue.  At the moment, in the South amongst the Protestant 
communities (split between the CCK and the NCCK), this debate has become fixed on issues 
of practical politics.  In effect, is it better to negotiate with the North over the nuclear 
weapons issue and hope that resolving this will then lead to reunification or is it better to aim 
to overthrow the DPRK (economically, politically or even militarily) and, this, by definition, 
would resolve the question of their possession of nuclear weapons. At the moment both the 
NCCK and the CCK have based their policies towards North Korea (the DPRK) on the basis 
of secular politics not the teachings of the Christian gospel.  The NCCK is tending to 
overlook human rights abuses in the DPRK, and the threat of that regime‘s nuclear arsenal, in 
their emphasis on the need to overcome the political division of Korea.  In turn, the CCK 
ignores much Christian teaching with its emphasis on seeking the collapse (perhaps by 
military means) of the DPRK as a precursor to unification.  In this, both bodies seem to have 
forgotten that they are fundamentally Christian confessional bodies, and as such their public 
statements should be based on the Gospels, not on the practicalities of day to day politics. 
 
Neither approach is particularly grounded on either in the Christian message of the gospels or 
the Just War tradition.  Thus this thesis does not just seek to explore and explain the current 
situation in Korea using the concepts of Just War, it also seeks to provide a basis on which the 
Protestant community can resolve their current impasse.  This means the thesis is grounded 
on the Christian concept of political theology, in particular in so far as this approach ‗offers 
alternatives to better comprehend the different postures and approaches towards a solution‘.   
 
In the case of the situation in Korea, this means there is no military solution to the problem of 
unification.  Nor can a solution be found in ignoring the human rights abuses in the DPRK.  
The answer lies in stressing three aspects that remain fundamental to any Christian identity in 
Korea – of a unified Korean koinoina, that any resort to force must meet the conditions of the 
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The main purpose of this thesis is to use political theology in order to focus on the 
theological and political response of the Protestant Churches to the development of 
nuclear weapons capabilities by North Korea. The current responses of the Protestant 
Churches can be compared to the longstanding Christian development of Just War 
Theology and an important conclusion is that the Protestant Community needs to take 
much more note of this tradition in formulating its response.  To undertake this task 
means reviewing the developments in the Just War tradition, in particular as it 
changed in response to the destructive nature of warfare in the Twentieth Century.  
Essential prerequisites for this are both to set out the background to the Christian 
community in Korea and then to understand the current differences and debates within 
what is, otherwise, actually a united church. on the subject of nuclear weapons and 
unification. 
 
Fundamentally, Duncan B. Forrester states that political theology should be seen as 
contextual theology.1 In the context of this thesis that means placing the wider debate 
on Just War into a specifically Korean context and forming a response that is both 
informed by the wider theology and relevant to the situation in Korea. Consideration 
of this issue requires attention to three elements which constitute the shape of the 
thesis. These are Christian moral teaching about war, and in particular just war; the 
history and particular shape of Christianity in Korea; and the response of Korean 
Churches to the development of nuclear weapon capabilities by North Korea. .  
 
The basic concept of Just War has been interpreted for centuries by rulers in states, 
and by churches in these states, as they have sought to adapt it to different contexts 
and political scenarios. In the context of modern Korea, any discussion of Just War 
needs to take account of the existence of nuclear weapons and the residual impact of 
the superpower tensions in the international arena that existed ever since the end of 
the Second World War.  Effectively two of the aspects referred to by Forrester – 
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 – have been important factors in the territorial politics in the 
peninsula for the past six decades  
 
The split in Korea that happened in 1945, which was cemented with the armistice at 
the end of the Korean War, has led to two very different societies emerging with very 
different underlying politics and moral underpinnings.  In the South, political, social 
and economic development has been informed by a combination of specific Korean 
factors, the presence of US troops (and ideology) and a range of religious influences 
including Buddhist, Confucian and Christian.  The Christian view is divided between 
a long established Catholic Church and two main groupings within the Protestant 
community.  These groupings are the conservative CCK and the more radical NCCK. 
On the other hand, the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has 
developed its own ideology, in its territory in the North, based on the Marxist-oriented 
principles learnt by its founding father and translated to suit his leadership.4  
 
In the South, according to the 2005 census
5
, some 46% of the population were 
described as having no religion (but are most likely to be Confucian in orientation), 
20% as Buddhist, 20% as Protestant and 5% as Catholic.  Since the Korean War 
there has also been a small Islamic community.   
 
The ongoing tensions and political developments in Korea since the late 1940s have 
all taken place against a background of the potential for the use of nuclear weapons.  
The appearance of nuclear arms has had an important significance not only as a 
technological development in weaponry but also in changing the concept of just what 
                                            
2
 Duncan B. Forrester warns ―There is a tendency to pay more attention to placing political theology in 
the history of ideas than relating it to its socioeconomic context. Ideology becomes the context for 
political theology rather than a tool for understanding that context.‖ Then, he suggests ―Any political 
theology has to work out its relation to current forms of political thought and ideology, learning how to 
discriminate between them, and how to use them as searchlights to illuminate social reality rather than 
as blinkers or blindfolds.‖ Duncan B. Forrester Ibid., p.152, p. 157 
3
 ―The Church provides the third part of the context for political theology. A lively Church, which 
addresses itself to the major issues on the public agenda and does not become engrossed with its own 
inner institutional concerns and interests, is likely to produce lively and interesting theology. Where the 
Church is not involved to a significant extent with the political society in which it is set, and operates 
as a kind of voluntary organization for people who happen to be interested in religion, its 
pronouncements are likely to be highly general and rather vacuous‖ Duncan B. Forrester, Ibid., p. 153 
4
 See Grace Lee, ‗The Political Philosophy of Juche,‘ Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, Spring 2003, pp 105-8 
5




it might mean to fight and win a war.  
 
Thus within the particularly Korean background of a divided peninsula which is 
ethnically and geographically a single unit, lies the issue of nuclear weapons and their 
ongoing proliferation.  This is, of course, a wider issue as well, as several powerful 
states still seek to apply nuclear strategies and develop new types of nuclear weapons 
(and presumably have plans for when they might use these new weapons) and other 
states are secretly seeking nuclear weaponry
6
 Some strategic debates around nuclear 
weapons suggest that the fear of mutual destruction prevents their use.7 Alternately 
others argue that such a mindset could prove extremely dangerous and definitely 
should be considered unethical, as pointed out by international peace groups, in 
particular, Christians and theologians.8 This is discussed in more detail in section 3 of 
Chapter 3. 
 
In this thesis I will propose that the nuclear issue has become a defining one in the 
relationship between Church and State in South Korea, and in the delineation of a 
Christian identity in Korea. However, the academic discussion on nuclear weapons in 
Korea remained low key even during the U.S. deployment of nuclear arms in the 
peninsula. In particular, most Christians in South Korea, except some progressive 
ones, were not alarmed by a potential nuclear presence until US Intelligence revealed 
in 1989 the North Korean secret nuclear project. 
 
Reason and Purpose of the Thesis 
 
One of the primary objectives of the just war advocates since the end of World War II 
                                            
6
 The Atomic Scientists Report analyses that ―nuclear weapon states have reduced the global stockpile 
to its lowest level in 45 years. In the same period (1945-2006), the number of nuclear weapon states 
has grown from three to nine. We estimate that these nine states possess about 27,000 intact nuclear 
warheads, of which 97 percent are in U.S. and Russian stockpiles.‖ 2006 Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, Vol. 62, No. 4, July/August 2006, p. 64 
Indeed, entering into the post-Cold War era, the number of countries deploying nuclear weapons or 
attempting to possess them has been increasing, as nuclear technology has been secretly delivered to 
nuclear ambitious countries. Let alone India and Pakistan, which detonated nuclear weapons in 1998, 
Israel acquired nuclear weapons during the Cold War. As well as that, a few countries such as North 
Korea and Iran have been attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Besides, many countries such as 
Japan and South Korea are reportedly known as having a capability to develop their own nuclear 
program whenever they wish to do so. 
7
 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History 
(New York ; Longman, 2000), p. 135 
8
 Cf. Walter Stein, Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience (London: Merlin Press, 1965) 
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has been an exploration of ‗just war‘ in practice. It is my intention in this thesis to 
establish through political theology the framework wherein the ethics of responsibility 
(political in nature) merges with the confessional ethics of Christians in relation to 
war and more particularly nuclear weapons. The main purpose of the thesis is to 
establish within the Korean context the means of achieving results apparently sought 
by all those politically involved in finding an acceptable solution to the Korean 
dilemma. In this, the issues of nuclear weapons and unification are now inextricably 
linked. This thesis also compares the application of varied theological postures 




This research started from the hypothesis that ‗political theology offers alternatives to 
better comprehend the different postures and approaches towards a solution.‘  This is 
applied to the prolonged development of crisis and entente cordiale within the divided 
Korea.  This gives the thesis a very practical focus, in particular it sets out the 
hypothesis that: 
 
The nuclear issue of North Korea is not a political or ideological matter, but a 
matter regarding an identity of the Christian Church
9
 in South Korea. 
 
In the light of this, a goal is to identify the Korean Church‘s current practice and 
position towards the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea and the current 
division of the peninsula. Therefore, the first role of the church in relation to this issue 
has to clarify its theological and political stance toward nuclear weapons. 
 
This central thesis can then be broken down into a number of specific themes and 
questions including:  
 
 What historical and political events have brought Christian Churches in Korea 
to their actual respective postures on reunification and national security?  To 
what extent can these modern debates be related to the different ways the 
                                            
9
 Specifically the focus is on the debate within the Protestant Community 
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Protestant Community first came into the Korean peninsula? 
 What priorities have been established in the NCCK and the CCK 10  in 
adopting their council stances towards political reunification?  How have 
they interpreted the Christian duty of Missio Dei in terms of their engagement 
with public life, and the changing politics, in South Korea?  
 What are the moral implications of just war in the contemporary war and 
security issues?  
 How much importance is attributed to national security in relation to nuclear 
weapons as a means of its attainment?  
 What are both councils‘ theological stances in relation to the nuclear issue? 
 Which is the Korean Church‘s view of the State‘s role in the nuclear issue? 
 How does the Christian Church influence State political policy? 
 
Development of the Thesis 
 
To properly address the core hypothesis and these related questions it is necessary to 
thoroughly underpin the argument with both a study of the historical Christian debate 
on Just War
11
, and also to understand the dynamics behind the emergence of the 
Protestant community in Korea up to 1950. The latter will be briefly set out as part of 
the methodology chapter, and then the Just War tradition is explored in detail in 
Chapter 2. 
 
Once these core concepts are established, the third major section of the thesis then 
looks at the varied responses of the Christian community to the division of Korea after 
1945, the emergence of the authoritarian regime in the North and the complex 
political dynamics in the South.  This debate is closely entwined with the emergence 
of the DPRK as a nuclear state by the 1980s.  In that sense any discussion about the 
                                            
10
 In this thesis, Korean Christians or Korea Church will mean Protestant Christians and churches. This 
can be justified as many Koreans would use the term Korean Church to encompass the Protestant 
viewpoint, and would call the Roman Catholic Church as Catholic Church, and second, most of the 
debate between Christians and churches related to the nuclear issue of North Korea are Protestants in 
Korea. The National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) and the Christian Council of Korea (CCK) 
are also councils for protestant churches. If the issue relates to Roman Catholic Church in Korea, I will 
describe it as the Catholic Church. 
11
 For convenience this is split into two related chapters.  The first considers the evolution of this 
concept up the twentieth century and the second considers how the mechanisation of warfare (and in 
particular the invention and use of nuclear weapons) altered the prior understanding. 
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re-integration of the Korean community (koinonia) has to engage with the issue of 
nuclear weapons and whether a necessary prior condition to unification is a nuclear 
free Korea. 
 
This discussion is based on an assumption that both Church and State adopt different 
viewpoints about the historical process and its relation to God‘s kingdom.  In 
particular, Stanley Hauerwas argues that the state is not the primary agent for God‘s 
providential care12 and thus any resolution must come from a Christian perspective. 
What this might be, and on what basis it should be articulated, forms the final section 
of this thesis. 
 
The thesis analyses the nuclear issue and differing church‘s policies in the context of 
their theological stances and their political implications. Their respective issues on the 
nuclear problem are found to be connected to their corresponding political stances and 
ideological preference; wherein the NCCK seeks a resolution of the nuclear issue 
through reconciliation and peace with the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea 
(North Korea), and the CCK seeks reunification through the collapse of the Northern 
regime.  Effectively the NCCK is arguing that the nuclear weapons issue comes first 
and the CCK that unification is the only way to resolve the nuclear weapons issue.  
My argument is that both positions are wrong as both are lacking in terms of 
underpinning Christian theology. 
 
Finally, all these strands are drawn together to explore how the Christian tradition of 
Just War can be used to explore responses and to suggest a way forward for the 
Korean Christian Community. 
 
The research methods and implications of this approach are explored in the next 
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This thesis takes the historic development of the Christian theology about Just War 
(and the related themes of Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum) to understand the current 
debates and divisions within the Korean Protestant community. 
 
To do this means carefully grounding the current dynamics in Korea in their historic 
antecedents as well as to analyse the contemporary debates within the CCK and 
NCCK as well as the dynamics, and internal logic, of the DPRK. 
 
The goal is to use this historic debate (updated to reflect the emergence of nuclear 
weapons) to analyse weaknesses in the position adopted by both major organised 
strands of the Church (CCK and NCCK).  This is an important task given the 









This thesis has a particular focus of addressing why: 
 
The nuclear issue of North Korea is not a political or ideological matter, but a 
matter regarding the identity of the Christian Church
13
 in South Korea. 
 
A practical consequence is the need to suggest a way to overcome the current division 
of Korea and to propose appropriate solutions, through examining the Korean 
Church‘s current practice and position towards the possession of nuclear weapons by 
North Korea.  To do this, there are two separate historical strands that needed to be 
explored.  The first is the development of the Christian tradition of Just War and the 
second is the development of Korean Christianity up to the end of the Second World 
War. This task is accomplished through examination and/or research of historical 
documents; corroborating evidence, the use of archival sources, interviews, and a 
survey of relevant published literature. 
 
The next step is then a careful analysis of the post-war debates between Korea‘s 
Protestant traditions, in particular in connection with re-unification and the Nuclear 
Weapons issue.  A comparative method was utilised to analyse the stances of the 
main Christian congregations, the more liberal NCCK and the more conservative 
CCK, with a reflection on the effects of their application of Christian principles in the 
scope of Korean political issues affecting reunification, nuclear armament and 
national security. 
 
This means drawing information from academic scholarship, Christian debates and 
more contemporary sources.  This has yielded considerable information for 
developments in the South but there are obvious difficulties in understanding both the 
policy debate and the political evolution within North Korea. This clearly has 
                                            
13
 Specifically the focus is on the debate within the Protestant Community 
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implications for the coverage of public opinion in the North. Most research sources 
have been derived from a bibliographical analysis of the available printed material. 
This has allowed me to set out the lines of thought of theologians who have developed 
the Just War tradition so as to present the widest possible array of arguments for, and 
against, the principal theories on war. As complementary sources, references such as 
articles, newspaper reports, essays and online search engines available through 
Internet have been employed to provide information on more contemporary debates 
and developments.  
 
Thus this thesis falls within the scope of political theology and, in turn, this becomes 
contextual theology.  
 
2. Research Issues 
 
Addressing these varied goals means thinking carefully about the type of research that 
needed to be undertaken.  As discussed above, the contemporary study of 
developments in Korea has been undertaken using comparative analysis of the various 
sources and statements of the main actors – the two countries, ROK and DPRK, and 
the two church groupings, the NCCK and the CCK. 
 
The underpinning context to this is almost 2500 years of Biblical and West European 
history that traces the precedents and development of Christian thinking in terms of 
Just War.  However, it must be clearly stated, this is not a history of warfare across 
that period and the reason for the historical element is to understand the diverse 
strands that have contributed to the development of Christian theology in this domain.  
Thus the focus falls on particular historical periods and the need is to interpret those 
events in so far as they form a backdrop to theological developments or seem to 
indicate a breakdown of previous orthodoxies.  The goal is to understand the 
Christian Just War tradition so that it can be properly applied in today‘s Korean 
context. 
 
This means concentrating on a number of ‗set-piece‘ periods that can be held to 




 Early Christian writings when Christianity was a minority (and often 
persecuted) religion mostly within the then Roman Empire; 
 The period of Augustine and Ambrose, when Christianity became the state 
religion of the Roman Empire and thus had to deal with issues of war (both 
aggressive and defensive by the state, and in the form of rebellion against the 
state) from a position of some moral responsibility for the actions of the State; 
 The early medieval (in West European terms) period exemplified by Gratian, 
with an attempt to revive and modify the earlier thinking about Just War; 
 An early modern (again in West European terms) period exemplified by 
Grotius, when warfare had become (largely) a matter of dispute between 
sovereign states and organised armies (at least when conducted in Europe); 
 A period from roughly the American and French revolutions to the end of the 
Second World War when it appeared as if both Christian and Secular models 
of Just War had collapsed; 
 A consideration of how far the development and use of nuclear weapons leads 
to significant alteration to earlier thinking. 
 
This is followed by a detailed study of post-1950 Korean politics and a review of 
some key aspects of the introduction of Christianity into Korea within the divided 
peninsula. 
 
Thus there is a need to some extent to vary the underlying research approach as the 
thesis develops.  The earlier sections (roughly up to Grotius) can be seen as reviews 
of the theological debates, located in their historical context and using historical 
events as exemplars.  In the main, this does mean that the approach is not that of 
conventional historical analysis (and some of these methods and their implications are 
discussed below).  However, the period roughly from 1770-1945 is analysed, not just 
to explore why the nature of warfare changed (blurring of boundaries between 
combatants and non-combatants, industrialisation of warfare, new ideologies with 
their concepts of nationalism, ethnicity or class as key characteristics), but also to put 
the current Korean debates into context. This is important, as one interpretation of this 
period is that it marked the loss of any meaningful distinction between combatants 




Throughout the thesis, the goal is to use concrete examples to explore the 
development of ideas or to place debates in context.  At the end this does mean 
making choices between various interpretative frameworks, acknowledging that 
―various philosophies or conceptions of the world exist, and [that] one always makes 
a choice between them.‖
14
 This is critical as the purpose of any research is to extract 
meaning from information and to use that information to support or disprove an initial 
supposition. 
 
As noted in the introduction, the basic goal of this thesis is to provide concrete 
suggestions as to how Korea might be able to resolve the current nuclear weapons 
crisis. In doing this it locates the debate not as a political or ideological matter, but a 
matter regarding an identity of the Christian Church in South Korea. Therefore, the 
first role of the church in relation to this issue is to clarify its theological and political 
stance toward nuclear weapon. This has implications for the style of argument 
adopted within the thesis – as explored below, this means taking an active mode of 
engagement rather than offering a dispassionate academic analysis.  This approach is 
firmly rooted in approaches to Christian political theology such as that developed by 
Duncan Forrester.  In particular the final chapter clearly sets out some practical steps 
that now need to be adopted by the Protestant community in the Republic of Korea 
(ROK). 
 
The Christian approach to ethics is different from secular ethics as it is based 
specifically on Christian faith and adopts its norms from Jesus Christ and the 
Christian God. As such it does not explore whether God's judgement or Jesus' 
behaviour was right or not. It basically regards them as truth.  This concept is a 
critical starting point in this thesis. 
 
Before reviewing Forrester‘s political theology, it is useful to consider other 
approaches to reading and interpreting historical events and trends. 
 
2.1.Historiography 
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 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, Q. Hoare and L. N. Smith (tr.) (London: 




A key step in historical research is first the need to establish the veracity and 
reliability of a particular source.
15
 In the case of this thesis though, the more 
important issue is how is the information to be interpreted and given meaning?
16
 
Within this, there is also a need to consider what the purpose of history and historical 
writing is. E. H. Carr in particular argues that there have been three main trends: 
 
 A model of historical writing that concentrates on the deeds and actions of 
great men, kingdoms and empires. Sometimes this is written with a moral 
purpose and in others essentially as descriptive history; 
 A model of historical writing that sees history as a sequence of events and 
trends, that can sometimes be exemplified by individuals but often based on 
class conflict and economic/technological changes; 
 An approach that relies on detailed analysis of small sections of wider events 
that in turn can challenge the wider sweep of analysis and generalisation 




These approaches offer quite different approaches to the philosophy of history. This 
can perhaps be exemplified by the various ways that the English history in the 17
th
 
Century has been handled. The earliest approach
18
 saw the century as a struggle 
between constitutional options and exemplified in the lives of the most important 
individuals such as Oliver Cromwell or Charles I. By contrast, Christopher Hill 
19
 
located the reasons for the wars (and form of settlement) as a class struggle by a rising 
bourgeoisie against the old feudal order. Implicit within this was the emergence of a 
small radical left that was suppressed in the same way that the French Jacobins later 
suppressed their radical, more proletarian, wing.
20
 The final form of historical study 
of the period has been to focus on events in small towns or amongst small groups of 
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the population. This, almost micro-level
21
 either explicitly rejects drawing larger 
scale lessons or is held to contradict the wider narrative driven conclusions. 
 
What needs to be clarified is how far these models of history can be accommodated 
within a Christian model of reading history and what implications that has for the 
style of analysis and conclusions that can be reached. 
 
2.2.Secular models of history 
 
Some secular models of historical writing tend to emphasise a narrative of events over 
exploring the underlying reasons why those events happened.  Classic examples of 
this style of writing could include Gibbon‘s History of the Roman Empire and 
MacAuley‘s Histories of Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Britain.  These present 
history almost ‗out of time‘ with no, or little, note of economic, social and political 
changes that could be driving the surface events.  One consequence of this was it 
was possible to write history that had relatively arbitrary start and end dates, so, for 
example, Gramsci complained: 
 
―… Is it possible to write a history of Italy in modern times without a treatment of the 
struggles of the Risorgimento? In other words: is it fortuitous, or is it for a tendentious motive, 
that Croce
22
 begins his narratives from 1815
23
 and 1871? That is, that he excludes the 
moment of struggle; the moment in which the conflicting forces are formed, are assembled … 




Effectively in Gramsci‘s construction, Croce‘s model of history is essentially static 
with events happening almost out of accident and certainly out of context. In terms of 
interpretation of events, this can be explored in the literary debate between Marx and 
Hegel. This was literary and one sided as Hegel was never able to respond to Marx‘s 
critiques. At the core there is more agreement between the two than some later 
Marxists (especially Engels) were willing to acknowledge but fundamentally Hegel 
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argued for a degree of stasis and for resolution of conflict that could be a refinement 
of the status quo. Thus he had a keen interest in human freedom
25
 but believed this 
could come about in any situation regardless of the underlying social and economic 
conditions–as long as the relationship was duly legislated. Marx took a more dynamic 
view and suggested that both the extent and limits to freedom were economically 





Typical of this style of historical analysis, Marxist historian, Eric Hobsbawn 
developed a model of European history since the French Revolution based on two 
long time spans.  The first, he calls the ‗Long Nineteenth Century
27
‘ and runs from 
the outbreak of the French Revolution (1789) to the outbreak of the Russian 
Revolution in 1917.  The second, a ‗Short Twentieth Century
28
‘ spans the period 
from the Russian Revolution to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.  What he argues 
by using these dates is that the first period (in a European context) was dominated by 
the forces unleashed by the French Revolution and the second by the existence of the 
Soviet Union.  Following these blocks is more important in his model of history than 
any arbitrary dates. 
 
Thus, to Hobsbawn, as to Gramsci, historical narrative should explore the reasons for, 
and consequences of, key events.  Hobsbawn argues that the history of nineteenth 
century Europe was fundamentally coloured by the French Revolution.  This, he 
believed, was a different form of bourgeois revolution to the earlier events in Britain 
and Netherlands and even the more recent American example.  It hinted at a much 
more radical restructuring of society, with elements that were adopted by both 
socialist and liberal traditions.  The early part of the nineteenth century was, he 
argued, a reaction of the existing regimes against these possibilities, encapsulated in 
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the Congress of Vienna which sought to re-instate conventional monarchies across 
Europe.  This process of containment was shattered in the revolutionary wave of 
1848 and those events solidified the existence of a more socialist, proletarian option.  
This also opened the door to nationalist movements in Germany, Italy and Poland 
(amongst other European communities) and this nationalism had, at various times, 
both a reactionary and progressive element. The rest of the nineteenth century up to 
the Russian Revolution then revolved around the consequences of the separation of 
socialism from liberalism and the new forms of nationalism. 
 
So in terms of historical interpretation, very roughly, the secular models can be 
divided into three.  One tends to stress a narrative of events (and as such places no 
particular emphasis on start or end dates).  A second tends to stress a dynamic series 
of events with the reasons variously located in economic, political or social 
underpinnings.  The third tends to reject both these ‗narrative‘ models and instead 
emphasise detailed exploration of specific periods or places so as to improve 
understanding of what happened at a particular time.  Some of these debates re-occur 
within the Christian tradition of understanding history but, importantly, that also 
places stress on the role of Christ at the core of any events. 
 
2.3.Christian Methods of Interpretation 
 
An alternative approach to the interpretation of historical events and debates is 
provided by Paul Tillich who explored the intersection between historical narrative 
and Christian modes of thought to identify what he describes as ‗Christology‘.  
Fundamentally he disagrees with the Gramscian model of reading history and the 
modernist approach of separating subject
29
 (ie how things are described – and thus a 
product of social construction) from the object being described (which is real, if 
clouded by language).
30
 Instead Tillich argues that: 
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―any such separation of the objective existence of history and a subjective judgment about it, 
is thoroughly to be repudiated. History is established or destroyed with the decision for or 
against its reality as a meaningful process. But—this must be said at the same time, and with 
equal emphasis—this establishment or destruction is not arbitrary. It is itself something 
historical. The decision for or against meaningful history is itself historical fate bound to 




Effectively at certain key stages history can be said to ‗reveals its meaning‘ and it is 
from these key points that blocks of history take on a structure and meaning. This is 
particular important in the earlier chapters of this thesis where particular time frames 
and events are covered in detail, precisely as they reveal key changes in the 
development of Just War theology.  Tillich argues that those who deny this can 
happen also deny the ‗possibility of a universal history‘. In developing this argument 
he concludes: 
 
―Now, this is the claim which in Christianity is expressed in the idea of Christ; and the 
problem implied in this claim in Christian theology is treated as the Christological problem. 
For Christian thoughts Christ is the center of history in which beginning and end, meaning and 




Tillich goes on to note that human freedom to derive multiple interpretations of 
historical events needs to be done carefully through Christian faith or: 
 
―It is a necessary implication of freedom that it can become actual only in the decision 
between good and evil. If freedom were the realization of meaning in a necessary process, it 
would not be actual freedom, and it would not create history. It would create perhaps a 
dialectic process in which, as in Hegel, logical necessity overrules human freedom entirely. In 




Furthermore Hegelian dialectical reasoning is guilty of: 
 
―interpreting history does not face the seriousness and concreteness of man‘s situation in 
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history; it does not face the real threat which is to be conquered in a concrete struggle in 
history and not by an abstract system conceived on a point above history. The decision, 
whether history has a meaningful direction, is to be made in history itself. History has 
meaning only insofar as the threat of meaninglessness is overcome in concrete decision. Since, 
however, no one knows the outcome of these decisions they imply an element of belief, of 




Overall in his reading of the historical process (and he does not deny the obvious – 
that this is done in a variety of ways from different world views) is that only a 
specifically Christian approach can yield a correct interpretation and ―Christology 
becomes the possible answer to the basic question implied in history, an answer, of 





Duncan Forrester shared some of these concerns but sought specifically to develop a 
political theology, so as to explain what this constitutes and how it allows one to 
interpret historical events.  He argues that ―political theology is contextual 
theology‖
36 
and in consequence relates traditional Christian belief to a given modern 
situation. Through this, an active question (that informs this thesis) is ―how the 
Church understands its social and political role. How is it related to the society, and in 
particular to the structures of power?‖
37
 An important role for political theology is to 
engage with difficult issues and not to avoid problems that question existing power 
structures. 
 
This approach can be aided by what Forrester calls Prophetic Theology. The Kairos 
Document expounds the roles of Prophetic Theology as follows: 
 
―It will denounce sin and announce salvation. But to be prophetic our theology must name the 
sins and the evils that surround us and the salvation that we are hoping for. Prophecy must 
name the sins of apartheid, injustice, oppression and tyranny in South Africa today as ‗an 
offence against God‘ and the measures which must be taken to overcome these sins and the 
suffering that they cause. On the other hand prophecy will announce the hopeful good news of 
future liberation, justice and peace, as God‘s will and promise, naming the ways of bringing 






 Duncan B. Forrester, Theology and Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 150 
37
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From this it is clear that there is a need to combine social analysis with insights from 
the Biblical texts. However, such analysis cannot just be a simple neutral set of 
insights, it must embed within itself God‘s ultimate message of salvation that means 
that liberation will come through Jesus Christ‘s teachings. 
 
3. Outline of the Korean Community: Development of the Protestant 
Christian Community in Korea 
 
Given each time Jesus Christ‘s message becomes embedded in a new context it will 
evolve rather differently, it is necessary here to pause, to explain the Korean Christian 
background and thus enable the reader to share one of the essential building-blocks of 
the thesis. Indeed many of the contemporary positions taken up by both the NCCK 
and the CCK can only be properly understood in terms of the historic development of 
Protestantism in Korea. One key ‗research tool‘ is a basic grasp of the development of 
Christianity, and specifically of Protestantism, in the Korean Peninsula. 
 
Korea was part of a wider Chinese Empire from the 1300s, nonetheless there was very 
little population exchange.  In part, regional geography played an important role in 
separating Korean, Manchurian and Chinese population groupings.  By the time of 
the establishment of the Chosun Dynasty
39
 the Amrok (Yalu in Chinese) River 
functionally separated Korea from Manchuria, a component of the Chinese Empire. 
As it happens, that region—subject to Arctic winters and not all that generous in 
responding to agricultural efforts, under the best of circumstances—had a very low 
population density. These conditions likewise contributed, at least to some extent, to 
the maintenance of Korean independence. Plainly stated, there was no significant  
population movement from Manchuria into the Korean peninsula.
40
 In any event, 
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long before the introduction of Christianity, the Korean people understood, in a rather 
inchoate fashion, that the peninsula was properly theirs and that collectively, they 
were the sole legitimate agents of governance.  This feeling of the whole peninsular 
being a unified state is an important issue underpinning the current tensions between 
the South and the DPRK. 
 
The Twentieth Century was a turbulent time for Korea seeing Japanese domination 
from 1905 to 1945, division into two parts along the demarcation line between Soviet 
and American troops, war and authoritarian governments in both parts of the 
peninsular.  Since the 1950s there has also been the threat of the use of nuclear 
weapons in any future conflict between the DPRK and the USA and/or Republic of 
Korea.  This context means that much of the development of the Protestant 
community has been under conditions of foreign occupation, actual armed conflict or 
the threat of armed conflict.   
 
The Republic of Korea (South Korea, or ROK) has an estimated population of 49 
million,
41
 of which about 26 percent are identified as belonging to Christian 
denominations. A comparable percentage of the population is self-identified as 
Buddhist. According to the Pew Forum, a non-denominational research organization, 
approximately three quarters of Korea‘s Christians belong to a Protestant 
denomination. The remaining quarter professes Roman Catholicism.
42
 As such, the 
Protestant community is one of the largest religious groupings in the country (and 
represents around 80% of all Christians) but are a minority overall in South Korea. 
 
However, the situation in the North is more complex due to the persecution of 
religious beliefs but it is estimated that there are about 135,000 confessing Christians 
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and 1,000 underground churches
43





3.1.Catholicism in Korea  
 
Christianity—understood in terms of organized church bodies, first appeared in Korea 
among the yangban elite at the end of the Eighteenth Century in 1784. This 
introduction of Catholicism came from Korean contact with the Chinese Court45, a 
mode of transmission which limited its influence to the Korean governing elite who 




Nonetheless, Kim Young-gwan argues that yangban adherents undertook a modest 
translation effort to facilitate popular understanding of Christian sacred scripture. 
―Confucian scholars who converted to translated the English and Chinese Bible in 
Hangul and published some important Christian literature in Korean for the common 
people.‖ [‗The Confucian-Christian Context in Korean Christianity, p. 70] However, 
as a practical matter, the great majority of eighteenth century Koreans were illiterate, 
which, at least in the short term, obviated, or at least limited, any benefits that might 
have flowed from such initiatives. However, readily available printed materials are—
in and of themselves—encouragements to popular literacy, as the experience in 
Europe after the introduction of moveable metal type to the printing process in 1453 
amply demonstrates. Thus the existence of the printed texts allowed the yangban 
‗outreach‘ program managed to attract significant numbers of ordinary Koreans due to 
the ‗magnetic‘ quality of the printed word—ordinary people could use the texts as a 
vehicle for literacy, albeit on a very small scale. Of course any broad-based initiative 
would have likely presupposed some organized effort at basic literacy education, 
perhaps an undertaking that Catholic missionaries of the period considered beyond the 
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capabilities of their limited resources. In any event, such an educative approach 
awaited the arrival of Protestant missionaries. 
 
By the start of the nineteenth century, Christianity had become aligned with reform 
and, thus, opposition to the Confucian orthodoxy
47
, at least in the eyes of the Chosun 
dynasty.   
 




The introduction of the Protestant religion followed some of the dynamics connected 
with that of Catholicism.  It came from outside Korea (in this case mainly via 
American missionary societies and Korean merchants who had contacts outside 
Korea).  The early years of a development after 1884 were also the early years of a 
new form of foreign domination – in this case by Japan.  This meant that the early 
community became identified with the growth of Korean nationalism and resistance 
to Japanese imperialism.  A critical difference though was the extent that the early 
Protestant communities sought to reach out to a wider section of society than a portion 
of the narrow educated elite.  
 
Most Korean Christians at the time were introduced to a faith based on Christian 
Biblical fundamentalism as a result of the work of western missionaries. The 
missionary methods and policies of the foreign missionaries were mainly focused on 
church growth.
49
  Unlike their Catholic counterparts (which remained 
organizationally subordinate to the Vatican), Protestant churches adopted a self-
governing program in the 1890s —popularly called the ‗Nevius Method,‘
50
 after 
missionary John L. Nevius—which ―emphasized self-support, self-propagation, self-
government and independence of the church.‖
51
 The Nevius model meant that 
missionaries worked directly with the ‗Minjung‘—the Korean hoi polloi—rather than 
through the mediation of the yangban.  
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As a result, Protestant churches learnt democratic practice and autonomy. However, 
according to Clark, ―The process took more than a generation, but by the late 1930s, 
the major Protestant denominations were self-governing, the Presbyterians with their 




3.3.Construction of a Korean Protestant Identity 
 
In the beginning, all of the Protestant denominations placed emphasis on the provision 
of modern healthcare and educational opportunity in part due to religious belief and in 
part because early missionaries were allowed in specifically as teachers and doctors.  
 
As it happened, it was the availability of western medicine was instrumental in a 
lessening of official hostility toward Christian missionary efforts.  
 
―When [in December 1884] Min Yong-ik, nephew of the queen, was stabbed by an assassin 
and was lying at the point of death with several severed arteries and seven sword wounds on 
his head and body, [Presbyterian medical missionary Dr. Harold N.] Allen succeeded in 
bringing the prince [Min Young-ik] back to health… The reward was gratifying. Though the 





Overall, establishing opportunities for education across the entire social spectrum 
took on a greater urgency for Protestant missionaries, at least in part attributable to the 
religious emphasis on personal interpretation of Sacred Scriptures (for which literacy 
is obviously a precondition). Pre-existing social mores indirectly supported these 
efforts. Learning was popularly admired, even among those to whom it was largely 
alien. ―The emphasis which the missionaries placed on education resonated with the 
Confucian value of education as an end in itself.‖
54
 The contribution to education 
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As with Catholicism, the Protestant tradition was influenced by the dominant 
Confucian cultural mindset.  In some instances this was antagonistic, with 
Christianity described as foreign and disruptive by the regime (both Chosun and 
Japanese).  As Julia Ching claims,  
 
―Confucianism as a dynamic discovery of the worth of the human person, of the possibility of 
moral greatness and even sagehood, of one‘s fundamental relationship to others in a society 
based on ethical values, of an interpretation of reality and a metaphysics of the self that remain 
open to the transcendental—all this, of course, the basis for a true sense of human dignity, 




In relation to Ching‘s argument, Professor of Christian ethics, Hyun Young-hak, asks 
a series of perhaps rhetorical questions relating to the Korean people. ―Has God been 
working in our history? If not, what does God have to do with us? If yes, was God 
working only in the history of the rulers? … As Christians we have to start with the 




3.4.Resistance to Foreign Domination and the growth of Protestantism  
 
The early development of the Protestant Church in Korea was also the period of 
growing Japanese domination over the peninsula.  Japanese incursions had started in 
1875
58
 and culminated in September 1905, when the Treaty of Portsmouth
59
 was 
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enacted. Russia agreed to recognize Korea as solely within the Japanese sphere of 
influence and to withdraw remaining troops from Manchuria. The interests of the 
Korean government and people received scant attention at these proceedings. Indeed, 
only a few weeks after enactment of the Portsmouth Treaty, Japanese occupation 
forces in Korea forced the Seoul government to acquiesce to the Treaty of Eulsa 
(November 1905), formally reducing Korea to the status of a Japanese protectorate, 
thereby ending Korea‘s capacity to function as an independent actor on the world 
scene.
60
  The final stage was the 1910 Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty
61
 that ended 
all aspects of Korean independence. 
 
For all Koreans—irrespective of their religious inclinations—these developments 
were all at once shameful and despicable. However, among Korean groups, Christians 
were well placed—both in terms of education and social organization—to resist the 
excesses of the Japanese occupation. As Clark expounds, ―By 1910, when the 
Japanese took over, there existed a network of Christian schools and academies that 
functioned, usually under Korean Christian leadership, as an alternative to the nascent 
colonial system. As Japan started building elementary schools in Korea, many Korean 
Christians opted to stay with their church-related academies.‖
62
   
 
During the occupation period, the Japanese government instituted a number of 
policies intended to both undermine Christian influence and Korean culture, both of 
which were viewed as obstacles to unimpeded control of the nation. Korea‘s resident 
Japanese authorities saw Christian schools as underpinning Korean nationalism, and 
there was a major effort to undermine their influence. A 1908 edict established 
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Japanese as the language of instruction in public schools, a blatant effort at 
undermining Korean cultural identity. This edict was amended in 1915 to include 
mission schools, with the added proviso that teachers in such schools were required to 
have ‗proper qualifications,‘ and such schools were forbidden to teach religious 




The overall Japanese efforts had mixed results. Various acts of repression had the 
consequence ―to associate Christianity in the minds of the ordinary Korean with 
Korean nationalism.‖
64
  Thus during the March First Movement of 1919 that found 
much of its impetus in the nation‘s Presbyterian and Methodist Churches. As first this 
appears paradoxical as, according to Kim Yong-bok,  
 
―The basic divergence of historical perception between Korean Christians and missionaries 
emerged in their respective attitudes toward the rule of Japan. Korean Christians, like their 
fellow countrymen, never accepted the legitimacy of the Japanese rule, whereas missionaries 





In the 1930‘s, the colonial power devised a plan to spiritually integrate Koreans into 
the faith of the Japanese. The authorities forced all Koreans to worship at Shinto
66
 
shrines. The Japanese authority tried to persuade Korean Christians that ―the worship 
was not religious act, but patriotic‖
67
 Keum Joo-seop claims, ―The patriotic 
conception of Shintoism in Korea was invented for the Japanese policy which was 
primarily a strategy for unifying Korea and Japan.‖
68
 Grayson argues that this Shinto 
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 was a great challenge to Korean Christians as a problem of not only faith but 
also national identity.  
 
Grayson observed that it is ―an interesting historical fact that a recently missionized, 
clearly foreign religion had accommodated itself so quickly to Korea that it became 
the standard bearer of Korean nationalism in little more than a generation.‖
70
 In any 
event, participation in the State Shinto rites raised issues of conscience paralleling 
those of fourth century Christians under obligation to burn incense at altars dedicated 




This gave the early Protestant Church a clear identity with the concept of Korean 
nationalism and resistance to foreign control.  As Grayson notes, they were able to 
demonstrate how aspects of faith and biblical scholarship
72
 gave logic to their 
resistance.  Unfortunately Japanese rule ended not with national liberation and 
unification but with the Allied Powers dividing Korea along the Thirty-eighth Parallel 
and instituting separate regimes in their respective occupation zones. The United 
States assumed control south of the parallel while the Soviet Union controlled the 
north. The Allies‘ disagreement over the future of Korea resulted in the establishment 
of two states with different political ideologies and economic systems in 1948: 
communism in the North and capitalism in the South.  
 
3.5. Implications for Korean Protestantism 
 
One of the early strengths of the Korean Protestant Community was their clear 
identification with the traditions of Korean nationalism.  As such, they grounded 
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their resistance to the Japanese in areas such as education, preservation of health 
services and in connection with the forced imposition of Shinto rites. Korean 
nationalism initially probably took the form of a loose understanding of being a single 
people who occupied a particular geographic unit.  Chinese rule, directly, had 
probably only impacted on the educated elite, for most of the poor it was not a 
practical reality.  Good or bad governance, arbitrary justice, seizure of crops in times 
of famine, were all acts by the local Korean aristocracy.  The Japanese period 
probably triggered a shift in attitude from people seeing themselves as Korean to an 
active articulation of a Korean identity in opposition to a directly felt imperial power.  
The Christian community was able to reflect this in their use of biblical analogies 
such as the sufferings of the Isrealites in Egypt. 
 
The early stages of the development of Christianity in Korea saw the adoption of 
Catholicism by parts of an elite that was comfortable with a basically Confucian 
world view, Christianity being identified with reform, social justice and the desire to 
modernise Korea. 
 
The Protestant community took much of this tradition and then developed in different 
ways.  First it directly sought to engage with the mass of Koreans and did this by 
translation of holy texts, evangelism and also a strong commitment to social justice, 
health care and education.  The introduction of the Protestant churches was also the 
period when Korea shifted from the benign and somewhat distant control of the 
Chinese Empire to more direct Japanese rule.  A consequence was a clear and early 
identification of the Protestant community with core Korean values in resistance to 
the cultural imperialism of the invader.  In the main, this resistance was passive and 
an important analogy was the suffering of the people of Israel in their Babylonian 
captivity and in Egypt.  There was little discussion of the practicalities of armed 
resistance and this meant the church did not frame its defence of Korean identity in 
the Christian Just War tradition.  Instead, as occurred after the end of the Korean war, 







The research goal of this thesis (to practically engage in the debates and options 
facing South Korea‘s Christian organisations in terms of the possession of nuclear 
weapons by the DPRK and around unification in general) and the decision to base it 
fundamentally on a Christian approach to reading information and interpreting 
implications has a considerable impact on the structure of the thesis. The key research 
tool is to question whether a given view or action does indeed fit ‗norms from Jesus 
Christ and the Christian God‘. As such the historical narrative is presented as a series 
of events used to explore the gradual development of Christian views on just war and 
also in particular in terms of the post-war situation in Korea. 
 
This short chapter has explored various ways in which the historical record and 
contemporary events can be explored and synthesised. Both Tillich and Forester offer 
specifically Christian ways of doing this that are at variance with the various secular 
models explored earlier. Essentially from Tillich comes the insight that centring 
history on a Christian interpretation will lead to a correct reasoning. Forrester is 
interesting in that not only does his political theology offer a tool for reasoning and 
understanding but he also explicitly sees such analysis as part of an active 
engagement. It is not a tool for abstract non involved analysis. 
 
As such, it is an important tool used throughout this thesis and that also informs the 
particular style of argument building that is used. It also underpins the thesis goal of 
offering direct commentary and advice as opposed to limiting it to explanation and 

















Part II: Just War Theory: Establishing a Moral Framework 
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Chapter 2:  The Just War Tradition in the Pre-Modern Era 
 
1. Initial Considerations 
 
The use of military force implies a host of moral considerations. Traditionally, these 
have been classified under two general categories—jus ad bellum (‗justice to war,‘ 
criteria that must be consulted and considered in evaluating the moral justification of 
resorting to war) and jus in bello (‗justice in war,‘ activities that must be avoided and 
desiderata that must remain privileged during actual conflict). These two categories, 
in turn, fall within the general rubric of ‗just war theory.‘ 
 
It should be made clear at the outset that the development of any just war theory 
tacitly presupposes some basic assumptions. As Kenneth Kemp argues, ―waging war 
is either susceptible to moral appraisal or not. If it is susceptible to moral appraisal, it 
must either always be wrong (‗pacifism‘) or sometimes be permissible. If it is 
sometimes permissible, then it must either be evaluated by the tenets of the just-war 
theory or some other theory.‖
73
 In sum, the development of just war theory—and 
reliance on tenets derived from such theory—cannot be justified from two points of 
view: absolute pacifists and moral nihilists. According to Kemp, ―Moral nihilism with 
respect to war … challenges the very possibility of applying moral predicates to acts 
of or within war. It is captured in the Latin proverbial locution, inter arma [enim] 




Kemp takes Karl von Clausewitz‘s view on the ‗nature of war‘ as an example of moral 
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Clausewitz likewise dismissed the notion of jus in bello. ―We can never introduce a 
modifying principle into the philosophy of war without committing an absurdity.‖
76
 
Even so, one Christian theologian (and just war theory advocate), George Weigel, 
argues that Clausewitz—perhaps unintentionally—put himself within the confines of 
just war tradition.  
 
―Just war tradition is best understood as a sustained and disciplined intellectual attempt to 
relate the morally legitimate use of proportional and discriminate military force to morally 
worthy political ends. In this sense, the just war tradition shares Clausewitz‘ view of the 
relationship between war and politics: unless war is an extension of politics, it is simply 
wickedness… [On] this crucial point, at least, Clausewitz was articulating a thoroughly classic 




The catastrophic effect of nuclear weapons—that provoked horrified reactions of 
individuals wedded to ‗just war‘ principles immediately after their first use in August 
1945
78
—and their development, stockpiling, and prospective use in combat means 
they have become a particular matter for consideration by Christian moralists. The 
fact that such weapons are considered ‗new,‘ in the sense that they were invented after 
the lengthy historical debate that developed just war theory, is beside the point. It is 
not enough to simply postulate at the outset that nuclear weapons should be forbidden 
simply because they are inordinately destructive. Any consideration of moral 
implications of such weapons use for Christian believers and practitioners must 
engage with trends in moral philosophy—some extending back millennia, others 
considerably more recent—that are applicable to the matter at hand. These include the 
aforementioned just war theory, interpretation of sacred scripture, and the application 
of religious precepts in troubled circumstances. 
 
The moral theologians, who gave substance to the ideas relating to the use of nuclear 
armaments, that characterised the post-war debate in the Korean Church (discussed in 
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chapter 5), never thought in such sui generis terms. Rather, like their counterparts 
throughout the Christian world, they relied on supporting antecedents, albeit perhaps 
with shifting emphases and in some instances, arriving at different conclusions. In 
order to appreciate the contributions of these recent developments, it is first necessary 
to review the historical background that provides a substratum for their thought.  
This historical review can be conveniently split into three parts, and each has a 
slightly different focus: 
 
 The first looks at the Biblical and Pagan debates on ‗Just War‘; 
 The second, very briefly, reviews the early Christian teaching on Just War 
before Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, and then 
how this altered once Christianity became the state religion.  This period is 
especially important for the writings of Hippo and Augustine; 
 The third covers a long period from the fall of the Roman Empire (in the West 
at least) to Grotius and looks at the development of the Just War tradition in an 
era when Christianity was the claimed state religion of every major European 
state.  Here, the focus is on particular theological debates, and draws in 
specific historic events either as context or as examples.  This covers the 
period up the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War. 
 
The next chapter then considers the development of the Just War tradition in the 
modern era, roughly from the American and French Revolutions to the end of the 
Second World War.  Whilst again, specific events are explored as examples the goal 
is to understand why key elements of both secular and Christian traditions of Just War 
broke down in this period. Chapter 3 then concludes with the attempts to reconstruct a 
Christian Just War tradition and, in particular, the impact of the potential use of 
nuclear weapons on this. 
 
2. Just War Theology: Pagan, Early Christian and Late Roman 
Developments 
 





―Christian just war thinking is a fairly continuous tradition of disciplined reflection on the use 
of violence, coercion and force in the resolution of conflicts. Its foundation is a recognition 
that the use of violence is deeply problematic, and for many Christian thinkers inherently 




However, from the secularist point of view, David Ahrens, a retired military officer 
and historian, states that ―Just war, the Western tradition of war, much like its people, 
is a product of a diverse cultural backdrop. While strong religious roots can be 
identified, it is not purely or uniquely a religious phenomenon. It cannot be reduced to 
a single source or interest of a particular class or institution or even to a particular 
time frame.‖
80
 Nonetheless, the just war tradition was developed systematically by 
Augustine on Hippo for the first time and was then considerably advanced by the 
thirteenth century Dominican theologian Thomas Aquinas even though there had been 
some considerations on just war in earlier periods. In this sense, ―Aquinas‘ conception 
of just war was the reference point for later theorists at the beginning of the modern 
era, including both Catholic theorists such as Vitoria, Molina, Soto, and Suarez, and 
Protestants such as Luther, Ames, and Grotius. Understanding Aquinas‘ conception of 




Aquinas establishes three essentials:  
 
―First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is waged (for it is not the 
business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights 
from the tribunal of his superior) … Second, a just cause is required, namely that those who 
are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on some account or fault… [and] 
Third, it is necessary that the belligerents should have rightful intention, so that they intend the 




According to Johnson, ―the roots of this distinction [between public and private 
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initiatives to war] lie in Augustine‘s thought: the service of private ends by private 
persons manifests cupiditas—wrongly directed, self-centred love or motivation—
while efforts by those at the head of communities to serve the good of those 
communities show the effect of a concern for justice informed by caritas, rightly 
directed love.‖
83
 It likewise reflects the traditional Roman understanding of ‗just 
war‘. In his De Officiis, Cicero observes, ―it may be understood that no war is just 
unless after a formal demand of satisfaction for injury, or after an express declaration 




In light of these considerations, ‗just war‘ theory may be construed as establishing a 
‗least objectionable‘ middle ground in ―the theoretical spectrum between the extreme 
pacifist position that eschews from all war on moral grounds and the extreme military 
realist position that rejects any role of morality in war, allowing that ‗anything goes‘ 
in order to end a war as quickly as possible. The basic concept of right and wrong in 
waging war can be traced back to antiquity, but the secular formulation of the Just 
War tradition, as it grew from its roots in the Church, is commonly traced through 





2.1. Classical Antecedents 
 
Both jus ad bellum and its associate, jus in bello, have an ancient lineage, although for 
the latter this was somewhat muted. In his Politics, Aristotle argues that nations 
should ―wage war for the sake of peace,‖
86
 in the sense that the proper purpose of 
engaging in warfare is public (restoring or assuring the continuance of reasonably 
undisturbed civil existence) rather than private (individual aggrandizement).
87
 In his 
De Officiis (On Obligations), Marcus Tullius Cicero compares a nation‘s resort to war 
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with an individual‘s efforts at dispute resolution.  
 
―In the case of a state in its external relations, the rights of war must be strictly observed. For 
since there are two ways of settling a dispute: first, by discussion; second; by physical force; 
and since the former is characteristic of man, the latter of the brute, we must resort to force 
only in case we may not avail ourselves of discussion. The only excuse, therefore, for going to 
war is that we may live in peace unharmed; and when the victory is won, we should spare 




However, Cicero was considerably less forthright regarding appropriate conduct 
during time of war. He famously observed, Inter arma enim leges silent—‗in time of 
war, the law falls silent.‘ However, this statement needs to be placed in the context of 
the Roman civil wars at the time and it was delivered as part of an exhortation to the 
jury trying Cicero‘s client, Titus Attius Milo, on a charge of murder. During the course 
of his address to the jury, Cicero argued that the death of the victim—Publius Clodius 
Pulcher, a notorious rabble-rouser and political troublemaker—occurred in the context 
of what amounted to civil war. Thus, it may be concluded that his observation ‗in time 
of war the law falls silent‘ was more a courtroom ploy than a philosophical 
observation. In light of this, it is perhaps preferable to give greater weight to Cicero‘s 




Perhaps closer to generally accepted thinking on the matter in Cicero‘s day were the 
words of his near contemporary, Dio Chrystostom of Prusa (AD 40-112), Greek 
historian and orator, subsequently quoted approvingly by Hugo Grotius. Dio 
Prusaeensis states clearly ―between enemies no notice is to be taken of written, that is, 
civil laws, but notice must be taken of the unwritten laws which nature dictates, or the 




In any event, Cicero certainly thought that there should be a concept of appropriate 
behaviour toward the enemy, although it appears to have functioned more at the 
fringes of conflict rather than in its overall conduct. For example, in De Officiis 
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Cicero cites ―a letter of the elder Marcus Cato to his son Marcus, in which he writes 
that he has heard that the youth has been discharged by the consul, when he was 
serving in Macedonia in the war with Perseus. Therefore, he warns him to be careful 
not to go into battle; for, he says, the man who is not legally a soldier has no right to 
be fighting the foe.‖
91
 While this may be construed as no more than a prudential 
observation, it may well be inferred that the father was implying that any military act 
by his son (officially a civilian) would put him in the general category of Cicero‘s 
‗brutes,‘ rather than that of an honourable man. Likewise, the ancient Romans 
sometimes took a dim view of treachery, even when the target was a national enemy.  
 
―Our forefathers have given us another striking example of justice toward an enemy: when a 
deserter from Pyrrhus promised the Senate to administer poison to the king and thus work his 
death, the Senate and Gaius Fabricius delivered the deserter up to Pyrrhus. Thus they stamped 
with their disapproval the treacherous murder even of an enemy who was at once powerful, 




Arguably, the decision of the Roman Senate and the consul reflected a perhaps tacit 
appreciation of the distinction between personal cupiditas (to employ Augustine‘s 
locution) and rightful state action.  
 
2.2. Biblical Sources  
 
The Holy Bible dramatises war scenes in the Old Testament in apparent contradiction 
to Christ‘s preaching in the New Testament, thus different justifications for different 
stances on war can be found depending on which Testament is being referred to. 
 
According to Yoder,  
 
―A generation ago Roland Bainton began fine-tuning the typology of just war by separating 
the Christian ‗holy war‘ model he developed to describe Crusades from the concept of ‗just 
war‘ properly so called (and sometimes referred to in this article as ‗JW‘).  Bainton was 
criticized for this effort by those who thought he was making a claim about medieval 
vocabulary or language usage. For instance, LeRoy Walters and others have objected that this 
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‗holy‘/‗just‘ distinction is not clearly present in the medieval sources. Historically, of course, 
these critics are correct: Bainton intended a precise formal distinction based upon differences 
in moral logic, not rooted in common usage at the time. Indeed, from Ambrose and Augustine 
through Gratian and Aquinas to Vitoria, word usage of the day did not yet separate out models 
for understanding wars. When it was believed that the sovereign God demanded by revelation 
that the Amalekites be massacred for having offended God, that counted for Augustine as one 
kind of ‗just cause.‘ When an ‗attack is to be warded off‘ or an ‗injury is to be redressed,‘ that 
was another kind of ‗just cause.‘ Thus, as Walters correctly argues as a historian, the medieval 
thinker used the same vocabulary for both types of war‖
93  
 
In order to better comprehend warfare descriptions and Christian preaching derived 
from the Sacred Scriptures, each part, Old and New Testament, should be separately 
examined.  
 
2.2.1 Old Testament 
 
The Old Testament contains numerous descriptions of warfare, including 
justifications—both human and divine—for engaging in it. And while the ideal of 
universal peace was, from time to time, expressed
94
, any support for pacifism is 
absent from the text.
95
 The Old Testament scriptures describe essentially three types 
of war. The first was a type of holy war commanded by God and one in which he was 
directly involved. A second type of war was a defensive war involving some 
mitigation of destruction and one in which all males participated, with the exception 
of those possessing outstanding religious duties. A third type was an optional 
offensive war conducted at the discretion of the king and one in which participation 
was excused for a greater range of other obligations. The two latter classifications of 
warfare were somewhat different from those held elsewhere, both in ancient days and 
today, and show evidence of respect for non-combatants and for requisite 
proportionality. For example, when the Israelite general Gideon captured Zebah and 
Zalmunna (the two Midianite kings who had murdered Gideon‘s brothers at Tabor), he 
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‗Holy war‘ is perhaps anomalous, in that—being divinely inspired (and even divinely 
directed)—such a kind of warfare cannot serve as a guide to wars waged in human 
interest. Indeed, according to German theologian Gerhard von Rad, war fought at 
God‘s command effectively constitutes war waged by God Himself.
97
 In effect, under 
such conditions, divine sanction has not only muted traditional moral arguments 
against certain behaviour but has also deliberately put them in abeyance. This 
certainly appears to have been the case in the encompassing destruction that followed 
the Israelite seizure of Jericho, most notably the slaughter of the city‘s inhabitants.
98
 
It may be surmised that the divine purpose was to assure continued religious purity of 
Israelites as they shifted from a desert-bound nomadic lifestyle to that of settled 
agriculturists in the Promised Land (where the temptations of prevailing pagan 
religious practice would always be before them).
99
 Thus, Jericho‘s hapless inhabitants 
were put to the sword and some of the city‘s material wealth (‗silver and gold‘) 




It is interesting to observe that even at that time what would become a generally 
accepted ‗law of war‘ many centuries later already appeared to be in use. Those 
Canaanite assets seized by Joshua‘s troops were deemed to have been taken 
legitimately because they were to be put to use for a public purpose. The individual 
soldier who appropriated such valuables for his own use faced dire punishment along 
with his family, as the fate of Achan indicates.
101
 And concerning the massacre of 
Jericho‘s defeated population, there seems to be a tacit mitigating factor at work. 
Rahab (‗the harlot‘), a Jericho resident who provided logistic assistance to Joshua‘s 
                                            
96
 Judges 8:18 
97
 James T. Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 34 
98
 Joshua 6:21 
99
 According to Dr. Ralph F. Wilson, ―If the temptation in the wilderness was unbelief, the temptation 
in the Promised Land was syncretism, ‗reconciliation or fusion of differing systems of belief‘… There 
was always the danger that worship of the true God would fuse with the worship of Baal and the gods 
of Canaan. In order to prevent this specific occurrence, God commanded the Israelites to utterly destroy 
the peoples of the land.‖ See Ralph F. Wilson, ‗Why the Slaughter of Jericho? Devoted to Destruction – 
Herem‘ 




 Joshua 7 
48 
 
agents before the city was taken, was spared from the sword and even rewarded with a 
plot of land.
102
 Neil Summerton interprets this as follows: ―the distinction between 
Rahab and the rest of the Canaanites was that she was prepared to submit to Yahweh, 




The behaviour of the victorious Israelites at captured Jericho, irrespective of its divine 
approbation, has parallels with the Crusaders‘ treatment of Jerusalem‘s civilians after 
that city was taken. For the Crusaders, the Middle East appears to have had the 
character of a moral ‗no man‘s land. Whatever constraints on officially sanctioned 
armed violence that might have been at work in a European context, these were held 
to have had no validity against the ‗Muslim in the Holy Land‘. The Crusaders‘ 
mission was claimed to be ‗holy,‘ perhaps, in some sense, comparable to that of 
Joshua at Jericho. At least inferentially, Jerusalem‘s civilian inhabitants were destined 
to fulfil the same ghastly role of Joshua‘s Canaanite victims. Indeed Islamic historians 
remark on the shock of the entry of the crusaders and the extent to which the norms of 
war between Islamic states and with the Byzantine Empire had been set aside.
104
 In 
particular regular accounts of cannibalism
105
 left a long term mark that still resonates.  
At Jerusalem, in the words of one of the participants—possibly Count Bohemund of 
Taranto— 
 
―Entering the city our pilgrims pursued and killed Saracens up to the temple of Solomon… 
Finally, having overcome the pagans, our knights seized a great number of men and women, 
and they killed whom they wished and whom they wished they let live… Soon the crusaders 
ran throughout the city, seizing gold, silver, horses, mules, and houses full of all kinds of 
goods. Then rejoicing and weeping from extreme joy our men went to worship at the 




This description is uncomfortably close to that of Jericho after the city‘s defeat. 
Equally tormenting was the Christian military leaders‘ evidently seeing nothing 
morally amiss in neither taking the lives nor seizing the goods of Jerusalem‘s civilian 
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population. According to Summerton,  
 
―if the holy war of the Old testament is to be a guide to a Christian ethic of war, we should 
note…the regulation and limitation of both ends and means in the Law….for example, the 
requirement to undertake military service (Deuteronomy 20:5-8); in the means of appointing 
officers-the implication being that it was to be by acclamation of the people (Deuteronomy 
20:9); in the requirement to negotiate as an alternative to making war (Deuteronomy 20:10-11; 




Indeed, the Crusaders‘ behaviour at Jerusalem does not even appear to have achieved 
the limited moral level that had been previously manifested by Joshua‘s forces at 
Jericho quite some many centuries ago. Of course, this historical experience may have 
implications as to the manner in which war would be conducted in those instances in 
which the combatants were separated by a significant cultural abyss.
108
  Essential to 
understanding the actions of the crusaders was the extent to which they did not regard 
their enemies, the others, (and in the context of the time this meant Eastern Orthodox 
Christians, Jews and Muslims) as fully human
109
.  In this their actions hark not just 
back to Jericho but also forward to the concept of war involving all society that 
started to emerge with the French Revolution. 
 
2.2.2. New Testament 
 
The ‗Words of the Sacred Scriptures‘ in relation to waging war, represent a 
conundrum in Christian thought.  Some of the instructions pronounced by Jesus 
during his ministry are clearly deontological (e.g., in the Sermon on the Mount, ―But I 
tell you, do not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to 
him the other also‖
110
).  This trend in deontological thinking (derived from the 
Greek deon, meaning ‗duty‘) means that the end can never be used to justify the 
means.  In this case moral systems are characterized by their focus on adherence to 
independent moral rules and duties. Deontological systems are contrasted with 
teleological—derived from the Greek telos, meaning ‗goal‘ (in the sense of desired 
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objective or end result). In teleological systems, a consideration of the ends can 
provide justification for the means employed for their achievement. This moral 
system focuses on the consequences of an act in establishing its moral validity. In the 
simplest of terms, deontological systems judge morality by examining the nature of 
actions and the will of agents rather than by goals achieved; it looks to inputs rather 





There are certain biblical arguments that are more ambivalent. When John the Baptist 
was preaching, he was asked by a group of soldiers what they should do. To this, John 
responded, ―Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with 
your pay.‖
112
 John did not avail of the opportunity to suggest that they should take up 
another occupation. Rather, looking at the words employed and the tenor of his 
language, John simply counselled them to avoid certain sinful behaviour, to wit, 
slander and theft. While it is speculative at least to some extent, it appears that given 
the militarised nature of Roman governance in Judea at the time of John‘s ministry, 
those troops responsible for maintaining Roman authority were effectively operating 
as an occupying army. David B. Kopel, Research Director of the Independence 
Institute, interprets the context of the passage as follows as: ―soldiers (like tax 
collectors) tend to enrich themselves by abusing the civilian population. Soldiers 
extorted money by threatening violence, and by making false accusations.‖
113
 This, in 
turn, suggests that much of the opposition to military service expressed by some early 
Christians had its origins in ancillary considerations, rather than an abstract opposition 
to all forms of government-sanctioned violence, irrespective of the circumstances of 
its administration. Likewise, we are informed in the Book of Acts that the Apostles 
welcomed the centurion Cornelius (and, evidently, other soldiers of his company) into 
the Christian community, granting them baptism, with no evident demand for them to 
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2.3. Early Christianity and Military Warfare 
 
According to John H. Yoder, ―The early church believed that God was at work within 
the church by means of Jesus Christ living on within it. The apostle Paul could say 
that it was no longer he himself who lived; rather Christ was living in him. He could 
claim that he could do all things through Christ (Phil. 4: 13)‖ As Michael Northcott 
points out, the early Christians believed in confronting the violent power of [Roman] 
Empire He further states ―The conflict (with the Roman Empire) is resolved not in 
armed struggle, or the sacrificial shedding of warrior blood, but in the sacrifice of the 
life of one righteous man for the life of the world, a sacrifice that put an end to the 
need for blood sacrifice in the Temple or on the battlefield, which subverted the rule 




Outright pacifism was rare, at least among orthodox early Christians, but there was, 
nonetheless a tendency to avoid military service and its implications.  Christians 
were deeply troubled at any resort to state-sanctioned violence, especially given Jesus‘ 
words that ―All who draw the sword will die by the sword.‖
116
 This remark could be 
applied to those who ‗live by the sword,‘ rather than anyone who defends his 
neighbours and himself. This led to early Christian arguments that all resort to war 
and participation in military units were contrary to the message of the Gospels, 
irrespective of the circumstances, especially as Jesus‘ denial of the sword [or force] 










―A leading authority on just war theory, James Turner Johnson,
119
 argued that the early 
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Christian rejection of war-fighting and killing stemmed from their expectation that the Reign 
of God was imminent and not from pacifism. The gradual realization that Jesus‘ Second 
Coming was taking longer than expected led the Christians gradually to focus on more 
immediate issues, such as military service. Johnson argues that the sizeable Christian presence 
in the Roman Army from at least AD 174 indicates that many Christians accepted the 
legitimacy of military service, and presumably had for some time… [In addition,] Johnson 





Equally, there might have been an institutional reason that hindered Christians‘ 
participation in military service. During the first centuries of the Church, mandatory 
military service only applied to Roman citizens. During the Church‘s first two 
centuries, the great majority of the Roman Empire‘s Christian population did not 
usually enjoy citizenship status.
121
  This was important as for most of the first and 
second centuries military service was voluntary. We know from surviving patristic 
writings that Christians were to be found in the ranks
122
; it follows that they either 
volunteered after baptism or were baptized into the faith while in service.  
 
On the other hand, Tertullian
123
, during his earlier orthodox period, showed no 
particular antipathy to military service. Indeed, his Apologeticum, addressed to 
provincial governors, was designed to show the illegality of the officially sanctioned 
persecution of Christians, Tertullian places his co-religionists in the context of general 
society. He states: 
 
―So we sojourn with you in the world, abjuring neither forum, nor shambles, nor bath, nor 
booth, nor workshop, nor inn, nor weekly market, nor any other places of commerce. We sail 
with you, and fight with you, and till the ground with you; and in like manner we unite with 
you in your traffickings— even in the various arts we make public property of our works for 
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 Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus (or Tertullian) (ca. 155-222), son of a Roman centurion, 
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In a similar manner, Saint Augustine, in his letter to Marcellinus argues that, ―if the 
Christian religion condemned wars of every kind, the command given in the gospel to 
soldiers asking counsel as to salvation would rather be to cast away their arms, and 




However, later on, Tertullian adopted a recognisable pacifist argument, especially 
after he had taken up the cause of the Montanist (Phrygian) ‗prophets‘.  At this stage 
he started to argue against Christian participation in a number of professions. ―[One] 
must not be a schoolmaster, for that would involve teaching mythology. One must not 
be a soldier—for ‗he who takes the sword shall perish by the sword.‘ One must not be 
a merchant, for cupidity is idolatry.‖
126
 Tertullian argued that Jesus‘ behaviour in the 
Garden of Gethsemane at the time of his arrest, halting his followers who resisted the 
efforts to arrest Him and restoring the severed ear of Peter‘s victim,
127
 irrespective of 
any other applicable New Testament incidents, was governing. ―For albeit soldiers 
had come unto John, and had received the formula of their rule; albeit, likewise, a 





Following Tertullian‘s arguments, the Mennonite thinker and uncompromising pacifist, 
John Howard Yoder, argued that our epistemological limitations subvert our efforts at 
calculating the effects of violence to which we might be tempted to resort.
129
 
Moreover, the peace sought by Christian pacifists extends beyond the mere absence of 
violence. Rather, according to Yoder it is situated in a vision of God, the agape or 
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communal love. In Jesus, God embodies a non-resistant love unto death. Through His 
obedience, death and resurrection, Jesus makes such love possible for His 
followers.
130
 Yoder argues that Jesus defeated evil by His submission to God. When 
tempted by Satan in the wilderness, Jesus chose not to use His powers to assuage His 
hunger. In the Garden of Gethsemane, before He was arrested, Jesus prayed to the 
Father that the cup of bitterness that awaited Him might pass, but closed with the 
words, ‗yet not my will, but yours be done.‖
131
 Most important from a pacifist‘s 
perspective, is that Jesus rejected Peter‘s ‗messianic violence‘ (described above). 
Given the primacy that Yoder places on Jesus‘ behaviour in the Garden of 
Gethsemane—much the same as that expressed by Tertullian—we may conclude that 
the traditional perspective continues to retain its force.  
 
―The key to the obedience of God‘s people is not their effectiveness but their patience. The 
triumph of right is assured not by the might that comes to the aid of the right, which is of 
course the justification of the use of violence and other kinds of power in every human 




For Origen (185-258), opposition to participation in war had its origins in the 
ostensible demoniac forces that gave rise to such conflict and the danger to souls 
exposed to them. In response Celsus, an inveterate opponent of Christianity, argued 
that Christians were derelict in their civic duty by their refusal to take up military 
service in defence of the empire. Origen responded,  
 
―We who by our prayers destroy all demons which stir up wars, violate oaths and disturb the 
peace, are of more help to emperors than those who seem to be doing the fighting... And 
though we do not become fellow-soldiers with him, even if he presses for this, yet we are 




In sum, Origen placed Christians in that category of specially protected individuals, at 
least as far as exposure to mandatory military service was concerned, asking 
rhetorically, ―Do not those who are priests at certain shrines, and those who attend to 
                                            
130
 Alain E. Weaver, ‗Unjust Lies, Just Wars?‘ Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 29, No. 1, Spring 2001, 
p 70 
131
 Luke 22:42 
132
 John H. Yoder, Nevertheless (Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1976), p. 238 
133




certain gods, as you account them, keep their hands from blood, that they may with 
hands unstained … [to] offer the appointed sacrifices to your gods? And even when 




Lactantius (ca. 250-330), a convert to Christianity shortly before commencement of 
the Diocletian persecution (302-311), based his pacifist arguments on Natural Law 
underpinnings‘ support of Cicero‘s De Officiis.  
 
―Humanity is to be preserved, if we wish rightly to be called men. But what else is this 
preservation of humanity than loving a man because he is a man, and the same as ourselves? 
Therefore, discord and dissension are not in accordance with the nature of man; and that 





Nonetheless, it is as a rhetorician that Lactantius is best remembered. In his De 
mortibus persecutorum [On the death of persecutors], a bitter diatribe against 
Diocletian and his immediate subordinates, he identified military service with support 
of those public figures favouring mistreatment of Christians, rather than a more 
abstract obligation to secure the safety of the state. 
 
For many early Christians, the performance of an otherwise acceptable civic duty 
(defence of the polity against enemies) was tainted by ancillary requirements having 
little or no relationship with military responsibility. For example, the oath of office as 
a soldier required swearing allegiance to the emperor, itself an acceptable action. 
However, at least during Diocletian persecution (302-311AD), this also included 
swearing by the emperor‘s ‗genius,‘ that is, his spirit in some sense understood as 
deified. Nonetheless, it appears that these constraints were neither absolute nor 
universal in their application.  
 
―Neither in the matter of military service, nor in regard to public functions, was there in 
practice any general and premeditated refusal of Christians to take part in the life of the State. 
It was only the close union between the [pagan] religious and public life of the city of that 
time that constituted an obstacle to a more complete manifestation of a public spirit… 




 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Divine Institutes, W. Fletcher(tr.), vi, 11, Arthur F. Holmes (ed.), War and 
Christian Ethics, p. 54 
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[Neither the] secessionist spirit of Tertullian … nor the philosophical scruple of Origen as to 




2.4 Christianity as State Religion 
 
The issue of Christian participation in warfare became more pronounced during the 
Third Century,
137
 especially with the policies adopted by Constantine
138
 in 311 AD. 
As Michael Northcott observes, ―Christians found themselves in the strange position 
of being not an embattled minority but the majority, and this new majoritarian 
position had the tragic consequence of deforming the faith of the first Christians into a 




Perhaps even more important was Constantine‘s self-perception of himself as 
something akin to a ‗thirteenth apostle.‘
140
 Constantine‘s legitimating of Christianity 
(in the eyes of the law) brought with it traditional Roman assumptions 
(‗Constantinianism‘) that would plague the Church for centuries. For Yoder, the 
sovereignty of Christ appeared clearly inside the Church, but Constantinianism 
mistakenly looked for His sovereignty inside the state and the leader of the state as the 
supreme temporal agency of God.
141
 This in turn resulted in misunderstanding of the 
Jesus‘ teaching of peace by imperial theologians such as Eusebius. According to 
Northcott, ―For the theologians of empire from Eusebius onwards, God would 
determine the outcome of history not in Jesus Christ but in the attempts of the Empire 





Even in the face of the Constantinian self-perception and, for that matter, the 
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seemingly unending debate among Christian theologians about the moral validity of 
resorting to war, a few Christians never abandoned the belief that war must be 
considered an almost unacceptable alternative.
143
 Duncan Forrester states ―In a fallen 
world violence may occasionally be necessary, and the responsible statesman is under 





A shift to supporting state-sponsored violence under certain circumstance, while at the 
same time reducing reliance on aspects of Constantinianism, engaged the thinking of 
Christian apologists through the Fourth Century. Among these were Ambrose of 
Milan and his celebrated convert, Augustine of Hippo. 
  




 was descended from a prominent Roman patrician family, his father, 
Auxentius Ambrosius, had served as Prefect of Gaul
146
 and, before his appointment 
as Milan‘s bishop (374), had served as imperial governor of Aemilia-Liguria.
147
 In 
his youth Ambrose enjoyed an extensive classical education, including both Greek 
philosophy (e.g., political writings of Plato and Aristotle) and Latin oratory.
148
 
―Ambrose preserved the Christian presumption against the use of violence, unless it 
was needed to protect important social values. He explicitly rejected defending one‘s 
own person with violence, but argued that charity
149
 demanded [emphasis in the 
original] one to protect one‘s neighbour.‖
150
 In Ambrose there appears, evidently for 
the first time in Christian thinking, a successful melding of the personal Christian 
ideal (‗turn the other cheek‘) with ―the classical Roman tradition requiring limited 
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violence for good order and to defend the Empire.‖
151
 In De Officiis, Cicero—a 
primary source for Ambrose‘s thinking on such matters—contends, ―while those 
whom you conquer are to be kindly treated, those who, laying down their arms, take 
refuge in the good faith of the commander of the assailing army, ought to be received 




Cicero had earlier pointed to the wholesale slaughter of the population of Corinth 
after the rebellious city had peaceably surrendered to the Roman military commander 
Lucius Mummius (146 BC), perhaps at the request of a Senate more interested in 
ridding itself of a major commercial rival in the eastern Mediterranean, than due to 
any residual military threat. ―I could wish that they had not destroyed Corinth; but I 
believe that they had some motive, especially the convenience of the place for hostile 





This opposition to such massacres was repeated in Ambrose‘s letter to Emperor 
Theodosius following the massacre of civilians after the successful siege of 
Thessalonica (AD 390).
154
 Here, Ambrose chastised the emperor for his failure to 
observe traditional moral responsibilities incumbent upon him as a Christian and by 
long-established Roman precepts. The civilian slaughter was murder and not an act 
that might be accounted as collateral damage of an otherwise just war. For that reason 
Theodosius was denied the sacraments until he showed repentance. In his letter—
interestingly, written as a private communication, as one between confessor and 
prospective penitent—Ambrose, somewhat rhetorically, explained his thinking. ―I 
have no cause for a charge of contumacy against you, but have cause for fear; I dare 
not offer the sacrifice if you intend to be present. Is that which is not allowed after 
shedding the blood of one innocent person, allowed after shedding the blood of many? 
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 St. Ambrose of Milan, Letter 51, ‗To the emperor Theodosius‘, H. De Romestin(tr.), Arthur F. 
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2.4.2 Saint Augustine and Just War 
 
Saint Augustine (352-430), Bishop of Hippo (near Carthage, in modern day Tunisia), 
is generally accounted the originator of just war theory in the Christian tradition. To 
avoid confusion on the matter, it should be borne in mind that for Augustine and, for 
that matter, his medieval successors—bellum encompassed considerably more activity 
than that regularly attributed to it today. In essence, it referred to any organized 
violent activity undertaken by a monarch or any other equally competent authority—
e.g., a national senate. Thus, considerations of ‗just war‘ extended to such matters as 
domestic insurrection though Augustine detested civil war. However, he relied on a 
number of antecedents, both scriptural and philosophical including those originating 
outside the specifically Christian tradition.
156
 Augustine identified three elements 
essential to the establishment of just cause for war: defence, retaking something 
wrongly taken, and punishment of evildoing, as well as the requirements of last resort, 
proportionality of good and evil done and the goal of peace. 
 
Arguably, proportionality of the good and evil done generated the most ambiguity and, 
consequently, the greatest difficulty for any conscientious Christian. According to 
Duncan, this consideration had engaged Christian thinkers long before Augustine.  
 
―The problem for the [early] Christians was how to maintain the prohibition against killing 
and violence. The first major attempt to think through this problem came from Clement of 
Alexandria (AD ca. 150-ca. 215), [who,] as the first Christian just war thinker, [introduced] 
two elements of what would later become standard just war theory, arguing for the defence of 




This is distinctly at odds with Northcott‘s contention that ―Christians after 
Constantine [i.e., post-313AD] invented a doctrine of just war which they attempted 
to link with Old Testament history, since they could find little justification for this 
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new doctrine in the New Testament.‖
158
 Indeed, early Christian apologists (e.g., 
Origen) regularly taught that the violent episodes in the Old Testament served a 
cautionary purpose for the Christian, in that they were analogues of the unceasing 
conflict between good and evil.
159
 Furthermore, the descriptive language of Lebreton 
and Zeiller [q.v., supra] certainly appears to be at odds with that of Northcott. 
 
To at least some extent Augustine‘s thinking departs from that of Ambrose,
160
 in that 
Augustine appears to incorporate ‗self‘ into the moral equation to a greater extent than 
his mentor. Duncan argues that he ―added a new condition for war, a right intention 
[emphasis in the original], meaning those dispositions inspired by Christianity to act 
justly in war, in both external action and especially interior disposition. The intention 
to restore justice must not give way to the love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce 
and implacable enmity, wild resistance and the lust of power.‖
161
 Taking Augustine‘s 
thinking a few steps further, there appears to be a tacit argument at work in favour of 
conscientious objection to participation in war.  
 
According to Duncan, ―Because of the power of sin, Augustine came to realize that 
God‘s order could not be readily realized through human thought or action. Hence the 
soldier could no longer simply be seen as carrying out a divine command when he 
killed [an enemy soldier].‖
162
 This understanding of the role of personal moral 
responsibility on the battlefield underlies, and legitimates, the application of criminal 
sanctions for certain types of behaviour in combat, however difficult they may be to 
apply in specific circumstances. In any event, this argument, often expressed in 
conjunction with ostensibly deontological moral commands to be found in sacred 
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scripture, becomes a recurrent theme in Christian considerations of justice to war. 
 
Duncan states that ―his [Augustine‘s] influence was all but forgotten until his thought 
was revived by the jurist Gratian in the 12
th
 century. There is no just war tradition 
prior to its coalescence in the Middle Ages around concepts drawn from Canon Law, 
Theology, secular law, chivalric morality, and the habits of relations among 
princes.‖
163
 Nonetheless, Augustine‘s thinking would influence on Christian thinkers 
in future centuries even though his work remained largely in abeyance until revived 
by the jurist Gratian in the latter years of the twelfth century. 
 
3. Europe’s Dark Age and the recovery of the Just War Tradition 
 
The medieval just war tradition came into being ―as a way of thinking about the right 
use of force in the context of responsible government of the political community.‖
164
 
Unlike its antecedents, it was as much based on canonical and customary law as it was 
an exercise in moral philosophy. The first major revival of Roman Law, Gratian‘s 
Decretum (ca. 1148) ―began to consolidate a firm body of thought on just war… It set 
the conditions for just war, but followed Augustine in insisting on an inward 
disposition of love towards those against whom one was fighting.‖
165
 Gratian, 
incorporated major common elements of both the Peace of God and the Truce of God 
into the Decretum, in effect giving them what amounted to a legal status (at least to 
the extent that authorities chose to defer to the Decretum). According to historian 
Frederick Russell, ―Gratian‘s definitive compilation posed the basic problems to be 
resolved, defined the boundaries of debate, and provided a framework within which 




3.1. The re-introduction of the concept of Just War 
 
It is not the purpose of this study to delve into the finer points of European History in 
this period. Instead, I shall draw on specific examples and in particular the 
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developments in Just War theory by Gratian, Grotius and the Council of Constance. 
 
These were all attempts to re-impose Augustine‘s ideas on Just War and then to refine 
them to meet the practical challenges of the time.  As such they were responses to 
the barbarism of much early medieval warfare.  However, these theoretical 
developments were based on two important existing concepts:, the Peace of God; and, 
the Truce of God.  In combination these had already sought to reduce the reach and 
occasion of warfare, which, in the tenth and eleventh centuries, had tended to be 
sanctioned and conducted with little or no constraint. Yoder in an extended essay on 
the development of just war thinking describes the prevailing condition of ‗limited 
anarchy.‘  
 
―There were a small number of knights, whose definition of their role included honour—
fighting fair and defending the innocent. Second, there [existed] a larger but fluctuating 
number of mercenaries, recruited only when needed. Both groups had a right to fight when 
and because the prince had that right. The mercenaries had no personal moral preference as to 
which side should win, except for the pay, the privileges of plunder, the enjoyment of a good 




The Peace of God was intended to establish sectors of medieval society that were 
‗immunized‘ from assault by the milites (mercenaries) that plied their trade in the 
service of whatever local lord happened to hire them. The declaration of the Synod of 
Charroux (called forth by Gunbald, Bishop of Bordeaux, in 989) is illustrative.  
 
―We [the local bishops], assembled in the name of God, made the following decrees: (1) 
Anathema against those who break into churches. If anyone breaks into a church, he shall be 
anathema unless he makes satisfaction. (2) Anathema against those who rob the poor. If 
anyone robs a peasant [of his animals or goods], he shall be anathema unless he makes 





The Truce of God, in turn, was intended to reduce the overall incidence of warfare 
itself. While the term is generic—each ‗truce‘ was a formal agreement between a 
                                            
167
 John H. Yoder, When War Is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking, (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 
1996), p. 9 
168
 Oliver J. Thatcher, and Edgar Holmes McNeal, (eds.), A Source Book for Medieval History (New 
York: Scribners, 1905), p. 412 
63 
 
prelate (representing the interests of non-combatants, the great majority of people) 
and a prince—each of such agreements invariably contained clauses governing 
specific behaviour on certain days of the week and certain seasons of the church 
calendar (e.g., Lent). The agreement between Drogo (Bishop of Terouanne) and 
Baldwin (Count of Hainault), concluded in 1063, is a good example. It provided, inter 
alia, that from Wednesday through Monday ―no man or woman shall assault, wound, 
or slay another, or attack, seize, or destroy a castle, burg, or villa, by craft or by 
violence.‖
169
 The agreement provided for free passage by merchants and others (i.e., 
Baldwin and his fuglemen were forbidden to engage in armed robbery under the 
pretence of waging otherwise lawful combat). The penalties for violation extended 
from denial of the sacraments to excommunication for a number of years. Again, 
these requirements took on the nature of a civil or criminal code. However, as noted 
above, bellum was traditionally understood as any officially sanctioned violence, 
whether against foreign enemies or domestic opponents.  
 
In effect, both the Peace of God and the Truce of God ‗fenced in‘ those regions of the 
body politic in which warfare might be conducted with no resulting official Church 
sanction. While there were numerous violations to these agreements, their 
establishment and the increased respect afforded them (often a result of evident self-
interest, enlightened or otherwise) gave them what amounted to the force of 
customary law.
170
 For better or for worse, these ‗contract‘ limitations on ‗state-
sponsored‘ violence were, for practical purposes, restricted to Christian Europe. In the 
concept of crusade, no such constraints were formally placed on the behaviour of 





 or the Islamic world). 
 
The abominable behaviour of the Crusaders at Jerusalem in 1099 (described above) 
arguably had at least some tacit support from Church spokesmen, a notable example 
being the Cistercian abbot, Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), a preacher of the 
Second Crusade. Bernard, was a key figure in establishing Peace of God agreements.  
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However, in his letter (‗A Holy War‘) addressed to the English people and in support 
of the new crusade, Bernard distinguished warfare between Christians and that 
between Christians and ‗infidels.‘  
 
―You attack each other; you slay each other and by each other you are slain. What is this 
savage craving of yours? Put a stop to it now, for it is not fighting but foolery. Thus to risk 
both soul and body is not brave but shocking; is not strength but folly. But now, O might 
soldiers, O men of war, you have a cause for which you can fight without danger to your souls; 




In sum, Bernard appears to be tacitly relying on Old Testament examples in support of 
his doctrine that contradicts some of the thinking of earlier Christians. 
 
3.2. Gratian’s Decretum: First Effort at Codifying Acceptable Behaviour in 
War 
 
References to war and constraints on its conduct appear throughout the Decretum.
174
 
Gratian, perhaps reacting to the tenor of the times in which he lived, concentrated on 
legitimate conduct rather than the legitimacy of armed conflict, per se, which, he 
seems to have taken for granted. Nonetheless, Gratian deferred to Augustine to the 
extent that he concurred in the latter‘s requirement for appropriate inward disposition 
toward one‘s putative enemy, if only because his punishment could then be justified 





In any event, the constraints proposed on the conduct of war had major implications 
that continue in Christian thought. For example, most types of economic warfare were 
forbidden. It was common practice in early medieval warfare to attack an enemy 
indirectly through the destruction of his means of producing wealth. Since the 
fundamental basis of Europe‘s medieval economy was agriculture, this usually meant 
crop destruction. Whether these proposed constraints had much effect is debateable as, 
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Duncan argues, ―Only from the fourteenth century did a right of non-combatant 
immunity begin to be recognized, as a result of Church moral scruple and the military 
tradition‘s wish to limit casualties.‖
176
 Even this argument appears difficult to sustain, 
at least as a blanket statement, given the evidence. Moreover, in the centuries that 
followed, as weapons turned more destructive, civilian targets more lucrative, and—
perhaps most important of all—religious and political motivations more intense, the 




Related to what constituted legitimate tactics in war, was the question of the 
legitimacy of the weapons actually used in combat. For example efforts were made to 
outlaw the crossbow—at least in warfare between Christians—through legislation 
adopted at the Second Lateran Council in 1139.
178
 The purpose of the prohibition was 
less about regulating warfare and more to reduce the threat to lawful public authority 
posed by mercenary bands, which, more often than not, were no more than armed 
robbers on the prowl when not formally employed. It is however, possible to see the 
arguments against the moral validity of the crossbow in medieval warfare—updated 
to reflect contemporary international relations and technological innovation—as 
applying to efforts to ban today‘s ‗weapons of mass destruction.‘ 
 
However, Gratian‘s successors, collectively known as the ‗Decretists‘, grafted onto 
his just war theory a coda to serve as justification for holy war (the Crusades), based 
on the Book of Joshua.
179
 This return to the logic of the Old Testament was an 
important departure from Gratian‘s thinking. Reflecting the thinking of such patristic 
scholars as Origen, Gratian ―cautioned Christians not to emulate the war narrated in 
the Old Testament, for this war merely prefigured the spiritual wars fought by 
Christians against spiritual enemies such as the Devil.‖
180
 Russell points to challenge 
to just war theory posed by the Crusades,  
 
―The crusading ideal is historically bound up with a theocratic view of society, while the just 
war is usually fought on public authority for more mundane goals such as defence of territory, 
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persons and rights… In the Middle Ages the distinction between holy war, crusade and just 





Duncan makes a similar point, ―Although a crusade was supposed to be conducted in 
accord with the Christian ideals, in the fervour of combat these were often sacrificed 
to expediency or passion. The prospect of booty and glory also inevitably attracted all 
sorts of adventurers.‖
182
 By the time of the Fourth Crusade (1204) the lure of loot 
and commercial advantage meant the target was the Orthodox Christian Byzantine 




3.3. The Council of Constance: Efforts to Codify Just War 
 
The Council of Constance (1414-1418),
184
 was called to adjudicate the then-
prevailing schism in the Church—three men simultaneously laid claim to the papal 
throne. Unlike previous councils of the Church where individuals were members, in 
the council of Constance the council members were representatives of kingdoms such 




The senior Polish representative was, the singularly humane rector of Krakow‘s 
Jagiellonian University, Pawel Wlodkowic (1370-1435.
186
 who challenged a 
spectrum of prevailing ideas then being used to legitimate Church and state behaviour. 
According to Kazimierz Grzybowski ―the treatises of Vladimirius were designed to 
refute the arguments of the Teutonic Order in an international forum before the great 
assemblage of the Council of Constance.‖
187
 The argument was about seeking a 
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peaceful coexistence between pagan and Christian countries and, at the same time, 
blaming ‗the Teutonic Order‘ for its coercive violence towards non-Christians in 
Prussia and Lithuania.
188
 He laid great emphasis on the moral integrity of the 
individual, including a right to free expression.  
 
This extended to persons at odds with prevailing Catholic doctrine. In 1415 the 
Council had summoned dissident, and already excommunicated, Bohemian theologian 
Jan Hus (1372-1415), under a warrant of immunity, to defend his doctrine of the 
Eucharist—which, as it happened, had already been adjudged heretical. Despite a 
previously granted guarantee of personal safety, Hus was tried and convicted of 




Wlodkowic described the regular depredations of the Order of Teutonic Knights—
conducted under the rubric of ‗crusades‘—assaults on peaceful pagans in Lithuania 
and Prussia which were no more than disguised rapine, robbery, and murder. This all 
too accurate description infuriated the Council‘s Teutonic Order delegates. They were 
particularly incensed by Wlodkowic‘s argument that ―Conversion can never be used 
as a pretext for war‖
190
 and that Christian nations under attack (as Polish territory 
often was by the Knights) had a right to call upon pagan citizens to join in the 
common defence which certainly did not sit well with Emperor Sigismund, who had 
called the Council into session in 1414.
191
 In any event, in 1421 Pope Martin V 
dispatched a papal representative (Antonio Zeno) to investigate reports of the Order‘s 
misbehaviours in the eastern Baltic region.
192
 There appears to be a certain irony at 
work, considering Wlodkowic‘s arguments when contrasted with those of Origen. The 
Polish rector, at least on the face of things, appears to be at least inferentially, taking 
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the side of Origen‘s pagan opponent, Celsus, in arguing for the responsibility of all 
citizens—irrespective of religious persuasion—to assume responsibility for the 
common defence.  
 
He argued that nations, irrespective of race or religion, those who live in peace have a 
natural right to be left to their own devices. Furthermore, Wlodkowic continued that 
the same argument from caritas that might support provision of military assistance in 
defence of a fellow Catholic Christian under enemy attack likewise applied to anyone 
else comparably afflicted, be he Anabaptist, Hussite, Lollard or, for that matter, not a 




According to Duncan, Vitoria came to the same conclusion, albeit for somewhat 
different reasons.  
 
―The ferocity of wars of religion eventually led to the widespread conviction that the cause of 
religion must be kept out of warfare as much as possible. Vitoria redeveloped just war theory 
as a systematic and coherent doctrine based on universal moral and legal principles. He denied 
that ideological wars, and wars based on difference of religion, were justified, and was 




The shifting emphasis toward jus in bello reflected significant technological advances 
in armaments—notably artillery and infantry weapons—that began in earnest in the 
last years of the fifteenth century. ‗Low technology‘ populations—e.g., those of the 
New World—were often helpless when confronted with the overwhelming firepower 
in the hands of the newly arrived Europeans. However, it is possible to compare the 
Conquistador/Native American imbalance with that of a comparable Teutonic 
Order/Lithuanian pagan one. There is every reason to believe that the Teutonic 
knights would have refrained from regularly raiding eastern Baltic hamlets if their 
inhabitants had been equally well militarily equipped. Likewise, the European 
adventurers who had put resisting Native Americans to the sword, irrespective of any 
ostensible theological justification, would surely have had less incentive to resort to 
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such behaviour were their opponents likewise equally well equipped in weaponry. 
 
Wlodkowic relied on principles derived from natural law.
195
 According to Polish 
historian Iwo Cyprian Pogonowski ―His proposal was based on the natural law and 
the premise that the license to convert is not a license to kill or expropriate and that 
only voluntary conversion is valid.  He defined the principle of national self-
determination, the international society, its functions, organs, and laws.  He began to 
formulate these laws for use by an international tribunal, which he proposed.  He 




Regarding religious belief, Wlodkowic argued that forcible conversion was per se 
sinful since it implicitly challenged the doctrine of free will and the integrity of the 
individual. Rulers were bound to respect the religious convictions of their subjects 
because natural rights belonged to individuals, irrespective of particular beliefs.
197
 
This, of course, was directly at odds with the thinking of Ambrose ten centuries earlier, 
who favoured legislation authorizing harsh treatment even execution of heretics, 
defining them as ‗traitors‘ to God. 
 
At a national level, Wlodkowic argued that ―Non-Christian and non-Catholic nations 
living at peace with their neighbours have the right to have their sovereignty and the 
integrity of their territories safeguarded‖
198
 In other words, to the extent that they live 
in peace with their neighbours they have a right to see their territory remain inviolate: 
These ideas were obviously contentious but they also laid the groundwork for the 
acceptance of natural law as a basis for just war in centuries to come. 
 
4. The ‘Natural Law’ understanding of Just War 
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This emphasis on Natural Law, was to form the main basis of developments in ‗Just 
War‘ theology over the next three centuries.  James T. Johnson in the introduction of 
his study about the implications of just war theory for future military operations, 
describes the transition from medieval to modern thinking.  
 
―With the growth of state power and the declining relative influence of the Church, Spanish 
theologians re-examined the classic definition of just cause during their conquest of the New 
World. [Francisco de] Vitoria (1480-1546) cautioned against abuse of the Indians and 
demanded that ‗the reasons of those who on grounds of equity oppose the war‘ be heard. 
[Francisco] Suarez (1548-1617) merged the purely religious principle just cause with the 
secular principle of natural law by extending the right of self-defence from individuals to 
nations, known as the ‗domestic analogy.‘ [Dutch legal theorist Hugo] Grotius (1583-1645) 





Actually, Grotius had composed his international law masterpiece, De jure belli ac 
pacis [On the law of war and peace] some years before the outbreak of the Thirty 
Years‘ War (1618-1648), although it first saw publication in 1625. However, he is 
usually seen as the major contributor in terms of adding ‗natural law‘ concepts to the 
Just War tradition.  Grotius‘ initial impetus in writing the work had been the 
establishment of the principle of free navigation of the oceans. However, he based 
much of his argument on the concept of innocent passage, not all that different from 
the right established centuries earlier, in the Peace of God, of the merchant going 




4.1. The Spanish Neo-scholastics 
 
However, before considering Grotius in detail, it is useful first to review the 
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contribution of Spanish and Portuguese theologians to the issue of both Natural Law 
and in upholding Wlodkowic‘s concerns about the validity of forced conversion.  
The Spanish and Portuguese colonization of Latin America, specifically, the manner 
in which it was accomplished and the outcomes for Native Americans, encouraged 
considerable soul-searching among those Spanish clerics who were appalled at the 
treatment that fell upon the inhabitants of the New World.  
 
―The crusading mentality [that had become almost endemic in European armies] also brought 
a particular fanaticism to the religious wars in Europe in the sixteenth century and overlapped 
with the savage conquest of the New World. The debates over the legitimacy of the conquista, 
especially at the School of Salamanca, with Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) and Francisco 




This clerical response was exemplified by Antonio de Montesinos, a Dominican priest, 
delivering a sermon in 1511, a decade before the conquest of Mexico, denouncing 
Spain‘s treatment of the New World Indians. Montesino‘s words encouraged 
Bartolome de Las Casas, a participant in the blood-stained Spanish conquest of Cuba, 
to renounce title to land and serfs in Cuba, take holy orders, and become an advocate 
of the oppressed.
202
 Echoing Wlodkowic‘s words a century earlier, Las Casas (1484-
1566) argued that the Native Americans had a natural law; right to their property and 
therefore that it should be returned to them. Furthermore, again reflecting the thinking 
of the Polish prelate, he argued that the inhabitants of the New World had a natural 





Vitoria, professor of theology at Salamanca also couched his arguments in terms of 
natural law,
204
 but he nonetheless, like Wlodkowic before him, relied on biblical 
tradition to encourage decent behaviour.  
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―Moreover, [the Christian] should reflect that others are his neighbours, whom we are bound 
to love as ourselves, and that we all have one common Lord, before whose tribunal we shall 
have to render our account. For it is the extreme of savagery to seek for and rejoice in grounds 




4.2. Hugo Grotius: Just War and Natural Law 
 
Vitoria was a product of the Thomistic doctrine that flowered in the Middle Ages, but 
Hugo Grotius, a Calvinist Hollander, took traditional just war doctrines and 
reconfigured them to meet the challenges of a society in constant flux.
206
 Grotius, 
perhaps tacitly reflected his nation‘s mercantile values and established the normative 
international order as one reflecting the properly ordered civil state.  
 
―This care for society in accordance with the human nature intellect, which we have roughly 
sketched, is the source of ius [Law], properly so called, to which belong abstaining from 
another‘s possessions, restoring anything which belongs to another (or the profit from it), 





While these precepts would almost certainly have been equally acceptable to either 
Cicero or Thomas Aquinas, Grotius took considerable pains to establish a natural law 
basis for its validity. ―What I have just said would be relevant even if we were to 
suppose (what we cannot suppose without the greatest wickedness) that there is no 
God, or that human affairs are of no concern to him.‖
208
 In sum, Grotius argued that 
the prevailing Christian doctrine of just war represented no more than natural law 
taken to its conceptual limits. And, while Grotius may represent the secularization of 
just war theory that had been started by Vitoria, by the same token it continues to 
resonate with the values and precepts enunciated by Wlodkowic two centuries earlier 
at the Council of Constance. 
 
Inherent in Grotius‘ thinking is the de-emphasising of jus ad bellum, in this a 
continuation of Gratian‘s emphasis on jus in bello.  As with Gratian, this may have 
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its roots in advances in weapons‘ design and related advances in military tactics which 
were making warfare more destructive. Rutgers University philosophy professor 
Jeffrey McMahan takes this considerably further when he says,  
 
―The decline of jus ad bellum began relatively early and was recognized even by Grotius, 
though he himself advanced an unusually detailed and sophisticated account of the 
requirement of just cause. He observed that peace treaties tended not to stigmatize the 
vanquished side as the wrongdoer or to demand that the vanquished compensate the victor for 
costs incurred during the fighting of the war. These practices suggest that even in the early 
phases of the development of the law of nations, there was comparatively little concern with 
the determination of which party was in the right and which was in the wrong. The focus 
shifted to jus in bello, or the principles governing the conduct of war, which ultimately came 




Nonetheless, Grotius retained the traditional components of jus ad bellum, including 
those reaching back to Aquinas and the other medieval scholars.
210
 Of jus in bello, 
Grotius argued that proportionality in war was a function of the military ends, not the 
political ones and further, that there is a requirement of affirmative discrimination in 







Just war theory achieved a philosophical ‗plateau‘ with the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648), the instrument that brought about an end to the Thirty Years‘ War
212
 and as a 
corollary, established the primacy of the state as the arbiter of right and wrong in any 
resort to war. This recognized that the carnage of three decades of warfare had so 
chastened Europe‘s monarchs that resort to war, while still a regular event, was no 
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 These included (1) just cause: an actual or imminent wrong against the state; (2) right intention: aim 
only at peace and the just ends; (3) proportionality: prospective good outweighs potential bad; (4) last 
resort: efforts at irenic solutions have failed; and (5) probability of success: the prospective war will not 
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longer the normative condition of the Continent. It reflected Europe‘s change in 
political organization.
213
 The establishment of confessional states, confirmed in 
legitimacy and made normative by the Treaty, had largely overtaken the universality 
implicit in the notion of ‗Christendom.‘
214
 (although many of the states remain multi-
ethnic and had shifting boundaries in areas such as Germany and Italy). Yoder has 
described the grave implications of this development as follows,  
 
―Now that every church had a state and every state a church, the only means to defend or 
advance a religious cause was military or diplomatic. So Europe saw a series of wars of 
religion, bringing into the heartland of Christendom the escalation of religious claims 
previously reserved for hostilities against the infidel. Just when the Catholic tradition had 
begun to disentangle the no-holds-barred crusade from civilly justified but also restrained war, 
internecine battles restored to the heart of Christendom the reality of the crusade without the 





Indeed, as the concept, jus ad bellum, receded in importance, jus in bello became 
more important to all parties who engaged in any prospective conflict. This was a 
matter of practicality. However, it would be undone by two developments: the rise of 
nationalism as a unifying national element and advances in military technology to the 





The Thirty Years‘ War—arguably a number of different national conflicts, waged for 
distinct reasons, but lumped together under a single rubric—ended due to exhaustion 
than to attained victory.
217
 The peace settlement then validated the confessional state 
as the ‗default‘ model, with all citizens required to adopt the religious practices of the 
ruler. Certain city-states were permitted to retain ‗freedom of conscience‘ provisions. 
New ‗freedom of conscience‘ provisions were included—e.g., the privilege to relocate 
                                            
213
 Ibid., pp.26-46 
214
 ―In Europe, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia institutionalized the principle of cuius regio, eius religio 
- that rulers of a state had the right to determine the religion of its subjects. This was in an effort to curb 
the religious warfare that had wracked Europe after the Protestant Reformation‖ 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confessional_state, accessed on September 28, 2008 
215
 John. H. Yoder, When War Is Unjust, p. 22 
216
 This matter is discussed in the next chapter 
217
 For instance, ―This war has lasted so long that they [the German princes] have left it more out of 
exhaustion than from a sense of right behaviour‖ David Maland, Europe in the Seventeenth Century 
(London: MacMillan, 1983), p. 159 
75 
 
to a more religiously congenial venue—although such a right would almost certainly 
have been meaningless to the great majority of peasants, men and women lacking the 




Most revealing, however, was the fact that the 1648 Peace was no different to the 
Peace of Augsburg (1555) that had ended the first round of major Catholic-Protestant 
religious warfare. Simply stated, the Thirty Years‘ War was at the last analysis, an 
exercise in futility that took away lives of a substantial fraction of Central Europe‘s 
population.
219
 Moreover, and perhaps of far greater relevance, earlier thinking was in 
a way lost as well. Whatever progress had been made in the development and 
acceptance of precepts governing the integrity of the individual, and the concurrent 
requirement that such integrity be respected by rulers by thinkers such as Wlodkowic, 
Vitoria, Suarez and Grotius, was gravely inhibited, if not outright aborted. Europe‘s 
continental leaders collectively abandoned the form of ‗government by consent of the 
governed‘ in favour of the ‗authoritarian model of government‘, assuming the latter as 
the best means of maintaining a lasting peace. To a limited extent it succeeded.
220
 But, 
as the experience of warfare in the Modern Age has demonstrated, it was only to a 
limited extent. These issues are discussed at length in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Just War Theory in the Nuclear Age 
 
1. Preliminary Analysis 
 
As set out in Chapter 2, by the sixteenth century a common reason for warfare had 
become religious (within Christianity).  Another development was the emergence of 
warfare between recognisable, and relatively stable, nation states.  The concept of 
jus ad bellum had been significantly undermined and, the brutality of the various 
religious conflicts also tended to obscure any commitment to jus in bello.  
Nonetheless, both concepts continued to have some residual impact on the conduct of 
war. 
 
However, by the mid-eighteenth century, new dynamics in warfare started to arise and 
this chapter, starts by considering possible reasons for this change, especially in 
relation to the wars of the American and French Revolutions at the end of the 
Eighteenth Century.  The destructiveness of weaponry, and the consequential 
implications for both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, was exemplified by the first use 
of nuclear weapons in 1945.  This act, can be seen as the result of a 150 year period 
in which both elements of traditional Just War theory broke down.  However, the use 
of nuclear weapons was an almost natural consequence of a whole series of changes 
(both ideological and technological) that had collectively had the effect of removing 
any meaningful distinction between combatants and non-combatants in modern 
warfare. 
 
We thus have a period characterised by the emergence of new secular ideologies 
(liberalism, nationalism, socialism and, ultimately, fascism) and also an increasing 
industrialisation and mechanisation of warfare.  Both trends seem to have combined 
further to undermine the residual force of jus in bello.  In effect, nationalism, 
especially as expressed in the American and French revolutions, and in subsequent 
events, brought into play the concept of the armed citizenry.  The consequences 
became quickly clear, if one side saw its entire citizen body as part of its war effort 
then the other side would feel justified in attacking that wider body.  Thus the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the emergence of mass armies, recruited from 
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all available citizens, and very much in contrast to the smaller professional armies 
used even as late as the Seven Years War (that had ended in 1763). 
 
Developments in the technology of warfare during the early years of the twentieth 
century (e.g., tanks, machine guns) and the willingness of combatant states to use 
weapons of an uncontrolled nature (e.g., poison gas) on the battleground had 
generated casualties at catastrophic levels.
221
  Equally in both the first and second 
world wars all combatants adopted strategies (blockade, mass murder, city bombing 
etc) deliberately designed to inflict substantive casualties on the non-military 
populations.  Any residual constraints were the product not of moral argument but of 
practical consequences.  Thus, despite fears, there was no widespread use of poison 
gas on the battlefield in the Second World War not due to moral qualms or constraints 
but due to fear of retaliation in kind. 
 
The end of the First World War had seen efforts at achieving ongoing irenic solutions 
(e.g., the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact) that proved to be of very 
limited effect precisely because these lacked any supranational enforcement 
mechanism that could be invoked against any major power.
222
 By the same token, 
support for worldwide disarmament, in the sense of the term extending beyond 
specific efforts at arms control, simply lacked any significant constituency at the state 
level (a consequence of the treaties that ended the war was to link disarmament to 




For instance, the 1921 Washington Naval Conference, aimed to achieve naval 
disarmament and sought a way to relieve tensions in East Asia among the imperial 
states (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan). However, this 
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The nations that would form the Axis Powers during World War II ultimately 
recognized that the existing international order would be unable to curtail ostensibly 
illegal international acts (e.g., Italy against Ethiopia, the Japanese incursion into 
China, Germany‘s remilitarization of the Rhineland). And, as a consequence, what 
was left of the debilitated international order collapsed with the outbreak of World 




2. The Changing Nature of War in the Modern Period 
 
There is now a considerable debate amongst some historians as to whether the wars 
that followed the French Revolution can be properly seen as ‗Total War
226
‘ (ie in the 
sense used for the second world war) or as a continuation of already existing trends.  
One part of this debate stresses how the concept of the Citizens War for both France 
and America radically redefined who was and who was not a combatant.  Thus the 
Duke of Brunswick felt quite entitled to threaten to kill the entire population of Paris 
if the King was executed
227
 and on the other hand the revolutionaries treated the 
entire population of provinces such as the Vendee as potential traitors.  One side in 
this debate takes the view that such threats and actions were really little but typical of 
what happens in war.  The other tends to argue that the depth and frequency of such 
actions were such as to mark the French Revolutionary Wars as different to the 
warfare waged since the Peace of Westphalia. 
 
Equally, whilst the nature of the French Republic, and the use of ‗Terror‘ by the 
Jacobins is hotly debated
228
, again, what is of importance is the emergence of the 
concept that ‗all who are not with us, are against us‘.  In consequence there was a 
further blurring (possibly even negation) of the distinction between combatants and 
non-combatants. 
                                            
225
 For details, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts, pp. 70-3 
226
 Two recent contributions are: Michael Broers, The Concept of `Total War' in the Revolutionary--
Napoleonic Period, War in History, Vol. 15, No. 3, pps 243-268, and Steven Gunn, David Grummitt, 
and Hans Cools, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Widening the Debate, War in History, Vol. 
15, No. 4, pp 371-388.  
227
 Ruth Scurr, Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution, London: Vintage Books 
228
 For example between Slavoj Zizek who argues that Jacobin‘s shift to ‗Terror‘ was justified by 
circumstances (see: Slavoj Zizek (ed) Robespierre: Virtue and Terror, London: Verso) and those who 
see it as the progenitor of the sort of terror that inevitably follows a revolution staged for such 





To understand the development (or collapse) of the theory of Just War over the 150 
years from 1790 to 1945, it is less important to consider the merits of particular 
incidents and more to explore the ideological and technical changes that might have 
contributed to this change.  Fundamental to this analysis is the role of Nationalism in 
changing both the reasons for warfare and its conduct. 
 
2.1. Nationalism, Ideology and Just War 
 
Effectively both the American war of independence and the wars of the French 
revolution were partly justified by a relatively new logic of nationalism.  Whilst the 
concept of nationalism was not new, in this period it started to take on a form that 
both legitimised (in its own eyes) the reasons for war and what was legitimate in war. 
 
To a large extent, Europe up to the 1750s was dominated by a number of multi-
national, multi-ethnic empires and kingdoms.  Some, such as Bourbon France had a 
rough national element (even if Bretons, Normans and inhabitants of the South 
retained distinct languages from Cosmopolitan French) but others such as the 
Hapsburg domains (variously Austria, Hungary, Italy and Spain) were in reality little 
other than the holdings of the ruling dynasty.  Nonetheless, by this stage a number of 
more ‗national‘ states had started to emerge but there was no immediate view that all 
members of a particular ethnic group should be members of a single state (or that a 
national group should automatically have its own state).  
 
So the series of wars between 1550 and 1610 that saw the independence of parts of 
the Netherlands from the Spanish (Hapsburg) Empire did have a nationalist element to 
them
229
.  However, towards the end of the war, the successful (Protestant) provinces 
of the United Netherlands sought to conquer what is now Belgian Flanders.  
Although there are close ethnic and linguistic links between Dutch and Flemish 
(closer than between Dutch and Friesland in the east that did become part of the 
United Netherlands), the attempt failed.  Partly on religious grounds (Flanders being 
mainly Catholic) and partly on grounds of trade (Antwerp in particular made a lot of 
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money as part of Spanish trade with the new world), any attempt at appealing to a 
common national identity failed and Flanders was content to remain part of the 
Spanish empire. 
 
In the main, this continued to be an issue for the various European nationalist 
movements that appeared in the period from the 1750s to the end of the nineteenth 
century.  Although the appeal of a united and independent national polity was strong 
in Italy, Germany, Poland and Ireland (as some examples), the reality of population 
location in Europe almost always made achieving this complex.   
 
One difficulty for the new nationalists was what to do when faced with a nationalist 
revolt against them?  For example, the French revolution led to a successful slave 
revolt in Haiti that in turn had its own national identity (but was inspired by the ideals 
of the Republic).  The response of first the French Republic and then of Napoleon‘s 
empire was to try to destroy the independence movement and only grudgingly to 




A final example can be drawn from the events in the multi-ethnic Austrian Empire 
during the revolutionary period of 1848-9.  There, Magyar liberals and nationalists 
aimed to establish an independent Hungary
231
, fighting against what they saw as 
German oppression.  However, they, in turn suppressed the nationalist movements of 
Rumanians and Slavs (in the east and south of Hungary) and, as a result, those ethnic 
groups co-operated with the Austrian counter-attack on Hungary.  They, at least, 
feared Magyar nationalism more than they feared German nationalism. 
 
Thus, as a concept, especially in Europe, nationalism has worked in complex ways.  
It suited the French revolutionaries to fuse their republicanism with a concept of 
French nationalism (hence the words of the Marsellaise) and they were less tolerant 
of any nationalism that was at variance with their goal of a unitary France.  By the 
time of the German wars of unification led by Prussia from 1850-1870 and of Italy at 
the same period, the main driving force was of a state within the planned national 
borders establishing its political and military dominance. 
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However, it is in terms of its impact on the concepts of Just War that the nationalism 
of the period from 1750 had its greatest effect.  First, warfare ceased to be a matter 
of the (small) professional armies that had become the norm in Europe from the 1680s.  
Second, it ceased to be a set of relatively bounded skirmishes between multi-ethnic 
empires over colonies, disputed provinces or the kingship of particular regions.  
Even the Seven Years War (1756-1763) that saw fighting in Europe, India and 
America
232
, and ended with the loss of French possessions in Canada and India and a 
stronger Prussia was otherwise a stalemate.  No state had the goal of destruction of 
one of the others.   
 
The new wars (with a nationalist ideology) changed this.  First, in both the French 
and American revolutions, the idea emerged of an armed citizenry.  In turn that made 
everyone a potential combatant, which undermined one the key natural law concepts 
built into Jus in Bello.  Second, victory was not in terms of provinces changing 
hands but in terms of the overthrow of a regime.  So by the end of the Napoleonic 
period, the coalition against Napoleon was no longer aiming for the restitution of 
provinces but for complete victory over the Napoleonic state.  Many of the wars of 
the nineteenth century (German and Italian unification, the American Civil War) also 
had, as key goals, the destruction of one of the combatants rather than the more 
limited aims of eighteenth century warfare.  They also, increasingly, became marked 
by what would later be called guerrilla warfare, which, in turn, further weakened the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants. 
 
Overall as warfare also became more destructive, the scope of what was aimed for 
extended and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants became blurred.  
This all led to the return of the idea that warfare essentially was beyond regulation (eg 
Clauswitz and Nietsche) and the only real rule was to win as quickly as possible. 
 
These trends continued as warfare became increasingly mechanised in the nineteenth 
century. For example the American Civil War (1861-1865) can be seen as a truly 
modern war, in the sense that it integrated an industrial economy and transportation 
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infrastructure of which the most notable were the steelworks and railroads, directly 
related to the war effort. Similarly, it was considered ‗total‘ war, in the sense that the 
war aims of the United States sought total victory through the complete destruction of 





U.S. General William T. Sherman‘s ‗scorched earth‘ march from Atlanta to the sea in 
November and December 1864; not only created a trail of intentional destruction of 
any civilian assets that might have some military value to the Confederates, but had 
the purpose of punishing and terrifying the inhabitants.
234
 Sherman went on to order 
the February 1865 burning of South Carolina‘s capital, Columbia, as the ‗final 
revenge‘ for that State‘s act of secession in December 1860. Simply stated the conduct 
of the war, at least in its final days, reflected more the values of a Clausewitz than 




2.2 The Implications of Weapons’ Innovations  
 
If the emergence of nationalism, and subsequently liberalism, socialism, communism 
and fascism, all gave warfare a new theoretical basis, then the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries also saw a radical increase in the destructiveness of weaponry.  
Again, the goal here is not to chart this in detail but to consider how the capacity of 
more deadly weaponry interacted with the intent of new ideologies to undermine the 
concepts of Just War. 
 
Thus the First World War was not just marked by the emergence of new weaponry 
(poison gas, tanks etc) but the combatant nations of the First World War engaged in 
air bombing of civil populations (even if the available technology restricted its effect). 
The German submarine campaign against Britain in 1916-1917 was a conscious effort 
to considerably reduce available food supplies which were regularly imported from 
the Canada and the United States in the British Isles, so that the population would turn 
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against the national war effort.
236
 In turn, the British and French used a naval 
blockade to undermine the German war effort.  Understood in these terms, the 
constraints traditionally imposed by just war thinking were already moribund, if not 
dead yet, in wars fought amongst European powers.  All combatants saw their 
opponent‘s civil population as part of the war – as a pool of manpower to be 
mobilised, working in munitions factories etc – and thus were prepared to use 
starvation as an instrument of war policy.  The only constraint was the limited effect 
of the then available weapons technologies. 
 
These trends were immediately present in the Second World War but were much more 
destructive due to advances in technology.  It involved the intentional destructive 
targeting of civilian populations and the application of radically new technology for 
that purpose.  In turn this encouraged a rethinking by Christians not only of just 
war‘s traditional criteria, but also of the very principle itself. Certain moral absolutists 
argued that any targeting of civilian areas was morally unsupportable since non-
combatants should have had a presumptive immunity from attack based on jus in 
bello principles of discrimination.
237
 Discrimination refers to combatants and non-
combatants. This principle prohibits the intentional attack on non-combatants. 
Premeditated killing of combatants is acceptable during military operations, but 
combatants must exclude unarmed non-combatants from intentional targeting. Of 
course, this principle is long standing, hearkening back to the arguments of the Peace 




Equally, the direct targeting of civilian populations was not new. Medieval European 
History is replete with examples of such misbehaviours for example, the slaughter of 
the citizens of Limoges in 1370 in English-governed Gascony in response to the city 
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fathers‘ ‗treasonous‘ adoption of a policy of allegiance to the French Crown.
239
 What 
was unexpected was the regular
240
 resort to such behaviour after so many years of its 
relative avoidance.
241
 The World War II actions committed by forces on both sides of 
the conflict were products of operations research
242
 (determining the enemy‘s critical 
economic sectors and establishing them as legitimate military targets, irrespective of 
their actual location and the prospects of collateral damage, as was the case in the 
Royal Air Force bomber attacks on Hamburg), terror (in order to induce popular 
opposition to conflict continuation, as was the case of the Luftwaffe campaign against 
British cities during the Battle of Britain, 1940), and revenge (e.g., the sustained allied 
bombing of Dresden in February 1945 or Soviet behaviour once Red Army units 




One of the distinctive ‗signposts‘ of the lessening of morally based restraint in jus in 
bello was the application of force for exemplary purposes, e.g., to terrify a civilian 
population into submission. The Anglo-Gascon destruction of the Limousins in 1370 
had that purpose, the Prince of Wales intended the atrocity to serve as a warning to the 
populations of other towns in the region as to their prospective fate should they take 
the same political course of action as chosen by Limoges.
244
 The bombing of 
Rotterdam by German air forces in May 1940 was intended to undermine Dutch 
morale: the targeted area was the city centre which was of no military value, nor did 
its civil or economic functions contribute to Holland‘s defence efforts. The fiery 
destruction of Dresden, in return, can be seen as an almost final revenge for earlier 
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German bombing of civilian populations as ―The German bombing of Rotterdam on 





Finally, the single most relevant World War II development in weapons‘ technology 
by far, was the atomic bomb. Other military technologies were actually more 
destructive in terms of lives lost such as, for example, the aerial bombings on Tokyo 
on March 9-10, 1945 that took an estimated 83,000 lives.
246
 Yoder claims that ―The 
last years of World War I had made it clear that in the next war there would be aerial 
bombing of cities. In the course of disarmament negotiations up through 1933, the 
awareness of how destructive this would be and how hard to control had grown.‖
247
 
Such, however, was not the case with nuclear weapons. Equally, whilst the reason for 
the use of atom bomb remains disputed, as is the true reason for the Japanese 
surrender, it represented not just a totally new form of weapon but
248
 the manner of 
its first battlefield application contravened traditional understandings of jus in bello. 
 
For some just war theorists, the introduction of nuclear weapons has brought about an 
international condition that is also sui generis. For example, Michael Walzer, a 
secularist in the Grotius tradition, takes an absolutist approach toward nuclear 
weapons saying, ―Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war. They are the first 
of mankind‘s technological innovations that are simply not encompassable within the 
familiar moral world.‖
249
 This argument raises an even larger question: At what point 
does the increment of degree of capability—for it is both the expanded explosive 
capacity of nuclear weapons and the associated radiation that separates them from 
other munitions—translate into a difference of kind? This question raises various 
intellectual problems and moral conundrums in relation to other prospective ‗weapons 
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of mass destruction‘ (e.g., genetically engineered biological weapons specifically 
designed to attack the food sources of an enemy population). 
 
By the same token, there are prescriptions that are regularly recommended as 
appropriate responses to crises having a significant moral dimension. Nonetheless, 
these are essentially secularist, finding their antecedents, often not acknowledged, in 




3. Just War Theology in the Post-World War II Era 
 
One of the primary objectives of just war advocates since the end of World War II has 
been the genuine reinstitution of ‗just war‘ in practice. Michael Walzer has established 
a number of criteria. These criteria encompass (1) international society, composed of 
independent states; (2) international law privileges for each state‘s territorial integrity 
and political sovereignty; (3) force or threat of force against any state constitutes 
aggression and is criminal; (4) aggression merits either self-defence by the victim or 
such action assisted by other nations acting in the manner of law enforcement; (5) 
nothing but aggression can be an excuse for war; and (6) offending states may be 
punished after being repulsed.
251
 As Walzer admits, these criteria may not be perfect 





In light of developments over the past few decades, Walzer has allowed a few 
corollaries to amend the rigor of the original rules. States may take pre-emptive action 
in the face of imminent attack. Representative secessionist groups unjustly governed 
may be aided. And finally, states act justly when they come to the aid of populations 
facing massacre or enslavement by rapacious governments.
253
 By any standards, 
these are provocative suggestions however moral their purposes may be. Collectively, 
the legalist paradigm and its corollaries reflect a reaction to the enormities of the 
twentieth century.  
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The development of nuclear weapons, their use in Japan at the end of World War II, 
and latterly, the build-up of nuclear arsenals and means of delivery carried out by a 
number of world powers, have engaged the thinking of moral theologians and have 
raised fundamental questions concerning the conduct of military operations within the 
confines of just war theory. Without doubt, developing and maintaining nuclear 
arsenals to use in war must call into question the provisions of jus in bello. To the 
extent that such warfare necessarily includes an attack on civilian populations—even 
in the context of an attack on an otherwise legitimate military target (e.g., a military 
airfield in or near a large city)—raises fundamental issues of discrimination and 
proportionality. Of course, it must be understood that such is not an absolutely certain 
outcome. One might envision combat employment of nuclear munitions—e.g., 
targeting enemy naval assets at sea, approaching strategic bombers at high altitude, or 
communications/surveillance satellites in orbit—in which the prospect of direct 
civilian casualties is remote, even if the resultant fall out and immediate damage to 
electronic communications would cause wider death and disruption. 
 
However, Yoder implies, at the very least, that nuclear war planners, however limited 
their intended nuclear munitions applications, fail to meet necessary just war 
prudential requirements stating, ―[Just war] criteria may hardly function as a checklist, 
for those making the decisions about war do not use a checklist to determine all of 
their specific motives and goals.‖
254
 Likewise, Oliver O‘Donovan sees in the 
prospective use of nuclear weapons the requirement for ―the radical correction of the 
praxis of war,‖
255
 if only because ―if the tradition which claims that war may be 
justified does not also admit that in particular cases it may not be justified, the 
affirmation is not morally serious.‖
256
 This locution, of course, points to the 
fundamental purpose of jus ad bellum. In sum, O‘Donovan argues that although 
―[weapon] design provides the most immediate evidence of indiscriminate 
intention,‖
257 
it is the actual purpose of the exercising party that is morally governing, 
if only because ―there is no weapon that cannot be an instrument of indiscriminate 
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In a larger sense, these locutions raise a number of logical questions. If the ‗correction 
of praxis‘ to be undertaken effectively eliminated the option to wage war under any 
and all circumstances because exercise of the option inherently raised the prospect of 
the employment of nuclear weapons, just war theory would be reduced to a nullity, if 
only because the responsible moralist would be ipso facto reduced to an automatic 
pacifism. As it happens, O‘Donovan takes a more nuanced approach. While the 
application of extremely high-yield (megaton range) weapons may generate 
inherently disproportionate outcomes, irrespective of the manner of targeting, even 




Both Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsay couch their thinking relating to the use of 
nuclear weapons in terms of civilization implications. Niebuhr, a committed pacifist, 
during pre-World War II years amended his earlier views in light of the threat to 
Christian civilization and values posed by national enemies driven by totalitarian 
ideologies. The prospect—evidently an extremely remote one—of civilization being 
physically destroyed by nuclear holocaust was a risk worth taking, if only to preserve 
that same civilization from complete moral disfigurement at totalitarian hands.
260
 
This argument resonates amongst the Korean Church today and, as discussed in 
chapter five onwards, the key question is whether it is worth the risk of nuclear war in 
attempting to bring down the regime in the DPRK or to work with that regime to 
remove nuclear weapons from Korea. 
 
Ramsay, like O‘Donovan, considers megaton-range weapons inherently non-
discriminatory, hence inappropriate for application under jus in bello constraints. 
―Any weapon whose every use must be for the purpose of directly killing non-
combatants as a means of attaining some supposed good [is] immoral.‖
261
 In absolute 
terms, Ramsay‘s argument appears unassailable. However, as a practical matter, 
megaton range weapons were never developed for the direct purpose of annihilating 
civilian populations. Rather, their primary purpose was the destruction of ‗hardened‘ 
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targets, e.g., enemy missile silos, perhaps under conditions of pre-emptive war. This 
application, of course, raises a host of just war considerations under the general rubric 




3.1. The Morality of Deterrence 
 
As described earlier, one of the components of just war, as understood by Thomas 
Aquinas, was that belligerents ―intend the advancement of good or the avoidance of 
evil.‖
263
 It would appear at least inferentially, that maintaining a stockpile of nuclear 
weapons intended to be used solely in response to a particularly grave and patent 
provocation (i.e., one that threatened the continued existence of the state or its 
citizenry) would at the least constitute an effort to bring about the ‗avoidance of evil‘ 
that would be incurred should a nuclear attack be initiated. In other words, the effort 
to avoid evil does not depend on a rational calculation, but rather implies an 
imagination of unimaginable damage. As O‘Donovan argues, ―Deterrence is about 
how the behaviour of nations can be subjected to management, by taking the infinite 
into our threats and by deploying the calculated prospect of human action and reaction 




In this regards, Ramsay indirectly argues that an existing nuclear arsenal contributes 
to prudential behaviour. He first lays out the changed circumstances of war.  
 
―What has happened since the atom bomb burst upon the world is that a religious ethic must 
rediscover obedience in a situation in which calculation becomes less and less possible. 
Neither pacifism nor bellicism can afford any longer to be concerned primarily with historical 
success; neither can derive its choices backward from prudential consideration of what will 
work or save the situation… The real import of the bomb is not that pacifism is proved to be 
workable, nor even that non-pacifism is proved unworkable, but that any horizontal and 




To overcome this inadequacy, Ramsay suggests reliance on ambiguity, a situation 
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contributing to, and sustaining the maintenance of, a prudential international regime.  
 
―There is deterrence that is mutual and may be quite enough inhering in the weapons 
themselves that are possessed even without any government intending any additional 
ambiguity concerning its possible use of them. There is a deterring ambiguity, or potential for 





O‘Donovan again takes a somewhat more nuanced approach, at least implying that 
opposition to a deterrent strategy based on weapons possession reflected an absolutist 
approach to pacifism, one involving ―a misreading of the just-war proposal as 




Walzer, in turn, dismisses deterrence as an acceptable strategy.  
 
―Atomic war was death indeed, indiscriminate and total, and after Hiroshima, the first task of 
political leaders everywhere was to prevent its recurrence. The means they adopted is the 
promise of reprisal in kind. Against the threat of an immoral attack, they have put the threat of 




From at least one perspective, Walzer‘s assessment (and, perhaps, even his corrective 
prescription) is anomalous. Walzer has consciously developed his just war theory in 
secularist terms. However, at least inferentially, his argument actually, more an 
assertion has the ring of religious oratory, if not precisely explored and reported in 
that terminology. 
 
Absolutist arguments based on religious precepts have been commonly forwarded, 
although, as a practical matter, have enjoyed little popular support from more the 
realist theologians such as Reinhold Neibuhr or Ramsey.
269
 Duane Friessen, an 
evangelical pacifist, argues that persons of his persuasion can ―appropriately employ 
just-war categories as a set of middle axioms to judge the behaviour of nations when 
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they are unable or unwilling to abandon trust in armed force as the way to peace.‖
270
 
As it happens, this is precisely the approach that O‘Donovan considers inappropriate. 
Friessen puts in religious terms the same blanket assertion made by Walzer. ―It is 
ultimately unacceptable for Christians to threaten to do violence against others in 
order to deter them from violence. Christians cannot simultaneously proclaim the 
good news of the Gospel and threaten their Soviet brothers and sisters with nuclear 
war.‖
271
 Some absolutists do not shrink from the graver implications of the anti-
deterrence argument. For example, American moral philosophy professor Gordon 
Zahn, after first establishing (at least to his own satisfaction) that prudential 
deterrence must eventually break down, concludes ―that since the destruction of 
millions of lives by America is the only possible alternative, then it is better to perish 
as the victim of the inhumanity of others than to save oneself or one‘s nation by 




Theologian George Weigel contends that such arguments constitute a categorical error, 
in the sense that the hierarchy of moral values has been subverted.  
 
―As a tradition of statecraft, the just war argument recognizes that there are circumstances in 
which the first and most urgent obligation in the face of evil is to stop it… [This] requires us 
to be morally serious and politically responsible. Moral seriousness and political responsibility 









3.2. Discrimination and Proportion in the Application of Force 
 
According to O‘Donovan, ―The two criteria to be met by any act of war…are, first, 
that it should not intend to take innocent lives (in effect, the lives of non-belligerents)-
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though it may happen that they perish, and fore-seeably so, in the course of an attack 
which intends only the destruction of a military objective; and second, that the evil it 
inflicts should be less grave than the evil it seeks to avert.‖
275
 In other words, he 
argues that weapons applications in warfare should be morally constrained under the 
principles of discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination can refer to both 
combatants and non-combatants in practice. Of course, it is forbidden to undertake the 





However, there clearly are numerous ambiguities. O‘Donovan lays out the problem 
for the conscientious military planner by saying, ―At the heart of the project of 
subjecting armed conflict to the disciplines of judgment stands what has been called 
in modern time the ‗principle of discrimination.‘ Separating the innocent from the 
guilty is the object of judgment, the intention that defines it.‖
277
 For example, enemy 
propagandists may, in a certain sense, be fundamental to war as is an enemy soldier, 
even if he were not in uniform. The same considerations may extend to an enemy-
state‘s national leaders.  
 
Much more difficult is the issue of strategic warfare. Modern warfare depends on 
industrial production and transportation infrastructure. Any attack on such facilities 
inherently involves a direct attack on civilians. Conceivably, this might be justified if 
all adult workers providing such products and services were considered de facto 
enemy combatants. In effect, many victims of allied air raids in Germany and Japan 
were Prisoners of War or Slave Labourers forced to work in factories.  But even then, 
the problem would remain unresolved insofar as many other that could not be 
considered combatants (e.g., infants, the aged) would inevitably find themselves 
amidst an attack and subjected to its harmful effects. 
 
Proportionality relates to weapons applications, in the sense of restricting destructive 
efforts to only that degree necessary to achieve military objectives. Thus, even though 
a state has a right to wage war, this principle should be satisfied for just war defenders 
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while warfare is being engaged, as the use of force is the last resort in such theory.
278
 
Under the terms of proportionality, social and restorative justice benefits gained by 
resorting to war must outweigh whatever evil came from the destruction inherent to 
the effort. 
 
For better or for worse, the application of either discrimination or proportionality 
lends itself to abuse, in the sense that just war thinkers may be tempted to shape 
criteria to meet specific conditions suited to hostilities at hand, rather than the other 
way round. As Yoder points out, legitimate criteria may not function simply as a 
checklist, as war checklist-makers usually do not employ such a checklist to examine 
their own specific motives and goals.
279
 In this regard, when this assumption is lost 
in criteria application, ―just war thinking [discrimination and proportionality] easily 
degenerates into the justification, even sometimes the glorification, of war, violence 
and force, because it is assumed that, once the set criteria are met, the military action 




On the other hand, after first observing ‗the ends justify the means, since nothing else 
can, but they do not justify any means,‘ Paul Ramsey establishes two ingredients ―in 
the moral economy governing the use of force: discrimination and proportion. Non-
combatant immunity assesses the action itself with no prudential reference yet to the 
totality of the consequences, while the principle of proportion takes all the effects for 
the first time into account. An action having multiple consequences, some of which 




Unfortunately, however, the principle of discrimination was undermined during the 
Second World War. Since the modern states‘ capacity to wage war is to a significant 
extent measured in economic terms, attacking an enemy‘s war production 
infrastructure appears sensible. However, much of that production is to be found in 
cities; any air assault on such assets is likely to result in collateral damage. A 
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substantial portion of the civilian damage sustained by the axis powers at the hands of 
the Allied Air Forces during World War II was attributable to just such bombing 
campaigns. Yoder describes the underlying factors at work when he said,  
 
―Wars are won less by position, which can depend on a decisive battle, and more by attrition, 
which depends on the total strength of the enemy‘s economy. Thus, the economy can be 
manipulated in such a way that even civilian productivity is understood as contributing to the 
war effort… The technologies of manufacturing, transportation, and communication expanded 
exponentially the capacity to destroy and the speed at which it could be done… 




The magnitude of civilian losses, even after separating out those casualties inflicted 
under the rubric of ‗terror‘ or ‗revenge‘, led to a concerted effort in the immediate 
post-war era to prevent any repetition.
283
 There are, however, a number of 
fundamental difficulties at work. Both technology and economic structures are in 
constant flux. A relatively innocuous technology or industry today might become a 
vital one in efforts to assure military success tomorrow. Thus, for example, a nation‘s 
communications grid and information-processing computer network would likely be a 
more important target today than, say, its oil refining capacity was fifty or sixty years 
ago. Combined with advances in weapons technology most notably, precision-guided 
munitions the prospective reduction in anticipated collateral damage (specifically, 
civilian casualties) may actually work as an incentive to undertake such actions 
However, there are perhaps unwanted consequences. For example, as Michael 
Johnson offers an example, 
 
―To summarize the emerging revolution in military affairs, the world took notice when… 
[coalition forces] exploited information dominance to destroy the vaunted Iraqi Republican 
Guard in 100 hours with 148 casualties. Unfortunately, would-be tyrants and aggressors 
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A case can be construed on the basis that nuclear weapons‘ destructive power is so 
harmful that as such no proportionality or discrimination ‗double effect‘ criterion 
could ever be made to morally applicable. As O‘Donovan states,  
 
―It is not a matter of how many people are killed by it [nuclear weapon], or even how many 
civilians are killed compared with how many combatants. It is a matter of its structure of 





Michael Walzer simply puts this ―Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war.‖
287
 
Nonetheless, given the often claimed political purposes of nuclear arsenals (e.g., 
deterrence), a number of thinkers have argued otherwise. While granting that the 
application of nuclear weapons in land warfare would almost certainly destroy the 
moral fabric (as well as the physical assets) of an enemy nation—thereby effectively 
undermining Aquinas‘ restorative justice argument permitting resort to war—as well 
as diminishing (if not obliterating) the moral integrity of the nuclear attacker, 
Reinhold Niebuhr believes that the risk of destroying civilization in order to deter a 
greater evil (e.g., totalitarian domination) was worth taking.
288
 Likewise, Ramsey 
argues the necessity of low-range nuclear weapons for defence and security, given 
certain restrictions
289
 while he opposes the application of megaton-range weapons 
(‗city busters‘) because they cannot be applied in combat without directly killing non-
combatants.
290
 For him, low-range nuclear weapons might be applied to, and whose 
explosive force would be restricted to, a battlefield where few or no non-combatants 
might be found. 
 
However, Jeffrey Stout, moral theologian at Princeton University, regards Ramsey‘s 
parsing of nuclear weapon explosive output as effectively making him a proponent of 
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nuclear weapons.  
 
―The more Ramsey thought about the technological development, the less trouble he had 
imagining uses for nuclear weapons. If the destructive effects could be controlled, their use 





In objective terms that observation certainly appears to be the case. Stout‘s objection 
to Ramsey may actually be more basic. For many nuclear weapons thinkers, there is 
an effective moral ‗firebreak‘ separating the use of fission and fusion weapons from 
the use of their conventional counterparts. Stout appears to find Ramsey‘s thinking a 
threat to that ‗firebreak.‘ 
 
O‘Donovan takes a similar approach to Ramsey‘s, but with a more straightforward 
treatment of the ‗firebreak‘ factor. He believes that high-yield nuclear weapons could 
not be categorically incompatible with the pursuit of justice, at least in their deterrent 
capacity. However, unlike Ramsey, O‘Donovan believes that smaller, tactical (or 
‗battlefield‘) nuclear weapons are inherently disproportionate, not because of their 
specific destructiveness but ―because of the risk of escalation and the powerful 
psychological threshold that separates nuclear from conventional weapons.‖
292
 
Thereafter, O‘Donovan suggests that if all megaton-range weapons had been 
abolished (e.g., by international agreement), the remaining smaller nuclear weapons 
might see their singular character (in comparison to their conventional counterparts) 
diminished if not erased, and remaining tactical nuclear weapons ―might well take 
their place among the decent arsenals of civilized countries‖
293
—in effect, 
disembarking into nuclear proliferation. 
 
Intent plays a major role in the development, disposition and application of nuclear 
weapons. In his discussion of discrimination—he uses the antithetical locution 
‗indiscrimination‘—O‘Donovan dispatches the issue of intent as well as that of 
ostensible uncontrollability. ―The term ‗indiscriminate‘ is often applied to weapons of 
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low precision or accuracy, or to weapons with uncontrollable side effects, but this is a 
misleading use of it. Discrimination has to do with the intention of attack, not with the 
technical limitations or grossness of the means.‖
294
 Thus, for example, ―anyone who 
deliberately maintains dirty weapons
295
 when clean ones are available is open to 
strong suspicion of indiscriminate intent, yet clearly this cannot be an intrinsic 
indiscriminacy of the weapon itself, which has not changed.‖
296
 O‘Donovan 
concludes that, while ―design provides the most immediate evidence of indiscriminate 
intention,‖ actual intent is more apposite, if only because ―there is no weapon that 
cannot be an instrument of indiscriminate intent.‖
297
 Thus, establishing the 
indiscriminate character of a nuclear weapon becomes a function of its owner‘s 
intentions, rather than some consideration intrinsic to the specific design of the 
weapon on hand. For example, if the sole purpose of such weapons were deterrence, 
then by this definition they cannot be indiscriminate (the stated intent is none use), 




There has been a ‗sea change‘ in nuclear weapons thinking among Western Christians, 
specifically pertaining to the distinction between possession and their actual 
application in warfare over the past few decades. During the 1960s and 1970s both 
Roman Catholic and Protestant leaders regularly forwarded the argument that the 
existence of such weapons was inherently immoral, if only because their existence 
made possible their usage and any such use would be per se morally objectionable. 
However, by the early 1980s this ‗absolutist‘ stance showed signs of evolution toward 
a more nuanced approach, one that somewhat grudgingly afforded a modest measure 
of legitimacy to the notion of nuclear deterrence.
299
 For example, in their pastoral 
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letter, The Challenge of Peace,
300
 American Catholic bishops allowed that 
―Governments threatened by armed, unjust aggression must defend their people. This 
includes defence by armed forces as a last resort.‖
301
 In this respect, American 
bishops appeared to be edging closer to Paul Ramsey‘s thinking rather than to that of 
John Yoder whose thinking had enjoyed widespread support in Catholic ‗anti-nuclear‘ 
circles. 
 
This development—legitimating the establishment of nuclear arsenals under the 
rubric of ‗just deterrence‘
302
—led to the view that deterring war through military 
strength constituted a means of avoiding conflict and was therefore a reasonable 
component of just war doctrine. For such thinkers, the purpose of ‗just deterrence‘ is 
to make prospects of peace proper under conditions proper of the nuclear age,
303
 
which, in turn, contributes not only to the prevention of war, but also the improvement 




Jeffery Stout identifies an inherent moral shortcoming in the ‗just deterrence‘ 
argument. Even if there were no intent to use nuclear weapons indiscriminately—i.e., 
contravening the proportionality and discriminatory precepts—the moral order would 
nonetheless be breached.  
 
―If it is unjust to do something, it is also unjust to intend to use them [nuclear weapons] under 
certain possible future circumstances. If both bluffing and leaving our intentions ambiguous or 
unformed also turn out to be unjust, then there is no just way to pursue a strategy of nuclear 
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Part of the problem is conceptual, insofar as the initial purposes for nuclear weapons 
development and procurement have been overtaken by other strategic purposes in 
relation to their retention. Whatever the practical merits of deterrence, nonetheless, 
the moral inconsistency remains unresolved. All parties are in agreement that actual 
use of such weapons would be morally reprehensible, perhaps even intrinsically evil. 
And it is here that a logical inconsistency appears, as renunciation of use also implies 
invalidity of possession. According to British theologian John R. W. Stott, who has 
regularly addressed the issue of morality of threatening to resort to nuclear weapons 
during crisis periods, ―We are caught between the ineffective and the immoral, or 
rather between a moral stance which is ineffective and an ineffective deterrent which 
[if used] would be immoral, and so between principle and prudence, between what is 
right and what is realistic.‖
306
 It should be understood that Stott is taking the 
argument considerably further than many of his contemporaries. In not so many 
words, he is arguing that whatever the merits of deterrence, reliance on such a strategy 
is fundamentally corrupting, irrespective of its effectiveness. Therefore, even if 
deterrence were to succeed indefinitely it would nevertheless be a morally 
unacceptable strategic option. 
 
Stott‘s argument reflects a profound understanding of the choice facing the 
Christian—that of Jesus or that of ‗practicality.‘
307
 In Stott‘s way of thinking, the 
Christian who opts to use nuclear weapons chooses to overlook Christ‘s redemptive 
work. It is not a matter of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, irrespective of the 
prudential behaviour of the possessor or for that matter, the manner in which such 
weapons might be actually employed in time of war or crisis. The moral fault lies in 
the attempt to use evil to defeat evil. Jesus asked rhetorically, ―if Satan drives out 
Satan, he is divided against himself. Now then how can his kingdom stand?‖
308
 
American moral philosopher and Union University (Tennessee, USA) professor David 
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Gushee emphasize this aspect of Jesus‘ ministry. ―He did battle; he waged war against 
evil, one might say, but he did not resort to evil to wage war against evil.‖
309
All in all, 
Christians who support reliance on nuclear weapons—however limited that support 
may be, e.g., strategic deterrence—are nonetheless engaging in a morally questionable 
transaction by arguing that the acceptable ends (e.g., some species of international 
peace) justify the means used to achieve them. All Christians—not just pacifist or 
other moral ‗absolutists‘—are called upon to oppose the notion that virtuous ends ipso 
facto justify the means employed to gain them. Thus, for those who wish to imitate 
Christ, reliance—no matter how limited—on nuclear weapons to prevent war is as 
wrong as employing evil means to prevent evil results. 
 
4. Concluding Thoughts 
 
The history of just war theory, at least until about the time of the Reformation, can be 
described as a debate amongst those who favoured reducing the reach and severity of 
state-sponsored violence and sought to codify such limitations. That codification 
effort collapsed in the face of the changing nature of the nation-state, developments in 
weapons technology, and the development of an understanding of the citizenry as a 
tacit component of the state‘s defence posture. While the post-Westphalia period had 
the appearance of one in which just war theory was a generally accepted restraint on 
state-sponsored violence (at least in Europe), it was more likely the case that a 
combination of war exhaustion and rough equality among states (or combinations of 
states) kept violence at least to manageable levels. 
 
However, that period‘s relative quiescence was contingent on both social and 
technological stasis, conditions that could not be expected to be indefinitely sustained. 
Once this started to break down, say in the political and military developments as a 
result of the French Revolution then respect for just war principles were 
undermined
310
. One of the early objectives of the revolution was to extend its effects 
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across Europe, initially in a non-military sense (it saw its ideals as universal).  
Revolutionary armies were welcomed in places like the Low Countries and in parts of 
Germany where they found local Jacobin clubs
311
 sympathetic to the ideals of the 
revolution.  However, both sides in the early wars increasingly came to see the 
whole population of their enemy as combatants. Equally by 1795, France‘s war aims 
were no longer particularly linked to the ideals of the revolution but aimed at 
conventional conquest of its enemies
312
 (and vice versa).  
 
Just as war exhaustion in the middle years of the seventeenth century contributed to a 
‗plateau‘ period of ostensible acquiescence to just war principles—on paper, if not 
always internalized—so has the devastation of the twentieth century‘s world wars 
generated what might be called ‗moral exhaustion,‘ in the sense that society could no 
longer tolerate the cost, either in terms of lives lost or property destroyed. This, in turn, 
has led to a resurrection of just war theory—interestingly, in both its religious and 
secular (or ‗legalist‘) formats. Moreover, the advent of nuclear weapons has affected 
notions of war in terms of just war theories. Nonetheless, it does not mean that such 
weapons did alter the anarchical character of the international order.
313
 Apart from 
the lively discussion of the morality of nuclear weapons among the western scholars, 
the spread of those weapons became a new theme in the context of each state‘s 
political and international relations to the other states. 
 
These debates on Just War (and the extent that nuclear weapons lead to a totally new 
framework) are now discussed in the connect of current Korean Christian attitudes 
toward war and security matters, in particular, procurement of nuclear weapons.  
However, what is clear is the extent to which Nuclear Weapons change the pre-1945 
understanding of Just War.  The scope for devastation, and the lack of any 
meaningful ability to limit the consequential damage, means their use (or even the 
concept of deterrence) cannot be justified in terms of Christian Just War theology.  
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This has substantial implications for the positions that should be adopted by the 
Korean Protestant Churches.  The extent to which this is the case is returned to in 





















Chapter 4: Development of the Protestant Community in South 




The previous sections have explored the evolution of Christian thinking about Just 
War and its developments in the nuclear era.  The next stage is to place those debates 
into a specifically Korean dimension.  The post-war period saw the Christian 
community (and Korea) divided in a way that was alien in the recent history of the 
peninsular.  There may have been a lack of independence but there had always been 
a unitary state covering the ethnic and geographic area.  The other major factor was a 
continuation of the military violence that had marked the previous 50 years.  This 
period saw actual armed conflict up to 1953 followed by an uneasy truce.  This 
meant the Christian community had to respond to internal division and the realities of 
armed conflict. 
 
To a large extent the initial response was to stress unity (koimoina) and Missio Dei 
rather than to ground the debates in the concepts of Just War.  Divergent strands in 
the Protestant community (the CCK and the NCCK) share a desire for Korean unity 
but differ in the approach they take.  This difference has become especially 
important since it became obvious that the DPRK was first seeking and then 
possessed nuclear weapons.  The NCCK started to place the priority on ridding the 
peninsular of nuclear weapons by engagement with the DPRK as a precondition for 
unity.  The CCK took a view that the only way to unity was first to seek the 
overthrow of the DPRK. 
 
Neither response is actually particularly in tune with the Christian view of Just War, 
especially as articulated in response to the possession or use of nuclear weapons.  
This chapter starts to pull these themes together and commences by looking at the 
evolution of nuclear weapons policy in the South and the Christian response to this. 
 




In 1953 South Korea entered into a Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States that 
established ―a number of U.S. military bases in Korea. In addition to the deployment 
of nuclear weapons, the U.S. reserved the right of first use of nuclear weapons, not 
only to deter but also to repel any attack on South Korea.‖
314
 Thus, at the outset, 
South Korea was an object of consideration in the prospective use of nuclear weapons, 
should hostilities resume on the peninsula, but not a determining agent of the manner 
or situations in which those same weapons would be applied. 
 
However, Korean regimes from the 1950s to, at least formally, 1975 also sought to 
develop nuclear weapons in their own right.  This is regularly associated with the 
military dictatorship of General Park Chung-hee (1917-1979)
315
 though Korean 
efforts in establishing a nuclear engineering knowledge base can be traced back in 
time to the brief Chang Myon government (1960-1961).  The initial development of 
nuclear technology was almost certainly economically inspired—one intended to 
develop a sustainable source of electric power, independent of foreign energy sources 
(primarily imported oil, as Korea has modest indigenous coal resources). It appears 
that Korean nuclear development remained primarily peace-oriented or, perhaps more 





As a practical issue, South Korea in the 1950s was in no position to develop an 
independent nuclear weapons arsenal. The nation lacked the required industrial base. 
A cadre of trained physicists, nuclear and chemical engineers, and industrial 
technicians would imply at least a decade to acquire.
317
 There was no national 
political incentive to proceed in such an endeavour. Nonetheless, in the late 1950s 
South Korea embarked on a peaceful nuclear program that, at the least, had the 
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potential to become a nuclear weapons program. According to Pinkston, a senior 
analyst for the International Crisis Group (ICG) in Seoul, the peaceful nuclear 
program was a smoke screen ―to establish the infrastructure to sustain a nuclear 
development program.‖
318
  Of course, other countries, including the UK, lied about 
the reasons for their ostensibly civil nuclear programmes in the 1950s.  Sellafield, as 
an example, was never designed to produce electricity and always to generate fissile 




While these efforts remained ostensibly non-defence oriented in the years that 
followed, matters took an abrupt turn in 1968. 
 
The rationale behind this ‗nuclear turn‘ seems to be a combination of fear that the US 
would abandon South Korea and a response to continued DPRK aggression.  The 
latter was clearly exemplified in January 1968 when a raid by a group of North 
Korean commandos, in an apparent effort to decapitate the South Korean government, 
―nearly succeeded in mounting a sneak attack on the presidential palace.‖
320
 
President Park responded to this provocation with the announcement that Korea 
would seek a ‗self-reliant‘ defence, i.e., one not contingent on American oversight. 
This, of course, indicates that the Park government had already given serious 
consideration to reorienting the direction of Korea‘s nuclear development program 
along military lines. 
 
More unsettling than any assassination attempt however, were very strong hints of an 
incipient reduction in the American military presence in the Far East, as part of what 




In January 1969, President-elect Richard Nixon announced the U.S. disengagement 
out of Asia, including Korea. This was a grave security concern to pro-US regimes 
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across Asia and South Korea.
322
 This decision, perhaps even more than the North 
Korean attempt on his life, encouraged General Park to opt for an independent Korean 
nuclear capacity. He responded to Nixon‘s decision stating, ―South Korea will do 
everything necessary, including developing nuclear weapons, to defend itself if the 




In summary, ―South Korea began a nuclear weapons program in 1970, in response to 
Nixon Doctrine‘s emphasis on self-defence for Asian allies. Following the withdrawal 
of 26,000 American troops [the Seventh Infantry Division, assigned to Korea for 
almost two decades], the South Korean government established a Weapons 




Ironically the year in which South Korea formally abandoned its nuclear weapons 
(1975) also saw the defeat of the US backed forces in Vietnam.  In the light of this 
rationale, it is unclear why General Park‘s government should have agreed to the 
American political solution. Indeed, as American strategic analyst Edward Olsen 
observed, ―The Park government was motivated [to develop a nuclear weapons 
capability] by a combination of a desire for nationalistic self-reliance and anxieties in 





Nonetheless, the Republic of Korea ratified the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on April 23, 1975, thus officially ending the nation‘s efforts 
to develop nuclear warfare capability. South Korea‘s ratification of the NPT was 
largely a function of political pressure exerted by the United States. This extended to 
trade sanction threats against such American trading partners as France (which had 
contracted with Korea to provide a plutonium reprocessing facility) and Canada 
(contracted to provide a heavy water reactor capable of producing weapons-grade 
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plutonium), and these trade agreements were eventually rescinded.
326
 The American 
quid pro quo for Korean acquiescence to the NPT was a guarantee of South Korea‘s 
national integrity. 
 
What is not clear, according to Global Security, is whether South Korea really 
renounced the search for nuclear weapons in 1975.  They note ―Although President 
Park Chung-hee said in 1977 that South Korea would not develop nuclear weapons, 
he continued a clandestine program that only ended with his assassination in October 
1979.‖
327
 Daniel A. Pinkston, an American national security analyst, confirms this 
assessment in part, but argues further, that the development program did not die with 
the President. ―Presidents Park Chung Hee, Chun Du Hwan, and Roh Tae Woo later 
pledged to forgo the development of nuclear weapons, but there are reports that all 





According to Global Security, for instance, ―South Korea may have had plans in the 
1980s to develop nuclear weapons to deter an attack by the North. The plans were 
reported to have been dropped under U.S. pressure.‖
329
 For the U.S. government a 
nuclear armed South Korea was not desirable either for the regional balance of power 




In partial confirmation of this, the Korean government recently reported to the 
International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) that in ―the early 1980s, a 
laboratory scale experiment had been performed at this facility to irradiate 2.5 
kilograms of depleted uranium and separate a small amount of plutonium.‖
331
 And, in 
2004, Korean research facilities, evidently conducting clandestine research efforts in 
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violation of existing agreements between South Korea and the IAEA,
332
 produced 
minute quantities of weapons grade enriched uranium, although, officially at least, 
―the government of the Republic of Korea did not have an enrichment or reprocessing 
program at all, and do not have and will not have that enrichment or reprocessing 
facilities [at any time in the future].‖
333
 Simply stated, it appears that for the past 
three decades there has been at least some distance between official public policy 
relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Republic of Korea (absolute 
forbearance) and the actual reality (applicable research efforts of perhaps varying 
degrees of intensity). 
 
Overall, among South Koreans there have been arguments for the necessity of nuclear 
weapons, and a revival of the plans, whenever military tensions between South and 
North Korea have been raised. Koreans have long manifested ambivalence at the 
prospect of nuclear weapons development. Thousands of Koreans, forcibly recruited 
and transported to Japan to perform industrial labour in support of the latter‘s war 
effort, were incinerated during the atomic strikes on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 
1945.
334
 By the same token, the North Korean assault on South Korea in 1950 
underlined the existential threat posed by a communist dictatorship determined to 
unify the peninsula under draconian Marxist rule. While United Nations and Republic 
of Korea (ROK) forces managed to secure what would eventually become the 
‗armistice‘ border—roughly following the 38
th
 parallel that had originally divided the 
two Koreas in 1946—South Korea was physically devastated and, for practical 
purposes, dependent on the United States to secure its national integrity. 
 
Interestingly, successive South Korean governments, irrespective of their dictatorial 
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or democratic natures, have pursued long-range missile delivery systems. For example,  
 
―South Korea began deploying US-made missiles in December 2003 that can strike most of 
North Korea. The Army Tactical Missile System Block 1A missiles are being deployed near 
the Demilitarized Zone. South Korea deployed 110 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 
up to 300 km (187 miles) by April 2004. This marks the first time that South Korea will 
deploy 300-km medium-range missiles, which are capable of striking Pyongyang and other 




It is against this context, that the Protestant community sought to address the issue of 
nuclear weapons and the danger that any further armed conflict could lead to the 
destruction of the entire peninsular.  In this process, more emphasis has been put on 
ways to achieve re-unification than on taking into account the precepts of Just War. 
 
2.1. Considering South Korean Nuclear Initiatives in Terms of Just War 
Theory 
 
Given the constraints outlined above, it becomes possible to establish the just war 
parameters that limited strategic planning of successive post-war South Korean 
governments. At its most fundamental level, global Korean government planning 
points to a teleological (as opposed to deontological) mode of thinking. Deontology, 
as outlined previously, refers to constraints established by (often abstract) duties. Yet 
the primary—indeed, the most fundamental—duty of the state is to secure the survival 
and to maximum extent within its power, the well being of its citizenry.
336
 Other 
duties, however noble, must assume a lesser status in practice. Again as outlined 
above, teleological thinking presupposes that a consideration of ends may provide a 
justification of the means availed of to achieve these; to such an extent that the 
possession of a nuclear retaliatory capacity provides the necessary measure of security 
to a nation. 
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There remain the issues of jus in bello and jus ad bellum. The jus ad bellum 
consideration is quite straightforward. Given inherent design limitations on both 
weapons and delivery vehicles, no South Korean government appears to have 
considered initiating a nuclear conflict as reasonable means of resolving the north-
south dispute. Rather, the purpose of such munitions was to deter a North Korean 
onslaught. The jus in bello component of the moral equation is more complex. 
 
As outlined in Part I, a major natural law constraint inherent in jus in bello is that of 
proportionality. As noted, Hugo Grotius argued that in the conduct of military 
operations it is essential to discriminate between non-combatants and combatants.
337
 
In this regards, Nuclear Weapons, no matter how tightly constrained in targeting and 
technical marksmanship, when used in the proximity of civilian installations, will 
generally cause a great number of fatalities and substantial destruction of non-military 
assets, generally described as ‗collateral damage.‘ 
 
Quite obviously, South Korean planners have rejected such anti-nuclear absolutist 





On the other hand, both Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsay situate their thinking 
related to nuclear weapons‘ use in terms of civilizational implications. They permit 
the use of nuclear weapons in case that human civilization is endangered by a certain 
factor such as impending military threats by totalitarian states.
339
 Likewise, to the 
extent that South Korean government planners have sought to secure the citizenry 
from totalitarian rule—and it may be reasonably inferred that such a goal, along with 
national survival itself, was a consideration—development of such weapons could be 
acceptable and justifiable, as far as Niebuhrians were concerned. Deterrence itself 
may be considered in this context.  
 
As outlined in Part I, one of the components of just war, as understood by Thomas 
Aquinas, was that belligerents ―intend the advancement of good or the avoidance of 
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 It would inferentially appear that maintaining a stockpile of nuclear weapons, 
intended to be used solely in response to a particularly grave and patent provocation 
(i.e., one that threatened the continued existence of the state or its citizenry) would 
minimally constitute an effort to bring about the ‗avoidance of evil‘ , incurred should 
a nuclear attack be initiated. 
 
Understood in terms of the above-described parameters, South Korean strategic 
nuclear planning seems to have been governed by much the same considerations that 
defined the thinking of those planners who devised the nuclear arsenals of the western 
democracies during the 1950s and 1960s—preventing nuclear war through deterrence 
and, should deterrence fail, having a war fighting and defence capability that would at 
least set up some limits on non-combatant casualties. 
 
2.2. Christian Perspectives  
 
As noted above, the Christian perspective has had to deal with two inter-linked issues:  
The presence of nuclear weapons (first American and then Korean) and the desire for 
unity. 
 
The development of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear arsenals have 
engaged moralists wherever such programs have been undertaken. Quite obviously, in 
totalitarian states such considerations have remained muted (e.g., the former Soviet 
Union). In other regimes (e.g., Great Britain
341
) such efforts have generated national 
discussion, once they have become public
342
. In Korean religious circles, a similar 
discussion began in the 1970‘s when South Korean Christians realized a necessity of 
national koinonia, ‗reunification of South and North Korea‘, although it does not 
appear to have engaged the general citizenry.
343
 In this regard, such national 
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arguments on nuclear weapons do not occur as a single isolated issue but rather 
integrated into the larger skein of moral values that are reflected in the nation‘s public 
policies. Moreover, ‗larger skein of moral values‘ will almost certainly likewise reflect 
whatever singular characteristics are to be found in the history of Korean Christianity 
progression. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, Christianity first arrived in Korea filtered through the 
thinking of an elite that was used to the concepts of neo-Confucian scholars. While 
this did not necessarily have implications for a proper understanding of fundamental 
Christian doctrine,
344
 it did have a profound—although perhaps only tacitly 
appreciated—implication in understanding the proper organisation of Christian 
koinonia.  
 
Just as Confucian principles were predicated in a manner to make the ruler‘s actions 
look like he dispensed the ‗mandate of heaven,‘ so did the civilian leaders of a 
prospectively Christianized Korea act in a manner as if same would foster the 
interests of what amounted to a national koinonia. Given this precept, national unity—
understood in ethnic terms—could take on a religious tint that might be less strong in 
other Christian communities. Furthermore, it should be understood that such a goal 
was one of inclusion and not one of exclusivity. At least in some respects it is a goal 
predicated on the (quite reasonable) assumption that a basic purpose of the properly 
functioning koinonia is that of prospering the salvation of souls.  
 
Thus, civil policies inhibiting such development of prospective ‗national‘ koinonia—
and a nuclear weapons program was identified as such—became not only civilly 
suspicious but also morally repugnant. At this point the debate on Korean unity – 
koinonia – and the Just War rejection of nuclear weapons becomes entwined.  This 
line of reasoning indeed provides an explanation for the regularly expressed 
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commonality of purpose in opposing nuclear weapons development and the 




Considered in this context, for any thoughtful Korean Christians, the nuclear issue 
cannot be merely reduced to a political or military issue, subject to State-emanated 
resolution. The presence of such weapons must be considered in terms of their 
prospective aggravation of personal antagonism and national hatreds extending many 
decades back. The division of Korea, no matter how unintentional it was, challenged 
the view that God‘s creational order was for Koreans to live in harmony. Therefore, 
Korean Christians believe they have a duty to address the situation created wherein 
one nation has—or will soon enough have—a modest nuclear arsenal and is also 
equipped with panoply of high technology weaponry, functioning under aegis of the 
American nuclear umbrella.
346
 Nonetheless, before such matters may be addressed, 
Christian considerations on nuclear weapons and their relationship to the moral 
mandates established under just war theory must be made more minutely than 
discussed in the second and third chapters. 
 
3. Korean Church’s Response: The NCCK 
 
3.1 The Development of the NCCK’s Political Position in the 1950s 
 
Institutional opposition to the development mass destruction weapons has been 
mainly a function of the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK). In at least 
some senses, this opposition represents a departure from the traditional ‗public face‘ 
of the organization that dates back over eight decades,
347
 that of fostering irenic 
solutions to prospectively (or actively) violent national political divisions. Its efforts 
to promote justice made Christianity synonymous with this in the eyes of many 
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Koreans, thus putting into practice the observation by German theologian Jurgen 





For much of its post-war existence the NCCK remained either on friendly terms with 
or tacitly tolerant of whichever regime was in power. To cite a circumstance, in 1945 
Korea was divided into South and North along the Thirty-Eighth Parallel by the Allies 
(primarily the United States and the former Soviet Union).
349
 The NCCK thus 
became a council only for churches in South Korea. Churches in the North were 




The South Korean government at the time of liberation was friendly to Christian 
churches because the first President, Rhee Syng-man,
351
 was a Christian elder who 
had lasting friendships with numerous Christian leaders. The Rhee government 
showed preferential treatment to the Christian Church. For instance, they supported 
Christian evangelism in the army and national prisons and also suppressed the 
missionary efforts of non-Christian religions. In return, the NCCK president Chun 
Phil-soon and the other Christian leaders threw their full political support behind him 




After an armistice was agreed to end the Korean War (June 1953), the somewhat 
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Christian-oriented government of President Rhee Syng-man turned towards 
repression.
353
   At this stage neither the NCCK, nor for that matter, any other major 
Christian group expressed any public support for the pro-democracy demonstrators.
354
 
According to Kang Wi-jo, 
 
―During this epoch-making event, known as the ‗April Student Revolution,‘ the church 
communities remained silent. Not only did Christians fail to object, but the Christian churches 
were known to be closely associated with Rhee. No church body or other Christian 




This would come back to haunt the NCCK a year later, following a military coup 
d’etat when the new governing junta mentioned earlier disturbances as a reason.  
Barely nine months after assuming office, Chang Myon‘s government (or Huh Chung 
cabinet) was overthrown by a military coup (July 1961) and replaced by a military 
junta. 
 
The military coup‘s leader, General Park Chung-hee, was a devout Buddhist. Park 
instituted a policy intended to unite Korean nationalism with the religious beliefs of 
its Buddhist adherents.
356
 Despite this modest reorientation in domestic policy, the 
military junta and the NCCK were at least tacitly united in their opposition to the 




In addition, at least some of Korea‘s church leaders hoped that the government‘s 
enforced public order approach would lead to faster economic development.  In turn 
such an outcome might lead to a return to a more democratic regime in such manner, 
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that it would encourage peaceful reunification with the North.
358
 Effectively they saw 
the potential of a trade off between a short period of authoritarian rule laying the basis 
for economic growth. In reality, ―the South Korean military government vigorously 
pursued economic development and this in turn was intended to legitimize their 
dictatorial governance.‖
359
  In other words, economic growth was not a precondition 
for a return to democracy but to be used to justify ongoing authoritarian rule. 
 
3.2. The NCCK Shifts Its Public Orientation: The Attractions of Missio Dei 
 
Faced with the challenge of a divided country, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in 
power across the divide and the presence of nuclear weapons the NCCK grounded its 
initial response more in terms of Missio Dei theology rather than using the concepts of 
Just War.  To some extent this mirrors the earlier response to Japanese occupation 
where the goal was to preserve aspects of Korean culture and the resistance was seen 
in terms of biblical examples of captivity.   
 
‘Missio Dei’—‗mission of God‘—is used to describe those efforts of a socio-political 
nature undertaken by the churches to foster government programs and policies that 
reflect gospel values. In its twentieth century application, the argument has its origins 
in an ecumenical conference held at Willingen, Germany, in 1952.360 Put simply, 
Missio Dei accepts as a fundamental proposition that preaching the gospel 
(evangelization) cannot be isolated from social nor political contexts of people‘s lives. 
Missio Dei considers that the nature of the Church is not only to serve the world 
through evangelism by proclaiming Jesus Christ‘s message but also to participate in 
this world through prophetic proclamation and witness.361  
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However, the NCCK‘s earlier intimate relationship with the Rhee government, had 
put the church organization in the position of having tacitly supported or failed to 
object to that government‘s malfeasance.
362
 One outcome of that relationship became 
evident in the aftermath of the 1961 coup d’etat. The Buddhist-oriented military 
regime, upon identifying the NCCK with the ousted Rhee government, was not only 
ill disposed towards this particular Christian congregation; it was less than cordial in 
its relations with Christians in general. It was in this context that the above-described 
Missio Dei precepts flourished. Freed from any residual conformity with the state, the 
NCCK was at liberty to preach social justice and respect for human rights. The church 
group‘s goals for society (or perhaps better, the Korean koinonia) were expressed 
independently of whatever specific regime enjoyed political supremacy.  
 
Having been forcibly removed from direct political influence, the NCCK was free to 
accept Missio Dei as an essentially religious vehicle for advancing ideas regularly 
associated with the political realm, although with significant moral components. 
During the period of the Park dictatorship, the great majority of Koreans found Kim 
Il-sung‘s communist regime in Pyongyang even more odious than that of the generals. 
By the late 1970s however, a significant component of NCCK leaders had concluded 
that the democratic movement would be restricted at best to modest achievements as 
long as Korea was divided in two.  
 
Thus, the goal of national unity was subsumed under the general rubric of the 
restoration of democratic norms and by extension, improved prospects for the 
eventual establishment of a Korean koinonia. Indeed, theologian Moon Ik-hwan, one 
of the first public proponents of reconciliation between the two Koreas, argued, ―the 
[peaceful] reunification of Korea is premised on democratization and vice versa. We 
Koreans cannot imagine the one without the other, because only a reunified Korea 
will guarantee the people‘s sovereignty.‖363 This perception of a nexus between 
reunification and the expansion of Korean democracy would take root and flourish in 
ensuing years. 
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As far as the NCCK was concerned, its member churches—some of which (e.g., the 
Presbyterian Church of the Republic of Korea [PROK]) had adopted the Missio Dei 
model beforehand—voted at the 23
rd
 NCCK General Assembly (1970) to commit the 
organization to a more public stand on political issues impinging on the conduct of 
Christian life. Needless to say, there were historical examples in Korea of such 
activity avant la lettre stated as such,  
 
―Shin Hung-woo, who participated in [the 1928 world missionary conference held at] 
Jerusalem as leader of the Korean YMCA, said that the church must become a witness for the 
social salvation of farmers. Thus, faith was linked with social commitment. Missio Dei, in the 
wide sense, began with the educational movement in rural areas, and took shape in the 1960s 





This adoption of Missio Dei coincided with the NCCK and its member churches 
became increasingly public in their opposition to the military dictatorship. As was to 
be expected, ROK leaders became wary of such developments. The Park regime‘s 
response to this perceived threat to its legitimacy was both brutal and abrupt. Thirty-
four pastors and missionaries of NCCK member churches were arrested and jailed 
following non-violent opposition to the regime‘s 1974 suspension of the National 
Constitution, an act intended to facilitate perpetuation of the military junta in 
government. Hundreds of Christians were arrested and subjected to torture.365 This 
public display of opposition to Korea‘s military dictatorship was preceded by a formal 
manifesto—‗Theological Declaration of Korean Christians‘ (May 20, 1973)—which 
defined Christian opposition to the regime in distinctly religious terms. ―Christians are 
fighters against the power of evil… Thus, the Church is commanded to fight 
suppression, on the side of the poor and oppressed, to liberate them and to restore 
their human rights… The Church is not an organization that intends to take political 
power, but, in order to carry out its mission, the Church sometimes positioned in 
conflict with political power.‖366 
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The theological foundation for the Missio Dei includes at least three factors. First, the 
desire for peace in Korea starts with an understanding of Jesus Christ as the ‗servant 
of peace‘. In terms of Korean politics, the NCCK confesses that Jesus came to 
proclaim God‘s kingdom of peace, reconciliation and liberation367 for the oppressed 
and the poor.368 Therefore, they understood ‗Acts 10:36-40‘ as follows: ―Jesus Christ 
suffered, died upon the Cross, was buried, and rose in the Resurrection to reconcile 
humanity to God, to overcome divisions and conflicts and to liberate all people and 
make them one.‖369  
 
When confronted with the numerous political injustices of the ROK dictatorship, the 
NCCK tacitly ascribed sinfulness to acquiescence to such patent evils. This was made 
clear in a public statement.  
 
―[The NCCK] encourages the Korean churches and Christians to be light and salt to build a 
society where God‘s love and peace, and justice and human dignity are fully realized. The 
NCCK calls on the Korean churches and Christians to practice their belief in God‘s love by 





In addition to criticising the Park regime‘s domestic repression the NCCK started to 
address the issue of reconciliation between the two Koreas, through active 
participation in the peace movement. The NCCK concluded that true peace for all 
Koreans would never be achieved without reconciliation with the northern part of 
Korea (i.e., the DPRK).  
 
However, this was not expressed in terms of Just War theology – ie what steps would 
be acceptable to defend the South and how far should the DPRK be challenged 
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militarily.  Nor did the presence of US nuclear weapons become a particular focus 
for protest. 
 
Instead the NCCK‘s ‗A Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National 
Reunification and Peace‘ (or so-called 1988 Declaration) stresses that: ―We Christians 
must practise the gospel of peace and reconciliation so that the just and peaceful 
kingdom of God may come (Eph 2.14-17), and to bring this about we must share in 
the suffering of our people.‖371 This passage is suggested as ‗the basic principles of 
the churches of Korea for national reunification‘ Sebastian Kim evaluates this 
declaration as follows:  
 
―The Declaration has led to the issue of reunification becoming part of the key agenda of 
Korean Christians and has challenged many conservative sections of the church to rethink 
their traditional approaches toward the North, moving from evangelism or relief to partnership 




In this regard, applying to Korean political division St. Paul‘s admonition that all 
Christians have been called to work as apostles of peace,373 the NCCK proclaimed 
that ―God has commanded the Korean churches to undertake the mission of 
overcoming today's harsh reality of our one people divided between north and south 
in confrontation, and we are thus obligated to work for the realization of unification 
and peace [Mt 5.23-24].‖374 This was interpreted through Missio Dei theology, to 
invite all Korean churches to take part in peace work leading to reconciliation 
between the two Koreas, and followed naturally from the focus on good governance 
in the ROK.375 
 
Thus, peace and reconciliation with North Korea came to be seen as essential pre-
conditions for resolving the political differences dividing the Korean Peninsula. The 
NCCK called this ―humanizing society and politics.‖376 For ecumenical Christians, 
‗humanizing society and politics‘ means re-establishing the creational order of God. 
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In these terms a peaceful state is held to define the Kingdom of God. 
 
3.3. The NCCK and its Issue of National Unity in the Post-Park Years 
 
General Park Chung-hee was assassinated at a dinner party in 1979, evidently at the 
behest of Kim Jae-kyu, former director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency 
(KCIA). This act precipitated yet another military coup, with the ostensible purpose of 
maintaining national security in a period of crisis. This overtly unconstitutional act—
one no more legitimate than the one that brought General Park to power in 1961—
persuaded the NCCK and the millions of Korean citizens as well, that their interests 
no longer shared common ground with those of the new military junta.  
 
In the face of student protests in Kwangju in south-western Korea, after first isolating 
the city from outside observers, Chun ordered paratroopers into the city with 
instructions to end any anti-government activity, irrespective of the cost in lives and 
property. Hundreds of civilians were killed and, to this day, thousands are still listed 
as missing. The assault on the Kwangju Democratic Movement was among the most 
notorious in Korean History. It also cost the Chun-led military junta all moral standing 
it might have otherwise enjoyed among Korean populace. Equally important, this 
atrocity crystallized the NCCK collective thinking on reunification. According to 
Hanshin University Christian History professor Yeon Kyu-hong,  
 
―the NCCK realized that the Korean government‘s monopoly of the issue of reunification was 
a major drawback in bringing about peace in the peninsula and argued that the whole Korean 
people, not just the government, were responsible for achieving such reunification. Moreover, 
the NCCK realized that reunification is not only about resolving regional conflicts, but part of 




This thinking set the stage for both increased interaction between Christian groups 
from both Koreas and almost, accidently, raised the issue of nuclear weapons on the 
Korean peninsula.378 
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Prominent among NCCK reunification arguments was an absolute rejection of 
violence as a means of achieving the objective. At its 38
th
 General Assembly (1989) 
the NCCK pronounced a moral veto on any kind of war or violence as a settlement for 
reunification, confirming that resorting to force is opposed to God‘s way of resolving 
conflicts. 379  Peace in their understanding means ‗shalom.‘ Shalom is regularly 
translated as ‗peace of God,‘ a condition in which man and society have been made 
morally whole—‗unthinkable [of attainment] without obedience to Yahweh‘s law.‘380  
 
What is Yahweh‘s law? It is the Messiah who reveals God‘s wisdom and also 
overcomes acts of violence and brings peace. Moltmann explains both ‗why and how‘ 
of Jesus Christ‘s representation of Yahweh‘s law when he said, ―Not in only evil but 
also the law of the retribution of evil with evil; not only acts of violence but also the 
limitation of them by violent resistance is done away with.‖381 The late Mennonite 
pacifist John Howard Yoder382 likewise viewed Christ and his work in this manner. In 
particular, Yoder clarifies a meaning of political being in the Christian realm stating, 
―The difference between church and state, or between a faithful and an unfaithful 
church, is not that one is political and the other not but that they are political in 
different ways.‖383 ‗Political in different ways‘ can be understood as meaning that the 
church has a different standard or ‗yardstick‘ distinct from the world‘s ‗mode of 
measure‘ when faced with evil.384 The church‘s mission to transform the world into 
what Christ intended must be pursued non-violently and peacefully, in contrast to 
courses of action regularly undertaken by civil authorities.  
 
From this perspective, the NCCK considers the present state of ‗peace‘ between the 
two Koreas to be morally suspicious, in that it validates an indefensible national 
division, one sustained by violence and resting tacitly on the ‗threat of use‘ of nuclear 
weapons. It judges this state of affairs to be totally inconsistent with the peace of God 
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as it indeed militates against the establishment of the Kingdom of God. In this regard, 
the NCCK has called on both Korean authorities to stop the arms race and take 
concrete steps to end their mutual hatred.385 
 
4. Korean Church’s Response: The CCK386 
 
As the NCCK‘s reunification movement was becoming active in the 1980‘s 
conservative Christians felt threatened by the growing progressive voices in society. 
Their uneasiness became revealed when the ‗Declaration of the Churches of Korea on 
National Reunification and Peace‘ (1988) was promulgated by the NCCK. Although 
this declaration was the first official document that proposed concrete steps toward a 
peaceful resolution between North and South, the conservative Christians saw this as 
the NCCK‘s alignment with the North, saying that  
 
―We do not agree to what the NCCK says through the declaration. They confuse a concept of 
Christian peace through evangelism with that of political peace through political movements 
such as democratization or defending human rights…And this document seems to seek a 
unified country that disregards different ideologies or political systems. This is not an ideal 




In addition, they opposed the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the Korean 
Peninsula that the NCCK document demanded,
388
 saying that  
 
―There will be nobody who opposes in principle the withdrawal of the U.S. Army and their 
nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea. However, we do believe that peace and stability in 
the region is not secure without them, because the northern regime has never abandoned its 
intention to force their communist ideology on us. It is clear that we need them [nuclear 
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Soon after this row in March of 1989, a progressive Presbyterian pastor, Moon Ik-
whan visited Pyonyang and met Kim Il-sung to discuss the issue of national 
reconciliation. This incident increased the conservative Christians distrust of the 
NCCK and various conservative groups and church leaders saw the visit as a grave 
violation of the National Security Law. In summary, the conservative‘s criticisms are  
 
―(1) the NCCK is not and cannot be representing the view and wish of the whole Christian 
community (2) the NCCK reunification declaration‘s assertion regarding the denuclearisation 
and the withdrawal of US troops form South Korea is not acceptable given the presence of the 
belligerent North; and (3) the North Korean Christians association cannot be considered a 
legitimate partner for dialogue, since nothing is certain about the ‗reality‘ of Christian life and 




As a result, these two incidents became the main factor that conservative Christian 
leaders used in establishing a counter-organization against the NCCK. 
 
In simplest of terms, CCK member churches—in its majority although not wholly 
evangelical in nature—have adopted positions on both nuclear weapons development 
and national reunification that sharply contrast NCCK postures since the early 1990‘s. 
This has its origins in differing interpretations of the manner in which Gospel values 
are to be fostered in the world. CCK churches—unlike their NCCK counterparts—
ground political thinking in a theological dualism, an ongoing conflict between good 
and evil. This does not mean that CCK churches and their memberships are unwilling 
to reach out to their enemies—they are certainly imbued with the precepts formulated 
in the beatitudes. The CCK underlying theological thinking is explored in the next 
section.  
 
4.1. The CCK Posture: Theological Orientation 
 
The history of Korean Christian demonstrates how the nation‘s first Protestant 
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converts were profoundly influenced by those western missionaries preaching 
fundamentalist doctrine. South Korean Minjung theologian Kwon Jin-kwan claims 
that ―Christian fundamentalism was introduced, spread and became rooted strongly in 
the Korean Christian churches at the same time as the Christian Gospel was 
introduced by American Protestant missionaries.‖391 These included a core-set of 
unquestionable beliefs such as the historical inerrancy of the Bible, Mary‘s virginity 
when Jesus was born, the imminent physical regress of an ever-living Jesus Christ, 
and all believers‘ physical resurrection after death. 392  In this sense, Korean 
fundamentalism shares many of the general characteristics of American 
fundamentalism.393 
 
Despite attachment to such a specific set of beliefs, most Korean Christians do not 
wish to be identified as fundamentalist because the term is held to imply ‗extreme 
conservatism‘ with negative connotations. Instead, they prefer to be referred to as 
‗evangelical‘. Jang Seok-man, a researcher associated with Korean Religious Studies, 
claims ―even if most Christians in South Korea do not want be identified as 
fundamentalists, statistics show that at least 70-80 percent of South Korean Christians 
[for practical purposes are members of] fundamental-based churches.‖394 Insofar as 
self-identification is concerned, the CCK as organisation and its members as faithful 
seldom use the term ‗fundamentalism‘, preferring to describe themselves instead with 
a less threatening term,  as is ‗conservative Christians.‘ The term ‗conservatism‘ 
contains a wide range of interpretations, principally dependent on whatever context it 
may be considered in. In this case, the term is used to describe a theological 
characteristic of the CCK. Park Chun-il, former General Secretary of the CCK (2003-
2005), explains that all conservative faith could be regarded as joining evangelism 
with fundamentalism.395 Thus, CCK‘s conservatism in its theological dimension may 
be regarded as a combination of evangelism and fundamentalism.  
                                            
391
 Kwon Jin-kwan, ‗Minjung Theology,‘ The Journal of Theologies and Cultures in Asia, Vol. 4, 2005, 
p. 75 
392
 John R.W. Stott, Fundamentalism and Evangelism (Kent: Crusade, 1956), pp. 2-5 
393
 Kwon Jin-kwan, ‗Minjung Theology,‘ p. 75 
394
 ShinYoun Dong-wook, ‗Evangelism, It is No More as It were,‘ Bokumjooui, Algobomyun 
Kideukkwonjooui, written in Korean, Hankyoreh 21, Vol. 536, November 24, 2004. 
http://h21.hani.co.kr/section-021003000/2004/11/021003000200411240536080.html,  
accessed on December 12, 2005cx 
395
 Lee Sung-kyun, ‗An Interview with the CCK General Secretary Park Chun-il,‘ Park Chun-il 
Chongmoowaui Interview, Newsnjoy, August 14, 2003 




Kwon argues that, while there is no clear difference between fundamentalists and 
evangelists in Korean Christianity, fundamentalists are prone to apply this dualistic 
view more radically towards the rest of the world.396 He points fundamentalists‘ 
anticommunism as a case to consider when he states, ―They believe that the U.S. is a 
friend, while communism is a foe. They want to rule the whole country with their 
version of the Christian Gospel [as a dispositive guide]… It wants to rule society by 
the righteous [fundamentalists], thereby evangelizing the whole of society.‖397 
 
So by perceiving North Korea through a prism of good and evil, they have effectively 
dismissed the North Korean church‘s admissibility and even validity. Kang In-cheol 
argues that many Christian leaders view communists as personifications of ‗Satan,‘ 
while regarding Christians as crusaders engaged in a spiritual battle against them.398  
 
In a similar manner, this dualistic approach also seems deep-set in the NCCK. As seen 
above, the establishment of the CCK resulted from conservative Christians‘ reaction 
to the progressive Christians‘ efforts at seeking reconciliation with North Korea. 
Because they regarded (and continue to regard) the northern regime in particular and 
communists in general as objectively evil, no reconciliation could be sought in any 
manner. In this sense, the NCCK‘s reconciliatory move toward North Korea is viewed 
by the CCK as an unacceptable action in any terms. Rev. Lee Soo-young, a minister 
and theologian who is in charge of one of the oldest Presbyterian Churches in South 
Korea, directly broached this issue stating,  
 
―They [progressive Christians] are respected as pacifists but they are actually supporters and 
glorifiers of the communist idealism that had caused the purging of blood and the trampling 
down of freedom. They adore ex-North Korean leader Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il, 
adhere to and spread widely the thought of Juche and glorify communist North Korea 
[translation courtesy of Dr. Kwon].‖
399
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Despite the strident nature of Lee‘s sermon, it appears that the CCK, like its NCCK 
counterpart, is shifting its stance at least regarding its reaching out towards the North 
Korean people (if not to the DPRK government itself). To some extent, this change in 
approach seems to be a consequence of the collapse of the now defunct Soviet Union 
(seen by many fundamentalists as divinely inspired and perhaps a precursor of what 
could be in store for the DPRK). Another factor at work was purely domestic in as 
much as the Kim Dae-jung administration which had regularly been criticised for its 
affirmative efforts at reducing tensions with North Korea, now appeared to be having 
minimal success in this actions; as a corollary, likewise effectively diminishing the 
CCK‘s opportunity as an alternative focus of political influence in the Korean 
peninsula. 
 
For the North Korean people the collapse of the Soviet Union has had negative 
consequences. For decades, the DPRK had been dependent on particularly favourable 
trade relations and technological assistance programme with the USSR. Indeed these 
financial ties amounted to foreign aid intended to prop up Kim Il-sung‘s communist 
regime. A country already beset by economic hardship was inadequately equipped to 
suddenly suffer the loss of such indispensable foreign support.400  
 
Looking then towards a prospective collapse of the North Korean regime, CCK 
leaders embarked on efforts to define a theology of reconciliation, one supposedly 
better suited to anticipated change in circumstances than CCK‘s rigid dualism 
collective outlook had to date defined. Park Joseph, Director of the CCK Mission 
Department identifies the ‗Lausanne Covenant‘401 as playing a role in justifying more 
affirmative political participation. According to Park, ―There were discussions about 
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what were the theological reasons to back up the CCK‘s participation in social matters. 
Although it is not clear enough to define the Lausanne Covenant as a working 
theology for the CCK, we found that the article 5 of the Lausanne Covenant could be 
the one [suitable to CCK purposes].‖402 
 
4.1.1. The CCK and the Lausanne Covenant 
 
To gain a greater appreciation of the implications of the Lausanne Covenant, 
especially for Christians of a fundamentalist rather than evangelical tendency, a brief 
excursus is warranted. At the International Congress on World Evangelization (ICWE) 
in Lausanne, Switzerland (1974), the Secretary for Latin America Rene Padilla 
(International Fellowship of Evangelical Students) addressed problems inherent in the 
prevailing Christian evangelical model. He argued that the Christian church had 
accommodated itself to secular culture and as a result, ―while we may still be able to 
see individual sins, we cannot see the sins and the evil of society.‖403 He went on to 
say that ‗the comprehensive evangelism‘ which recognizes the necessity of the 
‗prophetic office of the Church,‘ ―does not aim only at concrete repentance in society 
but with individuals as well.‖404 In this regard, the covenant contributed to the 
growing evangelical understanding of the relationship between evangelism and social 
action405 by raising churches‘ voices toward human rights, political injustices or 
environmental problems; all issues mentioned were either those evangelicals had not 
engaged in or which they had chosen not to refer to. Regarding the Christian social 
responsibility, the fifth article of the Lausanne Covenant is in particular primary and 
essential. According to German evangelical theologian Klaus Bockmuehl (1931-1989),  
 
―righteousness [is] the concern of God himself. But God is also concerned with reconciliation 
and ‗the liberation of men from any kind of oppression.‘ Here ‗liberation,‘ the much-discussed 
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catchword of ecumenical debate in recent years, is admitted into the text of the Lausanne 
Covenant, although it did not appear in the original draft. The same is true for the qualifying 
amplification ‗from every kind of oppression‘ which does not permit ‗liberation‘ to be 




Klaus explains why the statement of Article 5 distinguishes political liberation from 
salvation when he commented,  
 
―John Stott in his introductory address in Lausanne made the relationship clear when he said, 
‗Salvation is moral, not material.‘ Salvation is from sin, not from injury. Stott sees, however, 
that the concepts ‗salvation‘, ‗rescue‘ and ‗liberation‘ have the same spiritual content in the 
New Testament and therefore, wants to consider ‗liberation‘ as a practical modern alternative 
term for ‗salvation,‘ which has become somewhat old-fashioned. Obviously, to avoid general 




To the extent that some dichotomy between spiritual salvation and social liberation 
sustains dogmatic legitimacy, the CCK had sufficient reason to subscribe to the 
covenant considering that the world continued to be construed as a spiritual 
battleground upon which forces of good and evil engaged each other to prevail. Thus 
concluding, even though the ‗Lausanne Covenant‘ was the product of evangelical 
thinkers, it may be safely concluded that CCK considered the approval of its contents 
to be in no manner an implication of the legitimacy of the dualism, one that underlies 
in fundamentalist dogmatic theology. 
 
At first glance, it appears that adopting such a theological perspective could well have 
had implications for CCK‘s prevailing notions on war and nuclear weapons issues. 
However, in Korea there has rarely been an active theological discussion about the 
mode of waging war. In particular, given the reality of an artificially divided Korea, 
pacifism and just war theory as a theoretical basis in discussions of matters relating to 
war have not significantly taken into account the specific interests of Korean 
Christians.408 
 
Whatever the merits of the CCK decision in favour of greater ‗engagement with the 
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world,‘ a question remains to be answered—How can this covenant be considered 
theologically consistent with the dualistic perception that has so marked Korean 
fundamentalism for past decades?  The CCK‘s approach to North Korea and that 
nation‘s beleaguered Christians may well provide an answer.  
 
4.1.2. The CCK’s Perspective of Church Unity in the Light of Dogma 
 
The emergence of democratic (or in the least non-totalitarian) governments in Eastern 
Europe had the secondary effect of ameliorating the previous NCCK suspect-image in 
CCK‘s eyes. Anticipating the collapse of the North Korean regime, the CCK initiated 
reconstruction plans of the North Korean church along their fundamentalist Christian 
lines. Thus, in such case, a reunited Korea would be coterminous with a single 
national church or koinonia oriented towards fundamentalist religious principles. To 
achieve this objective, the CCK organized a specific internal organism called 
‗Division to Reconstruct the North Korean Church‘ in April 1993, later elevated to a 
special committee level within the ‗Committee for Cooperation of Northern and 
Southern Churches‘. 409  When the Division of Reconstruction became a special 
committee within the council in 1995, the CCK justified its establishment in the 
following terms,  
 
―We are approaching the 50
th
 anniversary of the independence from Japan. But, they [North 
Korea] affirmed their war preparations on July 27, 1993, on their so-called victory day
410
… 
Insofar as they do not abandon their 50-year long lasting ambition to force communism on 
South Korea, their self-destruction is a matter of time [because of a heavy burden of military 
expenditure and economic downfall]… Thus, we, the South Korean Church, should establish a 
reconstruction committee with a special end, and all South Korean churches and brethrens 




Quite obviously, the manifesto‘s language was not intended to accommodate the 
continuance of the DPRK regime. Among the ‗Practical Principles of the 
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Reconstruction of the North Korean Church‘ was a proposal for direct relations with 
underground churches in North Korea, saying that ―For reconstructing the North 
Korean Church, we may strengthen the existing [underground] North Korean Church 
through co-operating with them.‖412 Such a position implicitly excludes the KCF
413
 
as their counterpart for the reconstruction plan. Then, the CCK clarified matters 
stating that the KCF was not the existing Church of North Korea but only an organism, 
part of the northern regime.414 As expressed,  
 
―The KCF was organized by the communist party in 1946. The communists built the KCF 
with a purpose to oppress the real Christians in North Korea. This organization was notorious 
for persecuting them before and after the Korean War… If we accepted the KCF as a Christian 




Jang Cha-nam, Moderator of the GAPCK (2007), also confirmed that the CCK does 
not recognise the Protestant churches, denominated ‗Bongsoo church‘ and ‗Chilgol 
church‘, both located in Pyongyang, as faithful members of the Christian 
community.416 In sum, unlike the NCCK, which communicated with organizations 
rather than individuals, the CCK looked towards communicating with individuals 
rather than organizations. 
 
Nonetheless the need to address real human suffering in the North saw the CCK 
establish links with the KCF for humanitarian reasons.  While this did involve a 
direct relationship with the KCF, the CCK refused to modify its perception of the 
northern Church. Although their humanitarian aid was provided under the auspices of 
the KCF (as distribution agency), according to Lee Man-ryol, it was due to a different 
decision that the CCK recognized the KCF only as a working partner, not as an 
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official Christian Church.417 Thus, the CCK‘s plan to reconstruct the church in North 
Korea assumed that a South Korean styled-church had to be implanted. 
 
Again, unlike the NCCK, the CCK looks forward to a change of regime in North 
Korea, essentially as a result of its missionary efforts in the neighbouring territory. 
Much of these efforts take the form of clandestine evangelization in its many 
aspects—secret actions through covert routes to tackle North Korean issues such as 
―rescuing North Korean refugees in China, protection of their human rights, 
converting them to Christ, rescue and strategic works inside North Korea.‖418 This 
method is likewise used to inform the northern civilians about events in the outside 
world and current news. This backdoor tactic includes support lent to underground 
Christians in North Korea. It is reported that the ―CCK has stepped up their activities, 
smuggling tiny Bibles into North Korea and setting up secret way stations in China to 
assist and enlist the growing number of desperate Koreans who cross the border then 
return with food.‖419 According to Park Joseph, ―We want to do whatever we can in 
order to penetrate North Korea. We will help with defectors. We have direct meetings 
with North Koreans. We will send missionaries and help anyone to help send God‘s 
message.‖ 420  While this certainly has all the appearances of responding 
enthusiastically to apostolic mandate to ‗go, teach all nations‘ and likewise evinces an 
enviable display of Christian charity toward those in physical and spiritual need, there 
can be little doubt that the North Korean regime identifies such activities as gravely 
subversive. 
 
5. The Inter-linkage between Nuclear Weapons and National Unification 
 
By rejecting force as a means to achieve unification, the NCCK had to think about 
other means by which unification could come about.  This in turn led the NCCK to 
see the existence of nuclear weapons as a particular barrier – in part because they 
                                            
417
 Lee Man-ryol, ‗The Process of the Reunification Movement in Korea Church,‘ A Christian to 
Prepare for National Reunification, Minjok Tongilul Joonbihanun Christian, written in Korean (Seoul: 
Dooranno, 1995), p. 68 
418
 Park Joseph, ‗Christian Council of Korea's Efforts for Betterment of North Korean Human Rights,‘ 
What can be Done to Improve the North Korean Human Rights? The 2
nd
 Peace Foundation Symposium 
Workshop Paper, July 11, 2006, p. 169 
419
 Doug Struck, ‗Underground Christians Keep Faith in a Hostile North Korea,‘ Special Report, 





threatened to entrench the division between the two Koreas, but also their potential 
use exemplified all the NCCK‘s concerns about using force to achieve unification.  
At the same time, as discussed above, the CCK was expecting the DPRK to collapse 
economically as a consequence of the loss of Soviet subsidies and its continuing high 
level of military expenditure.  In this model the nuclear weapons were further proof 
of the real nature of the DPRK and, probably, a further reason to expect an economic 
collapse.  The validity of this expectation is explored in chapter six, but at this stage 
it is worth noting that the DPRK may well be developing military weapons for sale 
rather than its own use.  Thus the weapons programme (including its nuclear element) 
is in fact propping up, not dragging down, the economic fortunes of the DPRK. 
 
5.1. Linking National Unification with Good Governance in All Korea 
 
In light of a North Korean suggestion that reunification might take the form of a 
confederation (one nation) with two economic-political systems (capitalism and 
communism),421 Korean Christians in Germany and members of the Association of 
Korean Scholars in the United States considered the possibility that the North might 
be open to discussions bringing closer the prospect of reunification.422 This prospect, 
in turn encouraged a meeting with a representative group of North Korean Christians 
in 1982. It was at this meeting that nuclear weapons were first mentioned merely in 
generic terms. In any event, the parties assisting agreed that Korea ―must be reunited 
peacefully and the cease-fire agreement of 1953 must be changed to a permanent 
peace treaty. The Korean peninsula must be free from nuclear weapons. The 
suppression of human rights must be stopped and all political prisoners released 
immediately.‖423 
 
This meeting and similar ones that followed, resulted in common statements
424
 that 
reflected basic political themes: (1) national division was a function of great power 
interests and not of the Korean people and (2) the corollary proposition that relieving 
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existing division presupposed withdrawal of foreign troops (e.g., U.S. forces) from the 
peninsula.425 Despite bitter opposition from the Chun dictatorship, 426 the NCCK 
member churches and individual Christians continued to foster the idea of national 
reunification as both a contributing factor for and sustaining condition of peace in the 
long term. Increasingly, these peace and unification proposals were cloaked in 
theological language. To cite a case, at the NCCK‘s 34
th
 General Assembly, the 
delegates‘ official reunification document argued that the Korean Church‘s 
reunification movement was directed by the will of a peaceful God and should follow 
Christian precepts. ―We clarify that based on the faith of peace of the Kingdom of 
God, the Korean Church has a duty, a right, and the freedom to participate in [the] 
peace movement for Korean unification.‖427 
 
In the early 1970s the NCCK found its ability to influence South Korean domestic 
politics circumscribed by the ROK regime‘s strident attitude toward the DPRK. 
Opposition to the regime‘s domestic policy was effectively equated with support for 
the northern enemy. The NCCK leadership sought to break its deadlock with the 
South Korean government through dialogue with northern Christians, ostensibly 
functioning independently of their own government. Thus, reconciliation‘s first policy 
was a strategic by-product of the NCCK‘s democratic movement. In a practical sense, 
all criticism voiced by the NCCK focused on southern authorities during the 
dictatorship, with scarcely any directed at the northern regime. 
 
For the NCCK, the ROK and the United States were jointly perceived as the ‗axis of 
problems‘, one that obstructed reconciliation with North Korea. In support of such a 
conclusion, Korean church historian Lee Man-ryol points to the Helsinki Declaration, 
a manifesto prepared by Korean democratic activists who lived abroad (e.g., pastors, 
scholars, journalists) in conjunction with high-ranking North Korean officials. This 
declaration restricted its references to American imperialism and the South Korean 
dictatorship, ignoring the problems of North Korea. Lee claims this tendency within 
the NCCK showed no significant amelioration, even following the restoration of 
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democratic government in South Korea.428 
 
By the early 1990s South Korea had returned to a measure of civilian rule with the 
election of Kim Young-sam in 1992. In practice, Kim‘s government eliminated the 
more draconian policies of his predecessors and conducted domestic policy in a 
manner intended to foster national reconciliation.
429
 However, he remained 
adamantly opposed to any reconciliation with North Korea as long as that nation 
pursued a nuclear weapons procurement program. 
 
Kim‘s political conservatism and visceral anti-communism generated a political 
stalemate. Kang Wi-jo argues that the nuclear issue was a key factor in reaffirming his 
confrontation policy with North Korea. In the face of North Korea‘s withdrawal from 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Kim responded by saying: ―We cannot 
embrace North Korea as long as they try to possess nuclear weapons.‖430 As much as 
Kim‘s remarks found support among conservative Christians, they disappointed the 
NCCK which stated, ―We feel keenly that the present tension and crisis are derived 
from, first, the violation of the principle of independence and peace as the highest 
priority in the South-North Korean relationship. And, second, we regret … the Team 
Spirit exercise and North Korea‘s withdrawal from the [NPT].‖431 
 
The NCCK response pointed to a fundamental division in perception, separating the 
organization from a significant portion of Korea‘s Christian population. Most South 
Koreans identified the North Korean nuclear weapons development program as a real 
danger—thinking that the DPRK might use its nuclear arsenal to either intimidate 
South Korea or, under extreme circumstances, unleash its weapons against South 
Korean cities.  
 
The NCCK evidently had hopes that matters would improve with Kim Dae-jung‘s 
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assuming the Korean presidency in 1997.
432
 A Roman Catholic, Kim Dae-jung had 
for many years been an ardent opponent of the successive military juntas—he was 
sentenced to death for ostensible anti-government activities, although his sentence 
was reduced to a period of imprisonment following international protests—and he 
was understood to be well disposed toward the NCCK. Indeed, late in his presidency 
(June 2000), Kim Dae-jung went so far as to meet with North Korea‘s leader since 
1994, Kim Jong-il, to discuss reunification issues. 
 
5.2. The NCCK’s Response to Nuclear Weapons and Just War Theology 
 
The importance of the nuclear weapons issue had become clear to the NCCK by the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.  By this stage the DPRK (see the discussion in chapter 6) 
had developed nuclear weapons and this in turn led to debate about the US nuclear 
weapons associated with the American troops deployed in South Korea. 
 
In one sense, the NCCK‘s response to the existence of nuclear weapons can be 
paralleled in the response of many Christian churches.  Such devices cannot be 
applied in international conflicts, if only because their use must fail to meet the just 
war criteria of Jus in Bello, let alone the teachings of Jesus Christ and his apostles. In 
the profoundest sense, their very existence indirectly contributes to a regular ongoing 
mistrust—sometimes bordering on hatred—between Koreans on either side of the 
armistice line separating the two Koreas. The NCCK‘s ‗theology of nuclear arms 
control‘ evolved in the context of the wider Missio Dei effort. Reaching out to 
Christians—and for that matter citizens of whatever credo or absence of same —in 
North Korea as steps in the goal of national reconciliation, of necessity had to 
introduce the issue of North Korea‘s nuclear development program. 
 
However, I believe that the NCCK‘s response actually fails to meet the expectations 
of Just War theology.  At least inferentially, it appears that the NCCK either 
considered any prospective DPRK nuclear munitions development as primarily 
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defensive—e.g., intended to deter prospective U.S. aggression—or likely to be 
overcome through closer political relations.  There is thus a willingness to 
accommodate the possession of nuclear weapons by the DPRK in order to achieve the 
goal of national unity, seen by the NCCK as more important. 
 
Sohn Kyu-tae, South Korean Christian ethicist, suggests that in discussing matters 
relating to nuclear weapons three dimensions merit examination. One is a theological 
dimension. The theological position that the Church has reveals its basic perspective 
toward nuclear weapons. Another is a political dimension. Even if the theological 
stance establishes principle, implementation of that principle must occur within a 
political context. Finally, there is an ecclesiastic dimension, how the Church that 
confesses Christ as the Lord, is to cope with the nuclear issue according to given 
situations. 433  Each of these dimensions finds reflection in NCCK public 
pronouncements on the issue over the past three decades. 
 
From the outset, the NCCK dealt with the nuclear arms issue in terms of national 
reconciliation. This in turn, as outlined above, presupposed an understanding of Jesus 
as the ‗servant of peace‘, whose message in the Korean context constitutes a 
proclamation of the Kingdom of God, reconciliation and liberation from oppression. 
Furthermore, we are promised that God will bless those who work for peace and 
reconciliation and enable them to become His children.434 And, in terms of theology, 
Jesus Christ operates through His people as they recognize His Lordship. Vanderbilt 
University theologian Douglas Meeks has described this relationship as ‗a function of 
the ultimate lordship of God.‘435 For the NCCK, this became the starting point that 
emphasizes the theological role in promoting peace. 
 
Putting the words of Jesus into public practice is the purpose of Missio Dei. In the 
words expressed by ICC (the International Congregational Council) moderator 
Norman Goodall over half a century ago, ―the nearer the Church comes to its Lord, 
the nearer it comes to the world.‖ Christians should no longer stay separated from the 
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world but should be God‘s people in the world.436 That is to say, the Church must 
participate in social issues in order to build the Kingdom of God.  
 
The NCCK nuclear ‗theology‘— although not a systematic level of theology—
appears to have been predicated on the belief that the presence of American nuclear 
arms in the peninsula or the nearby ocean waters was a driving force in North Korea‘s 
determination to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the NCCK has regularly 
insisted that the United States remove its nuclear weaponry from the region.437 
 
On the face of it all, this appears to take a pacifist position on nuclear weapon 
although, in the words of Kang Moon-kyu, former chairman of the NCCK Unification 
Committee (1982-1995), ―the NCCK never formulated its position systematically on 
nuclear weapons. It is a plain fact the NCCK takes a position for non-nuclear 
peace.‖438 Likewise Reverend Kwon O-sung, NCCK general secretary since 2006, 
claims, ―We have never discussed the theological aspects of nuclear weapons so far. 
However, we stand firmly on the unconditional objection to that kind of weapon. We 
believe that God‘s providence on peace and reconciliation does not match with the 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons.‖439  
 
Both of these statements appear to reflect a measure of equivocation, perhaps based 
on a determination that more concrete statements could result in even greater division 
than already existed. This posture in itself raises a number of fundamental problems. 
As ‗political‘ as such a stance might be, it risks subverting the mission of the church. 
The NCCK‘s theological stance emphasizes both responsibility and nonviolence on 
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part of both contending factions; but the church, if it is to be consistent with the logic 
of Missio Dei, must likewise be straightforward. If satisfying its divine mission 
requires that the church go ‗into‘ the world, the principle of nonviolence—a principle 
the church is likewise mandated to observe—establishes that the church must 
distinguish itself ‗from‘ the world. Participating in the affairs of the world does not 
stop the church being politicized, but the church should also Christianize the world.440 
In other words, the church must not conform to the logic of the world, but should 
critically point out its problems by showing God‘s way. 
 
The NCCK position on nuclear weapons appears designed to avoid any direct 
alienation of North Korea. While a ‗peacemakers‘ first requisite does avoid the 
exacerbation of already difficult or conflictive situations, it is important that 
avoidance of conflict does not lead to fundamental error in terms of theology or 
honesty. In the words of American pacifist theologian Jim Wallis, ―political bias 
endangers the reliability and authority of prophetic witness.‖441  As noted above, by 
the late 1970s, some elements of the NCCK had placed stress for Korea‘s ills on US 
imperialism and authoritarian government in the ROK rather than the regime in the 
DPRK. 
 
However, quite reasonably the NCCK has seen reconciliation with North Korea as the 
sine qua non for satisfactory resolution of the DPRK nuclear weapons issue 
(especially as it has rejected a military solution to ending the division). Mistrust is 
identified as the source of the plethora of political problems that continue to plague 
relations between north and south. Indeed, the DPRK nuclear weapons program is 
identified as final and definitive proof of where such mistrust can lead. Ongoing 
hatred created the mistrust, which, in turn, generated a sense of security threat.442 
Therefore, the most desirable option is a move for reconciliation with the North 
Korean people.
443
 In order to establish a more amenable political atmosphere towards 
national reunification, the NCCK created an associated body then called ‗Christian 
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Solidarity for Peace‘ (now the Korean Christian Solidarity for Peace, or KCPS).444 
The KCPS established its guiding principles in its initial public document, the Peace 
Statement against War and Nuclear Weapons stating,  
 
―We believe that building peace is our imperative task. We believe that the evil intent of war 
and violence, based on secular vested interests, is contrary to the will of God. The insecurity 
arising out of the nuclear crisis, which can lead to war, is not the will of God. In faith, we 




The NCCK appears to have intentionally avoided attributing any responsibility to the 
DPRK for the current state of affairs. Indeed, the NCCK has gone so far as to argue 
that any military or economic sanction imposed against North Korea would not be 
acceptable in terms of the nuclear issue.
446
  In this the NCCK appears to embrace 
North Korea unconditionally.  
 
In summary, the NCCK sees the nuclear issue as a function of political concessions to 
the DPRK, with the southern administration making every effort to achieve a peace 
treaty through its diplomatic and political approach.447 However, this approach to 
conflict resolution appears indifferent to the nature itself of the northern regime. Even 
if we accept the reconciliatory action toward North Korea as a primary concern, it 
remains as a case that despotism therein still prevails and uses harsh political and 
religious persecution. 
 
This was recently underscored by Seoul University political scientist Jun Jae-sung, 
himself a practicing Christian, who argued that the Korean Church must take into 
account all the factors driving DPRK nuclear weapon development, in order to 
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achieve a rounded understanding of all of the factors at work and to avoid the risk of a 
tacit political bias creeping into theological formulations.448 All in all, there exists a 
distinguishable possibility—perhaps probability—that the NCCK has formulated its 
ostensibly politically neutral evaluation of the nuclear issue to provide greater 
accommodation of at least one of the political parties (e.g., the DPRK), whether or not 
such accommodation is correct in terms of Christian belief, as opposed to reflecting a 
pragmatic secular world view. 
 
5.3. The CCK and the Nuclear Weapons Issue in the Korean Peninsula 
 
The CCK‘s perception on moral and political implications of North Korea‘s 
development of nuclear weapons is in sharp contract with that of the NCCK‘s. A 
substantial portion of CCK membership has either immediate or familial memories of 
the Korean War. Many of them were refugees (or are children and grandchildren of 
refugees) fleeing south to escape the DPRK. 
 
Apart from matters of faith, their first and foremost concern was the ongoing threat 
posed by the northern communist regime, popularly regarded as an enemy watching 
for any opportunity to invade South Korea. Fear of the northern communists 
encouraged them to place national security as a priority above all other concerns, even 
those whose accomplishments were synonymous to the mandates of the Gospels (e.g., 
improving the lot of the Korean poor). According to Kwon, ―North Korea and its 
communist ideology are most repugnant to [South Korean] Christian 
fundamentalists.‖449 He attributes this to their experiences during the Korean War.450 
Thus, as long as the southern government maintained a confrontational face toward 
North Korea, they were content to avoid any activities that might generate political 
instability within the South Korean society. In this sense, Dr. Kim So-young evaluates 
conservative Christians in South Korea as having ideological priorities that at least in 
some ways predispose them to disregard the church‘s prophetic role and their 
concomitant duty to prosper God‘s peace and grace in the world.451 This perspective 
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was also reflected in their attitudes toward the development of nuclear weapons. 
 
CCK concerns regarding nuclear weapon appear to have been largely restricted to the 
northern nuclear issue. For example, former CCK president Kil Ja-yeon anticipates 
that North Korean authorities will not give up efforts to develop and possess nuclear 
weapons except under the strongest and most direct military challenges. He asserted 
that the only way North Korea might agree to abandon its nuclear plans was through a 
strengthening the U.S-South Korea military ties and in establishing a nuclear umbrella 
coverage from the United States, perhaps comparable to the ‗dual-key‘ system 
adopted by U.S. allies within the NATO alliance.452 
 
There is likewise to be found in the CCK ranks a number of Christian theologians 
although admittedly few in numbers, who see nuclear weapons as vehicles of God‘s 
judgment in some context. Thus, to cite an example, at the International Conference 
on Peace and Reconciliation held at St. John University in York, England on August 
15, 2006, Professor Kim In-soo, an invited speaker and a well-known conservative 
church historian in South Korea said that  
 
―Japan forced Koreans to worship their king as a living god [during their rule of the Korean 
Peninsula, 1909-1945]. The wicked country, which persecuted the church severely, was ruined 
by A-bombs and was destroyed. It was God‘s righteous judgment for the country, which had 




Christian newspaper columnist and theologian Kim Jin-ho, criticizes this line of 
thought maintaining that it arises from conservative Christians‘ fundamentalist 
interpretations of Christian truths. He argues that seeking peace through violent means 
has been justified in the mainline Christian churches and ―those Christians have also 
justified the sacrifice of innocent people as an inevitable cost for achieving peace by 
war.‖454 He claims that this is simply a wrong approach to real Christianity because 
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the sacrifice of Christ did not happen by war but through his committed work.455 





6. Highlights of the Theological Division between the CCK and the NCCK 
 
Perhaps more than any other issue, the varying reactions to the so-called ‗Sunshine 
Policy,‘ an ‗open door‘ towards North Korea established under the auspices of Kim 
Dae-jung in 1998, highlight the different perceptions, fears and hopes of South 
Korea‘s Christians. To many CCK members, ‗Sunshine‘ amounted to ill-disguised 
appeasement, perhaps even a surreptitious effort intended to weaken the South Korean 
state in the face of its mortal enemy in the North. The policy proposal was one of 
unlimited opening to North Korea, to take effect after the DPRK finally and 
irrevocably abandoned its nuclear pretensions and adopted a more overtly pacific 
attitude toward the ROK. Despite these mandatory preliminary steps, the CCK was 
dissatisfied with all arguments in defence of the policy. For example, Rev. Lee Soo-
young expressed his opposition saying that ‗the Sunshine Policy‘ was too soft and 
naïve to be able tackle the nuclear problem provoked by North Korea.457  
 
On the contrary, NCCK members hoped to establish a more positive action for 
reconciliation with North Korean authorities. They believed that a stronger sunshine 
policy would allow a more peaceful solution to the northern regime towards 
confrontation resolution. 
 
In contrast, the NCCK has adopted the Korean equivalent of the ‗social Gospel,‘ the 
Missio Dei model of evangelization through good works, often accomplished through 
existing non-religious public institutions. The CCK approach has been quite 
distinguishable. Kwon Jin-kwan has expressed the view that ―Korean fundamentalists 
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tend these days to be more political rather than doctrinal.‖458 He also argues that 
―Christian fundamentalism in Korea has become politicized like it is in the other parts 
of the world. It used to be indifferent to politics, but now it has become one of the 
most active political powers‖ 459  However, Kang In-cheol views this as having 
resulted from longstanding anticommunist attitudes rather than any effective recent 
CCK politicization. He contends that this phenomenon arose from what he describes 
as the CCK‘s ‗religionalisation of anticommunism‘. The ‗religionalisation‘ points 
towards a conservative Christians‘ redefinition of their political anticommunism 
elevated to a religious doctrine level.  
 
Thus, opposition to communism is not a simply a single component of national policy 
among several others but rather takes precedence over the rest as the most important 
factor surpassing all other political agendum. 460  With what amounts to an 
apotheosis—or, perhaps even ‗satanization‘—of anticommunism, CCK silence during 
South Korea‘s dictatorial period becomes more comprehensible; that is to say, when 
the southern political leadership shared the a great majority of CCK members‘ views, 
these were willing to overlook domestic rights transgressions in lieu of fortified 
national security. However, when a national government—dictatorial or democratic—
undertook irenic initiatives toward the North, the tacit agreement was automatically 
broken. With such breach in ideological homogeneity, the CCK was unable to tolerate 
Kim Dae-jung government‘s non-hostile acts towards North Korea; the alternative 
option was to define such a progressive regime as a mere representative of Korean 
leftist forces.461 
 
While it is not easy to draw out a clear demarcation line to separate fundamentalism 
from evangelicalism, given Korean Christianity‘s adoption of components of both 
credos, CCK‘s theological stance toward the North‘s nuclear program certainly places 
it squarely in the fundamentalist camp, given their willingness to identify the conflict 
in terms of an almost single dimensional view ––the evil northern regime vs. the 
noble United States and South Korea— or in other words, the ‗forces of darkness‘ 
arrayed against ‗legions of light‘. From the CCK perspective, it is inconceivable that 
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South Korea would acquiesce to anything that amounts to a demoniac power having 
mass destruction weapons to threaten the very existence of South Korea. 
 
Conversely, while they regard the North Korea‘s development of weapons of mass 
destruction as the inherent danger, it does not appear a major priority to discuss and 
determine whether nuclear weapons should be banned unconditionally, irrespective of 
which state possesses same. Moreover, discussions at a theological level have never 
been attempted and the consequences of this are explored in the next chapter.
462
 The 
practical outcome has been a restricted acceptance of U.S. nuclear presence only for 
deterrent purposes on certain occasions a discussion of the possibility of a pre-
emptive American strike against North Korea‘s nuclear weapons development 
infrastructure. While such an approach might be barely acceptable under the most 
tolerant just war parameters, given the generally accepted limitations pertaining to 
civilian inviolability and proportionality, any such initiative would surely contravene 




On one hand, South Korea has conducted some kind of nuclear research program with 
distinct military ramifications (at least into the 1980s).  By contrast, the DPRK now 
possesses nuclear weapons and seems to be fully committed to improving its missile 
technology as a means to use these weapons.  In this context, the twin goals of the 
elimination of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula and national reunification 
reflect an identifiable national purpose. In sum, both objectives enjoy almost universal 
popularity, however, difficulties do arise over policy implementation.  At the 
moment the Protestant community in South Korea is divided both over the nature of 
the DPRK (is the current leadership a partner or barrier to peace?) and whether the 
removal of nuclear weapons is the priority or can this only be achieved after the 
destruction of the DPRK? 
   
It is safe to state that civilian leadership which inherited political power from the 
military junta in the ROK has collectively perceived nuclear weapons development 
                                            
462
 To be fair to the CCK, such shortcoming is shared with the more tolerant NCCK. 
147 
 
(and likely procurement as well) in terms regularly associated with the lines of 
thought of Paul Ramsay and George Weigel. Conversely, the NCCK appears to have 
adopted almost an absolutist policy, at least in as far as the United States and South 
Korea are concerned even though this stance became vague toward North Korea‘s 
nuclear development. Even if the NCCK takes a position of non-nuclear weapon in 
principle, it is to be questioned whether their practical implementation of this notion is 
morally acceptable or legitimate when compared to their ultimate goal, national 
koinonia based on God‘s shalom. In contrast the CCK has placed the destruction of 
the DPRK as its first goal (perhaps hoping this will come from an economic collapse 




Chapter 5: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development Efforts 




The previous chapter considered the response of the South Korean Christian 
Community to the nuclear weapons programme in the South. It also explored how the 
NCCK in particular, started to develop a view, based on Missio Dei theology, of 
effective rapprochement to the North and opposition to various authoritarian regimes 
in the South and aspects of the US military presence.  This in turn led the 
conservative CCK to stress the importance of defence against communist aggression 
and to emphasise the need for the DPRK to be overthrown (or collapse) before the 
nuclear weapons (and unification) issue could be resolved. 
 
This chapter now moves that analysis forward and concentrates on the current 
situation and options.  It starts to analyse the stance of both the CCK and the NCCK 
in terms of the just war theology explored in the earlier chapters. 
 
To do this, it is necessary to first briefly discuss the history and current nature of the 
DPRK.  This is essential in exploring the validity of various responses and to 
understand the situation in Korea today.  An interesting, and related consideration is 
whether or not the DPRK is a potential partner for peace or essentially (in 
theologically terms) evil, actually has any bearing on what should be the proper 
Christian response in either case.  In other words are both elements in the Protestant 
community in the ROK setting out their position more in terms of secular politics 
(based on their differing analyses of the DPRK) rather than in terms of scriptural and 
Christian traditions? 
 
A final, and closely related question, is why at this stage do elements of the Korean 
Protestant community start to use the language and analyses of the Just War tradition?  
This was not the case during the Japanese occupation when their response was 
essentially one of cultural resistance, nor was it part of the debate during the period of 
armed conflict up to 1953.  Does the answer now lie in that, for the first time, it is 




2. The Birth of the Communist Regime 
 
The North Korean state came into existence in May 1948, when the Korean 
peninsula‘s Soviet occupation zone463 was politically reconfigured as the Democratic 
People‘s Republic of Korea (or DPRK). At the same time, the American occupation 
zone was officially denominated the Republic of Korea (or ROK). Both governments 
claimed legitimacy over the entire Korean peninsula. 
 
Upon establishment of the DPRK, the Soviet occupation regime appointed Kim Il-
sung (1912-1994), for many years a communist activist, as chief of state. Born Kim 
Sung-ju—he adopted ‗Kim Il-sung‘ as a nom de guerre,—into a Christian family that 
emigrated to Manchuria in 1925 to escape Japanese persecution. Kim became 
embroiled in anti-Japanese political activism following that nation‘s occupation of 
Manchuria in 1932 and supported Mao Tse-tung in the latter‘s efforts against the 
Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek.464 During World War II, Kim served in 
the Soviet Army, rising to the rank of captain. 
 
During his period of rule (1948-1994), Kim relied on both the Soviet Union and the 
People‘s Republic of China (PRC) for international support, shifting emphasis from 
the former to the latter during the 1950s.465 Domestically, Kim eliminated factional 
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3. The Nature of North Korea’s Government under Kim Il-sung 
 
The DPRK under the rule of both Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il has become 
one of the most isolated nations in the world. In the succinct words of Yonsei 
University professor Kim Pan-suk,  
 
―North Korea is a classic example of the ‗rule of man.‘ Overall, political management is 
highly personalized and is based on loyalty to Kim Il-Sung and the Korean Workers‘ Party 
(KWP). The cult of personality, the nepotism of the Kim family, and the strong influence of 





Matters have not changed overmuch since Kim pere (‗Glorious Leader‘) was 
succeeded by Kim fils (‗Dear Leader‘).
468
 During the period of the Kim senior‘s rule, 
the reins of government were largely in family hands. He (and later his successor) was 
a member of the KWP Central Committee and, after 1991, commander of the Korean 
People‘s Army. His wife, Kim Song-ae, was a KWP Central Committee member, as 
was his daughter, Kim Kyong-hui. An assortment of kin (nieces, nephews and in-laws) 
likewise held (and continue to hold) high government posts.469 
 
An outstanding feature of North Korea‘s political system is glorification of the leader 
through a cult of the dignitary. In order to solidify his personal rule, Kim senior 
instituted what he denominated juche (主體- literally, ‗self-reliance‘) as a governing 
principle. As developed through the 1960s, juche became an ideology that replaced 
orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The juche synthesized communist theory and those neo-
Confucian principles that emphasise family unity.
470
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 The Confucian ideal in the juche is designed to consolidate Kim Il-sung‘s and the KWP‘s political 
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Indeed, Kim‘s juche may be considered a distorted mirror reflexion of an idealized 
Korean Christian koinonia. And, just as many Korean Christians expect to see a 
unified Korea as koinonia widely expressed, it so appears that the KWP hoped juche 
too formed the basis for a unified Korea. However, critical differences lie in how 
Korea‘s Christian pacifists see a unified Korea as one from which mass destruction 
weapons have been banished. On the other hand, the KWP envisages a unified 
peninsula as a fully armed nation, able to assert itself as a regional military power, if 
not as a fully-fledged world power. 
 
3.1. The Implementation of Juche Philosophy 
 
Juche is seen in North Korean philosophical debate as the apotheosis of Marxism-
Leninism, so intimately interconnected with its progenitor Kim Il-sung that since 
1974 it has been officially called Kim Il Sung Chuui (or Sasang, literally meaning 
‗Kim Il Sung-ism‘).471 While strictly speaking, juche is an ideology designed to direct 
North Korea‘s political goals—an independent foreign policy, a self-sufficient 
economy, and a self-reliant defence posture472—from the North Korean perspective, it 
is inseparable from and entirely synonymous with Kim Il-sung‘s leadership.  
 
The basic idea of juche starts with the assertion ―that man is the master of all things 
and decides everything, and that an ideological consciousness determines human 
behaviour in historical development.‖ 473  However, it contains a departure from 
orthodox Marxism-Leninism. According to Kim Jung-il,  
 
―the leader [Kim Il-sung] was well versed in Marxism-Leninism. But he did not confine 
himself to applying Marxism-Leninism to the Korean revolution but pioneered a new phase of 
revolutionary theory from a steadfast Juche-based standpoint and resolved the problems 
arising in the revolutionary practice from a unique angle. The leader discovered the truth of 
Juche idea in the course of the struggle against bigoted nationalists and bogus Marxists, 
flunkeyists and dogmatists, while hewing out a new path for the revolution.‖
474
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Likewise, juche follows Stalin and Mao in consciously substituting individual 
leadership for party rule
475
, as it argued that popular revolutionary fervour gives rise 
to what amounts to a messianic leader. The full development took time and Kim Il-
sung‘s first ‗juche‘ speech was delivered on December 28, 1955,476 ―when the Sino-
Soviet quarrel had reached its greatest intensity, and North Korea strove to stay 
neutral in the noisy feud of its two major sponsors.‖477 In the decade that followed, 
ideological considerations were nevertheless added to what had been essentially a 
doctrine of nationalist autarky. In this sense some of the political developments within 
the DPRK could be held to mirror developments in another ultra-isolationist 
Communist dictatorship in Albania. Juche was granted equal footing with Marxism-
Leninism at the KWP‘s Fifth Congress.478 And a decade later, at the Party‘s Sixth 
Congress, ―references to Marxism-Leninism [were deleted], leaving juche as the sole 
official ideology of the Party.‖479 
 
3.2. Juche as Political Messianism 
 
Kim Yong-bok, the Korean minjung theologian, distinguishes between ‗political 
Messianism‘ and ‗messianic politics.‘
480
 According to Kim, ‗Messianic politics‘ is the 
politics of suffering people whose aim is not to seize control but to humanize and 
tame the secular powers of authority. Conversely, ‗political Messianism‘ seeks to seize 




In his essay on the factors separating messianic politics from ‗political Messianism‘ 
and the concomitant implications for the people, Kim states,  
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―In the Korean context, one may suspect that the notion of the subjecthood [subjectivity of the 
minjung] from North Korean communism has sneaked into minjung theology. Once again, we 
should not mistake the fact that in North Korea the notion of ‗juche‘ refers to the autonomy of 
the national totalitarian dictatorship which uses the name of the proletariat. It is a sort of 




This ‗realized subjecthood,‘ is of a reflected image of Christian koinonia. As Professor 
Kim describes it, ―Jesus-messianism or messianic servanthood is a radical challenge 
to all forms of political, royal, and power messianisms. It is concerned with saving 
and transforming the minjung so that its subjecthood may be realized.‖483 This, of 
course, is conceptually different from North Korea‘s fully realized juche philosophy. 
 
The neo-Confucian aspects of juche are reflected in the manner in which it was 
inculcated by its promoter. Grace Lee, a ‗scholar in residence‘ at California‘s Stanford 
University, provides a vivid description. ―The Kim Il-sung regime instructed the 
North Korean people in the juche ideology using analogy drawn from human anatomy. 
The Great Leader is the brain that makes decisions and issues orders; the Party is the 
nervous system that channels information; and the people are the bone and muscle 
that physically execute the orders.‖484  
 
Despite its official atheism, the DPRK has gone to considerable lengths to elevate the 
late Kim to the status of a god. In 1996, his son, Kim Jong-il announced that his late 
father was now ‗eternal president.‘ While this was surely intended to ascribe some 
species of retroactive divine approbation to the political decisions of the deceased 
dictator, it was also equally surely intended to confer a comparable legitimacy to his 
successor.
485
 This particular action is indeed equivalent to that of the Roman Senate 
two millennia before, at the command of its ultimate successor, Caesar Augustus. 
Augustus, the first individual formally recognized as emperor, directed that the 
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assassinated Caesar be declared divus, or deified, thereby tacitly establishing 
Augustus‘ legitimacy to rule.  
 
Were North Korea‘s juche philosophy solely a vehicle for sustaining their country 
from the outside powers (e.g., Soviet Union and China, or even the United States), it 
might not pose a significant threat beyond the nation‘s borders. However, its 
development has identified the interests of the nation with that extended family and 
intended to justify DPRK‘s aspirations considerably beyond its borders, mainly to 
South Korea. It is for this reason that juche has implications for the DPRK‘s approach 
to national unification and also on the development and procurement of a nuclear 
arsenal with its corresponding delivery vehicles essential for deployment. 
 
4. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Procurement Programmes 
 
In a broad sense, there exist two views about the DPRK‘s nuclear ambition. (1) A 
peaceful purpose to make up for a deficiency of electricity or (2) security purposes to 
deter the U.S. nuclear threats. It began very early, even before 1950, a time when 
domestic resources such as indigenous expertise in fundamental science, nuclear 
technology or finances to build a nuclear plant were scarce. The only resource in 
abundance was natural uranium ore and its monazite mines.
486
 The outputs of these 
were traded to the Soviet Union in exchange for military equipment. Former Soviet 
foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, reveals this in his memorandum that the DPRK 
exported concentrated monazite, tantalum, niobium, and about nine thousand tons of 





4.1. Historical Overview (1950-2006) 
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It was on June 25, 1950 that the North Korean army initiated a sudden attack.
488
 In 
response, the United Army, composed of 16 United Nations member-countries, 
engaged in war after ―having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of 




During that war, General Douglas MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the United 
Army, requested that U.S. President Truman authorise the use 26 nuclear bombs 
against the North Korean and Chinese armies. Even though his demand was resolutely 
denied by the U.S. President,
490
 the request was shocking enough to discourage the 
DPRK‘s intentions to continue its aggression. As a consequence, the parties involved 
signed the Armistice Paper in 1953.
491
 After the cease-fire negotiation was completed, 
the U.S.-led United Nations Command announced the presence of nuclear artillery 
shells and nuclear-tipped rockets in South Korea at the end of January 1958.
492
 This 
announcement may have confirmed the North Korean leaders in their desire for their 
own nuclear program rather than trading their uranium ore for conventional Soviet 
weapons.  
 
North Korea‘s nuclear planning had already begun in 1955 when the Soviet Union 
and the North Korean governments agreed a ‗joint nuclear research‘ programme. 
Pyongyang sent more than 250 nuclear scientists and specialists to the Soviet Union 
for training.
493
 In the 1960‘s, the Northern regime engaged in costly military 
development, placing as much emphasis on the military expenditure as on economic 
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development. In fact, one-third of its budget was exclusively for the military sector 




With Soviet technical assistance, the IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor was built in 
Yongbyon in 1965. The Soviets received the top-level assurances from the North that, 




China also played a role in transferring their nuclear technology to North Korea. As 
ideological and territorial disputes between China and the Soviet Union deepened in 
the mid 1950‘s, China was willing to share their nuclear technology with the North 
Koreans. Pyongyang would enter into an agreement with China for the assistance on 
nuclear research in 1959. Neither China nor the Soviet Union, wanted to transfer 
directly the know-how of making a nuclear bomb. North Korea‘s request to share ‗the 
atomic secret‘, when China succeeded to detonate the first atomic bomb, late in 1964 
and then in 1974, was turned down by Mao Tse-tung.
496
 Although, according to 
Mansourov, there was some tacit help with North Korean nuclear scientists invited to 
the Lop Nor nuclear test site and research facility in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region of China. Moreover, the scientists ―took part in a reception given by the 
People‘s Republic of China (PRC)‘s Seventh Machine Industry Ministry responsible 
for China‘s ballistic missile development program.‖
497
 Mansourov believes that such 
invitations were in relation to 70 or 80 high explosive tests conducted by the North 




With its enormous efforts to build nuclear infrastructures, North Korea could conduct 
‗chemistry experiments‘ with uranium and perform ―plutonium extraction activity on 
a small scale by reprocessing 300 milligrams from the IRT-2000 NPR‘s spent fuel at 
the Isotope Production Laboratory in Yongbyon.‖
499
 They also joined on September 
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16, 1974 and later officially signed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
in 1977 which gave them access to the IAEA database. This meant that the North 
could access Western nuclear technology at the price of a limited international 
inspection to the Yongbyon Atomic Complex.
500
 At the end of the 1970‘s, the DPRK 
could maximize a generating capacity of the IRT-2000 of up to 7 megawatts.  
 
Into the 1980‘s, North Korea planned to build a nuclear power plant for electricity 
production as their economy was depressed. The Soviet Union promised— if it were 
not for military purposes—to technically and financially assist the construction of four 
440 megawatts light-water reactors (LWR) under the condition that the North would 
join the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) on December 12, 1985. At the same time Kim 
Il-sung asked the Soviet leadership to authorise the construction of an underground 
nuclear power plant.
501
 The plan was frustrated when the USSR was broken up in 
1991.   
 
By 1982 the second reactor‘s nuclear core and the nuclear control building were 
already under construction. This was the first time that the outside world (including 
China and the Soviet Union) openly suspected North Korea‘s ambition to go into 
nuclear power with construction secretly underway. When a nuclear reprocessing 
facility under construction near the 5 megawatts reactor at Yongbyon was registered 
by the U.S. spy satellite and publicised to the international press,
502
 the Northern 
regime issued a statement declaring in ‗clear terms‘ that it did not develop nuclear 
weapons.
503
 Mazarr cited a senior U.S. official‘s remark on the issue, ―While 
reprocessing can be part of a legitimate civilian nuclear power program, explosive 




The U.S. government demanded North Korea placed all of its nuclear related facilities 
under IAEA safeguards.
505
 The North Korean regime responded that ―the 
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establishment of the Korean Peninsula as a nuclear-weapons-free zone is a 
precondition before we can sign the IAEA safeguards agreement,‖
506
 requiring as 
conditions to accepting to IAEA on-site inspections the following, (1) promises not to 
launch a nuclear attack against the DPRK, and (2) withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear 
weapons from South Korea.
507
 On September 27, 1991, U.S. President George Bush 
responded that the United States would withdraw all nuclear weapons from South 
Korea.
508
 His formal consent was followed by then South Korean President Roh Tae-
woo‘s ‗Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula‘ on January 20, 1992. 
Both Koreas promised to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and prohibit 
testing, manufacturing, production, acceptance, possession, storing or deployment of 
nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, that agreement contains a 




On the other hand, the North signed the safeguard agreement with the IAEA, 
scheduling an inspection thereafter on May, 1992. At a glance, IAEA Director General 
Hans Blix and his team found that facilities inspect were ―‗extremely primitive‘ and 
far from ready to produce the quantities of plutonium needed for a stockpile of atomic 
weapons.‖
510
 However, in the course of the inspection, the IAEA team found 
undeclared sites omitted from the report previously to the Agency by North Korea. 
The IAEA concluded that North Korea had reprocessed spent fuel from its indigenous 
5MW reactor in 1989, 1990 and 1991 in contrast to North Korea‘s previous report that 
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After this conclusive report, South Korean authorities felt betrayed by the North. The 
Southern regime then changed to a hard-line political stand. The re-establishment of 
the suspended joint military exercises could be regarded as a severe nuclear threat to 
the North.
512
 North Korea also announced their withdrawal from the NPT on March 
12, 1993.  
 
Precisely how many nuclear weapons now comprise the DPRK nuclear arsenal 
remains secret. North Korean officials have restricted their comments to observations 
that the DPRK has ―manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defence‖513 and that 
―North Korea possesses multiple bombs and was building more.‖
514
 The fundamental 
limitation on the number of weapons that can be manufactured is the gross amount of 
fissile material produced each year.515  
 
4.2. Considerations of North Korean Objectives in Pursuing Nuclear 
Weapons 
 
When North Korea conducted a nuclear test in October 2006, with an estimated yield 
of less than one kiloton. ―Although seismographs registered the detonation and 
environmental sampling confirmed radioactivity, uncertainty about the weapon‘s 
design and sophistication remains.‖516 
 
North Korea is probably confident that it has a nuclear arsenal of sufficient size to 
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 ―[American] nuclear expert David Albright estimated in February 2007 that North Korea had a 
stockpile of reprocessed plutonium of 28-50 kilograms, enough for between 5 and 12 nuclear weapons. 
These estimates appear to be based on projections that a country like North Korea would need 6-8 
kilograms of plutonium to produce one atomic bomb. The [International Atomic Energy Agency] has 
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discourage the United States from undertaking any attempt to overthrow the regime 
through force.
517
 Secondly and closely related to the first point, the DPRK is free to 
negotiate the most favourable terms of assistance, confident that it can withdraw from 
any such negotiations—with the concurrent tacit threat of intent to restart plutonium 
and HEU production—without fear of direct physical retaliation by the other part. A 
third point is that if the United States and its allies are not be amenable to the terms, 
the DPRK could always consider the possibility of clandestine international sale of 
nuclear technology or for that matter, a weapon itself. A fourth consideration closely 
related to the third, is that as time goes on ceteris paribus North Korea‘s relative 
position in the international power equation will almost certainly improve as a logical 
consequence of international developments.  
 
The North Korean strategic weapons have been an expensive burden on national 
economic efforts; and have further diminished the quality of life of an already 
impoverished population.
518
 Nevertheless, programme continuity may be considered 
to be beneficial to a very rather small segment of North Korean society. To the extent 
that these development and procurement programs tend to contribute to maintenance 
of the juche ideal, it is the DPRK intentions to continue as a generalised ideological 





The interaction between juche and the strategic weapons development programme 
implies that North Korean war planning does not fit any definition of ‗just war‘. 
Indeed, the population of the Korean peninsula seem to be explicitly a primary target. 
In his overview of just war, theologian James T. Johnson observes, ―the roots of this 
distinction [between public and private initiatives to war] lie in Augustine‘s thought: 
the service of private ends by private persons manifests cupiditas—wrongly directed, 
self-centred love or motivation—while efforts by those at the head of communities to 
serve the good of those communities show the effect of a concern for justice informed 
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by caritas, rightly directed love.‖520 It is to such extent that juche’s demands for 
economic and military autarky impose substantial demands on the already burdened 
populace. 
 
In this context it is worth considering the real nature of the DPRK regime.  It may 
well have ceased to have anything but the most passing of concerns for its own 
population (here there is an interesting parallel, and critical difference, to the 
trajectory taken by the Cuban regime after the removal of Soviet economic subsidies 
where that regime adopted autarky in an egalitarian manner).  It is readily 
acknowledged that the DPRK has failed as a civil state and for all purposes remains a 
political garrison dedicated to the production of both strategic and tactical weapons, 
many up for sale in the international market. In opting for such an economic regime, 
the DPRK has essentially made itself a financial prisoner of the international arms 
market, in the sense that its fortune, even its very survival, are contingent on 
international demand for its manufactures. Understood in such terms, achieving the 
goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula—a primary concern in the prospering of the 
messianic kingdom‘s shalom—does become based on the disappearance of the 
DPRK‘s current regime, as that regime can neither change the manner of its rule nor 
abandon its current nuclear weapons programme unconditionally.  Fundamentally, 
this raises the question of whether the DPRK is ever capable of internal reform (along 
the lines of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s) if effectively its political system is 
now little other than a means to organise the development and sale of weaponry. 
 
4.3. External Influences on the DPRK, an analogy with the Soviet Union 
 
One plausible interpretation of how the DPRK‘s leadership now sees Juche is that it is 
an ideology used to justify their own survival.  The emphasis on military spending, 
and near absolute autarky, may well imply that they see a feasible future effectively as 
a state that develops and sells weaponry.  Acquisition of weaponry for themselves 
becomes a means of deterring any potential attack.  It is most likely that Juche has 
lost any of the internationalism inherent in both Soviet and Maoist interpretations of 
Marxism-Leninism and that, with the possible exception of South Korea, the DPRK 
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leadership has no ambitions to use Juche as a reason for wider subversion or conquest.  
In consequence, they have no particular interest in having a wider external political 
movement that shares the core of their ideology and has somewhat similar goals. 
 
If this is the case, then how open is the regime to outside influence?  The next 
section considers whether the NCCK‘s model of engagement and the CCK‘s model of 
antagonism might have their respective desired goals of mediating the threat of war in 
Korea or overthrowing the DPRK regime respectively.  Here, the intention, briefly is 
to consider the history of similar external engagements with the Soviet Union 
(especially in the 1970s and the 1980s) and consider if there are any practical lessons 
to be learnt from those attempts. In other words is the situation in Korea today 
analogous to that between Western Europe and the Soviet Union just before the 
latter‘s collapse in the late 1980s?   
 
In 1981 many saw the USSR as a stable autocracy, one with little or no domestic 
opposition
521
 and sufficiently wealthy to pursue strategic weapons development 
programs at the same rate, and with the same likelihood of success, as their 
international adversaries. Yet, a decade later the Soviet Union had collapsed; an 
economic and to some extent social failure. Effectively the image of stability was 
false, the relative prosperity in the early 1980s was a consequence of increases in the 
price of oil and gas in the early 1970s
522
 and this had allowed the leadership to ignore 
the underlying economic problems. As these started to become more and more intense 
a severe debate broke out amongst the Soviet leadership between those who believed 
the system could be reformed (essentially those around Gorbachev), those who argued 
for cutting lose the Soviet satellite states as the economic subsidies could not be 
maintained and those elements in the Nomenklatura who were keen to lever their 
existing economic power into personal wealth.
523
  Western Communists, in particular 
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those within the Italian Party (PCI) had warned the eastern block leaderships that their 
regimes were in danger of collapse in the 1970s—hence the increasingly fractious 
arguments between the PCI and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) at 
the time.  The Soviets could not easily ignore the largest Communist Party in 
Western Europe and despite their ideological development of Euro-Communism as an 
alternative to orthodox Marxism-Leninism, the PCI could not totally break with the 
Soviets.
524
 Thus the two parties spent a fractious period between 1968 and 1984 not 
listening to the other but not quite able to stop talking. 
 
This has some relevance to the possible developments with the DPRK. The regime 
seems to be even less responsive to the needs of its population than the USSR (which 
may link back to its decision discussed above to become essentially a weapons based 
economy) and also its lack of any foreign interaction (despite the attempt of the 
NCCK to play this role). The CPSU found it hard to ignore the PCI and this led to 
some contamination of internal soviet debates,
525
 however, the DPRK lacks any 
similar external engagement (however limited).   
 
Here, an interesting and possibly useful analogy maybe drawn from the behaviour of 
two of Western Europe‘s largest left wing parties towards the Soviet Block in the 
1970s and 1980s.  The West German Socialist Party (SPD) undertook a process it 
called ‗Ostpolitik‘
526
 which sought to explain Soviet behaviour to the West 
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(effectively they believed that peace in Europe and, as a longer term goal, German 
unification would be enhanced if Soviet actions were understood in their own right).  
Their goal was not to challenge the Soviet leadership but to ease tension by ensuring 
that the West understood the Soviet‘s own logic for their actions.  The SPD 
effectively used the mindset currently adopted by the NCCK – seeking unification by 
first seeking to reduce the level of tension and, as a pre-cursor, looking for a nuclear 
free Germany and Korea respectively. 
 
The Italian Communist Party (PCI) shared some of these goals (in particular in its 
own analysis an end to the division of Europe was crucial if it was to be allowed to 
come to power through elections in Italy without provoking a coup) but differed 
substantively in how it proceeded.  The PCI criticised NATO actions as it saw 
appropriate (for example the placement of Cruise Missiles in Sicily) but in the main 
concentrated on the problems being caused by Soviet behaviour in a variety of ways.  
Thus it opposed the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet actions in Ethiopia and the 
crackdown on Solidarity in Poland.  It actually reversed the SPD‘s position and took 
the view that it would explain the West to the Soviets and try to make the leadership 
of the USSR see how their various actions were increasing tension in Europe and 
making war a distinct possibility.  As part of this the PCI was very clear on the issue 
of human rights failings in the Eastern Block, supported the overall Helsinki Accords 
and in particular gave substantial support to dissident groups such as the Czech 
Charter 78 movement. 
 
Although the NCCK has sought to engage with the DPRK it has not done so in such a 
clear way.  Its approach is probably closer to that of the SPD (maybe as both share 
an interest in national re-unification) and, in particular, it has ignored the human rights 
abuses within the DPRK and also absolved the regime of much responsibility for 
increasing the threat of nuclear war in Korea due to its actions.  However, if the 
Christian community is properly to offer a route forward for the Korean people it is 
essential that the approach meets all the expectations of the Gospels and Christian 
teaching.  In this sense there can be no acceptance of the presence of nuclear 
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weapons (even if it is believed they are purely for deterrence) and the issues of human 
rights cannot be put to one side in the search for peace.   As the NCCK 
demonstrated in the Park years, human rights are often the basis on which peace can 
be achieved not an impediment. 
 
The NCCK may have some leverage on the leadership of the DPRK due to their 
willingness to engage with the regime.  It is unlikely that this rivals the influence of 
West Europe‘s largest Communist Party on the Soviet Union and the PCI was clearly 
linking the ending of the division of Europe to the immediate issues of human rights 
across Europe (both in the Soviet Block and the authoritarian regimes still in power 
up to the mid-1970s in Greece, Portugal and Spain).  It is particularly important that 
the NCCK return to a clear commitment to human rights now as opposed to ignoring 
this in their emphasis on re-unification.  The failure to do so is a lapse into secular 
politics not the stance of a Christian faith body.  It also makes it easier for the CCK 
to ignore other aspects as they can point, quite rightly, to NCCK silence on issues of 
religious and human freedom in the DPRK. 
 
5. Towards a Nuclear-free Korea: Overview of Factors at Work 
 
Against this background, it is not surprising that South Korea‘s Christian community 
has been divided in their understanding of the North Korean state itself and its nuclear 
programme in particular. The NCCK, adopting a European-type ‗liberal‘ or 
‗progressive‘ stance, has sought ways to obviate such problem by fostering a policy of 
reconciliation with North Korea, at the same time opposing any sanctions plan 
directed against the DPRK. This policy has been extended to include the United States, 
which has been encouraged to abandon its antagonistic policy to the DPRK, 
subsequently engaging in dialogue with North Koreans in an attempt to seek irenic 
solutions to the spectrum of issues presently dividing the Korean Peninsula. By 
contrast, the CCK continues to pressure the ROK into abandoning its purported 
appeasement policy towards the northern government, appealing instead to 
strengthened ties with the United States and concomitant increased military protection 
for South Korea. 
 
This can be understood in two ways – by means of a secular analysis or one founded 
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on the gospels.  A secular model would be to consider which of these two 
approaches is most likely to achieve the stated aims.  In reality this comes down to a 
consideration as to whether the DPRK might embark on an internal reform 
programme or collapse due its economic problems.   
 
On the other hand, the Christian tradition demands that any response is based on the 
gospels and Christian theology not on concepts of realpolitik.  In this, at the moment 
the positions of both the NCCK and the CCK fail in critical respects.  Both have 
adopted positions that accept—respectively implicitly and explicitly—the presence of 
nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula. The NCCK publicly sympathizes with the 
DPRK‘s security concerns vis-à-vis the United States, and thereby tacitly (perhaps 
even grudgingly) assents to the North Korean weapons programme. Of course, the 
CCK has been forthright in its support for an American nuclear presence in the 
peninsula as a deterrent to possible northern aggression of South Korea‘s territory. 
 
To at least some extent, NCCK and CCK perspective differences are related to their 
members‘ life experiences and religious beliefs. Understood in such light, the 
differing approaches of the two church councils with regards to the DPRK nuclear 
issue almost certainly has its origins in opposed interpretations of the nature and 
intentions of the northern regime, its nuclear programme, and any prudent southern 
responses to both circumstances.  
 
To the extent that the development of weapons of mass destruction does not diminish 
the likelihood of future conflict, it appears immoral to either develop such systems or 
encourage their presence in situ as a reply to an adversary‘s weapons potential. This 
certainly appears to be the case with nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula. The 
councils of both the NCCK and CCK, appear to be adopting some variant of the 
Ramsey deterrent argument, which states that the deployment of nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent is morally acceptable provided the expected outcome being avoided through 
deterrence is of a sufficiently grave evil. However, the issue on hand is the 
applicability of the so-called Ramsey ‗test.‘ 
 
Christians are called to live by a set of standards which in many respects are more 
stringent than those popularly accepted as requisites by other communities. By the 
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same token, Christians not only live in the world but are also called to evangelize it. 
According to history professor John D. Roth of Goshen College (a Mennonite school 
in the United States),  
 
―Christians, I believe, are called to live actively in the real world. They are not to hide their 
faces from the pain, violence, and brokenness that is all too evident in daily life. But because 
they see that world from a divine perspective, from the vantage point of Christian faith, they 
will be cautious about accepting uncritically the standard definitions of what is real, even 





With these thoughts in mind we may evaluate both perspectives and practices of 
NCCK and CCK Christians respectively; the manner in which each of these arrived at, 
justified, and implemented, their respective nuclear weapons policies. Thereafter, we 
may consider the structure of a prospective Korean polity, one consciously organized 
to reflect the moral values of Korean Christianity. 
 
5.1. Evaluation of the NCCK approach 
 
Without doubt, the NCCK has made substantial contributions to overall efforts to 
open North Korea‘s window to the world. It has been a prime-mover in securing 
direct open meetings with North Korean churchmen, in search of steadfast relations. 
In the same manner, it not only placed itself in opposition to ROK‘s government 
during the dictatorial period, it also enlisted the international Christian community to 
make its voice heard in support of the restoration of democracy in South Korea. 
Nevertheless, we may well ask whether NCCK‘s overall approach to the North 
Korean nuclear programme has been as theologically responsible as it has been 
politically prudent. Thus, two distinct although related issues present themselves: the 
establishment of a reunified, non-nuclear Korean state and the propriety of the 
NCCK‘s sympathy (to extent of tacit admission) towards a nuclear weapons-
developing North Korean state. 
 
Achieving reconciliation requires more than some lax effort at wilful historical 
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amnesia. While mutual and unconditional forgiveness may be essential, some 
investigation into the sources of hatred and inappropriate behaviour are required, if 
only to bring all matters to light should efforts at reconciliation eventually fail. In the 
political realm, the relationship between peace and justice may be tenuous and/or 
transitory. ‗Status-quo‘ political peace as opposed to true peace is indeed possible 
without the necessary exercise of justice, if only because political objectives 
themselves may be of short duration and for that matter do not necessarily need to be 
based on personal moral values.  
 
However, the Christian Church is not a community whose existence is predicated on 
the achievement of political ends in this world. Rather, it sees itself as having a divine 
purpose, the salvation of souls. In order to achieve that end, the Church inter alia 
fosters a peace—sometimes termed shalom—that ultimately rests on justice. That 
‗shalom‘ implies a state of being made whole or sanctified. And the justice that 
supports it is recognition of the genuine equality and moral value of all humanity in 
the eyes of God. According to Moltmann, ―In the Old and New Testaments, it is 
theologically clear that justice has precedence over peace because justice creates 
peace, but peace does not bring about justice. Therefore the peace activity of the 
Church and of Christians has to be directed to justice.‖
528
 The divine purpose for 
humans is to live a state of shalom, which is to live in peace without fear and jealousy 
as the place where they lived in the beginning was a Garden of Eden, which means 
‗rejoice, happiness and pleasure‘.
529
 Thus, we may say that shalom cannot sustain 
itself without God‘s justice.  
 
As the above discussion has clearly demonstrated, progressive Korean Christian 
participation in South Korea‘s democratic movement contributed to restoration of 
individual freedom and nationwide political justice. Indeed, as democracy was 
reasserted in South Korea, the political turmoil and the cruel oppression that had 
characterized state policy under the military regime became diminished substantially. 
In the process, they never called for reconciliation with the dictatorship without the 
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oppressors‘ repentance. In many aspects, this decrease in state violence not only 
appears to corroborate Moltmann‘s view but for that matter can be interpreted as an 
outcome of applied political justice, with the NCCK‘s playing an important role in its 
achievement. Likewise, NCCK efforts at Korean unification were aimed at bringing 
justice ‗before‘ peace because the division itself is a symbol of injustice and hatred 
among the entire Korean people. What effectively motivates the desire for a united 
Korea is the recovery of peace through justice.  
 
However, even though the NCCK concurs that peace without justice is in vain, they 
nevertheless appear to have focused more attention on peace recovery through 
‗political compromise‘ rather than seeking to establish a social order identified as 
shalom. This has been especially evident with regard to North Korea, ever since the 
nuclear weapons issue was provoked by the northern regime. NCCK documents 
issued before 1997 reveal that they originally did emphasise recovery of peace 
through justice.
530
 Yet, looking at the declaration of ‗21
st
 Century Korean Theology,‘ 
unconditional reconciliation between the South and the North is described as a 
priority target of all peace efforts. The term ‗justice‘ is replaced by ‗reconciliation‘ 




A basic problem emerges here though. In the past, the NCCK promoted human rights 
during the Korean democratic movement. At that time, they clearly preached divinely 
ordained justice that underlies all human rights. They were assiduous in their efforts 
not to offset justice for some temporal (and ephemeral) political peace. They believed 
that democratization would not only bring justice in the form of human rights, but 
would also sustain those rights in the future. The ‗1988 NCCK declaration‘ argues that 
reunification should be achieved by common people, thereby guaranteeing democratic 
participation, not simply as a matter of political convenience.532  
 
                                            
530
 The NCCK, Resources for Korean Church Reunification Movements, Hankuk Kyohoe ongil 
Woondong Jaryojip, written in Korean (Seoul: Chunji, 2000), p. 24 
531
 ‗A Declaration of 21
st
 Century Korean Theology,‘ NCCK Archive, the NCCK, November 20, 2000 
532
 It says, ―In every step of the formulation of proposals for reunification the full democratic 
participation of all members of society must be guaranteed. Most importantly, participation must be 
assured for the minjung (civilians or common people), who have not only suffered the most from the 
situation of division, but have been continuously alienated and excluded from the decision-making 
processes of society, despite their constituting the majority of the population.‖ ‗Declaration of the 
Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace (1988)‘ 
170 
 
Unfortunately, the arguments contained in the 1988 manifesto appear restricted to the 
citizens of South Korea without taking into account the northern population. The 
North‘s political system does not allow democratic—or, for that matter, any other kind 
of political—participation without the regime‘s control. Furthermore, it is both widely 
reported and popularly assumed that basic human rights are blatantly disregarded by 
the Kim Jung-il regime. Of course, the DPRK has its own political system, a 
composite of communist ideology and reverence of the national dictator bordering on 
emperor worship that is encompassed under the rubric of ‘juche’. They may in fact 
believe their system is far better than those in practice in other countries. They may be 
convinced that they do not need a western-style democratic system in order to thrive. 
They may likewise think they do not need or wish a complicated and considerable 
judicial procedure either. However, understood in objective terms, fundamental 
human rights—the right to life and liberty, freedom of thought and expression and 
equality before the law—evidently do not exist in North Korea.
533
 Besides, it is 
reported that underground Christians in the North have been arrested by the secret 
police and threatened with death; such threats have on occasion been carried out 




Even in the face of such evidence, however, the NCCK seems to have hesitated to 
refer to the human rights situation in North Korea in the same manner that it 
employed during the southern dictatorship period. Reverend Seo Kyung-seok, former 
chairman of the CCK‘s Human Rights Committee, argues that  
 
―The NCCK claims that peace and reconciliation with North Korea should come first before 
looking at the human rights problem in the North. However, as I remember, the NCCK 
revealed successfully the falsehood of peace without human rights during the Park Jung-hee‘s 
dictatorship period in South Korea. In this regard, I do not know why they are relatively calm 
at this moment against the northern regime‘s human rights oppression.‖
535
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The reason why the NCCK has been silent on the human rights situation in North 
Korea might be twofold. Firstly, exposing the human rights issue would justify the 
isolation of the Northern regime from the international community in the eyes of any 
anti-North Korean party. Instead, they opt to put emphasis on national reconciliation 
between the two Korean governments. At the Conference for Human Rights and 
Mission Policy held by the NCCK Human Rights Committee (May 26 - 27, 2005), the 
council concluded—in what can only be described as an act of faith contrary to 
experience—that promoting peace through the economic interchange between the 
South and the North was more important than emphasis on human right violations by 
the North, if only because economic development would ultimately translate into 
improvements in human rights.
536
 Any condemning of human rights violations was 
reserved for the United States to express, thus internationally politicizing the human 
rights issue to pressure North Korea in the world scenario.
537
 In line with this 
approach by the NCCK, Jung Tae-wook, a professor of law, argues that the United 
States should be condemned for using such unfortunate circumstances for its own 
political ends.
538
 Then, he explains a reason why the human rights matter cannot be 
an issue for Christians. 
 
―Context and situations constantly change. Our ethical judgment must take consideration of 
this. There cannot be a rigid template or absolute prescription to changing situations. 
Moreover, even if the matter of human rights has been widely discussed in the Western 
Christian realm, it might not be a doctrinal issue. Sometimes, it is argued that there should be 
moral standards before discussing universal human rights. For example, not all Christians 
accept that people like gays deserve basic human rights because they think Christians should 




This analogy, however, is flawed as a basic Christian tenet is that human beings are 
entitled to live according to God‘s love and grace; furthermore, moral shortcomings—
which as sinners all Christians are prone to have—do not eliminate their inherent 
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rights to certain basic human rights, regardless of political, cultural or economic 
systems into which they are born. Moreover, even though traditional Christian 
morality may be at odds with certain postulated human rights—e.g., the homosexual 
behaviour to which Professor Jung alluded—that same Christian morality teaches the 
believer to ‗love the sinner,‘ irrespective of his sin. That same Christian love precludes 
any argument in favour of denying basic human rights. 
 
There have been in recent years a myriad of considerations and discussions—some of 
them quite heated—among Christians in relation to human rights. However, a 
consensus now appears to have emerged. The lines of thinking of Thomas P. 
Schirrmacher, a German systematic theologian, seem to be widely representative in so 
far as, ―Human rights, given to protect the individual, are derived from Christian 
thought. The General Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations on 
December 10, 1948, clearly demonstrates its Christian roots. The bans on slavery and 
torture, the principle of equality before the law, the right to rest and recreation—as 
seen in the Sabbath or Sunday rest—come from Christian traditions and not by chance 
from the governments which confirm these rights and anchor them in their 
constitutions although they are mostly in Christian countries.‖540 
 
In this regard, justice and human rights may not be convenient formulae but are 
indeed fundamental principles and as such, always have universal application. As the 
NCCK clarifies in its 1988 declaration, if the two Koreas‘ reconciliation is to be 
carried out by common people, human right violations at government level must first 
stop, if only because reconciliation is a process to achieve the peace encompassing all 
Korean people, both in South and North Korea. Thus, regardless of whether or not the 
United States withdraws from this issue strategically and politically, the human rights 
problems in North Korea must remain on the NCCK agenda; furthermore it must 
continue to be a matter of public record and emphasis. 
 
Another further reason for NCCK‘s relative silence on human rights issues for North 
Koreans could be a consequence of the gravity of the nuclear weapons issue. The 
North‘s nuclear weapons development programme is a serious security concern for 
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the people of South Korea. Therefore, effective actions in relation to human rights 
abuses are to be preceded by the unequivocal resolution of the nuclear threat. Such a 
southern strategy—maintaining an affable relationship with the Kim Jung-il regime as 
the best means of preventing a nuclear war in the region—presupposes avoiding any 
predicable irritation of the regime with references to inconvenient issues such as 
human rights. In the political realm, human rights and national security concerns are 
not naturally synonymous. 
 
However, the NCCK is a faith-oriented organization that represents Protestant 
Christian individuals and organizations in South Korea, not a secularly established 
political organization, whose constitutionally mandated requirement extends to the 
protection of its citizens and their property but which is not constitutionally required 
to make the same efforts beyond its borders. The council is a faith community that has 
the moral responsibility to speak out against political and ethical wrongdoing. The 
role of any church is not to foster or emphasise policies whose primary virtues are 
practicality irrespective of moral considerations but to inform the people where God‘s 
justice lies, making an effort to see it brought to fruition. In this regard, Yoder 
explains the difference of mandate of Church and State when he says, ―The mandate 
of the church, the mandate to overcome evil, is the superior mandate; the mandate of 
the state, that of keeping evil in check, only has meaning because the church is 
accomplishing its mission.‖541 The NCCK took this view and observed the mandate 
of the church, when it spoke out against injustices committed by the military 
dictatorship in the South. However, it has not done so in its relations with the North. 
 
On the other hand, the belief that initiating economic growth in North Korea with 
Southern assistance will foster human rights in the long term is also naïve if only 
because the primary and perhaps only beneficiary of any aid could well be the ‗inner 
sanctum‘ of North Korea‘s political regime; at least as long as the DPRK‘s one-party 
dictatorship continues. Moreover, NCCK‘s policy of silence concerning a regime that 
was responsible for the death of millions of North Koreans—men, women and 
children who starved to death—should be reconsidered in both moral and ethical 
terms. 
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North Korea‘s highest leaders, Kim pere and Kim fils are evidently responsible for the 
national famine. But, they might judged that the fate of their people suffering calamity 
was an acceptable price to pay in the achievement of national political goals. In this, 
they were probably following the precedent set by Stalin‘s regime which worsened a 
famine in the Ukraine of the 1930s by continuing to export grain so as both to fund a 
military build up and avoid alerting the external world to the existence of the 
famine
542
.  The North Korean famine was largely a by-product of what amounted to 
a similar financial decision—redirection of national assets to concentrate on the 
development of military weapons systems.543 
 
The public theology espoused by the NCCK rejects the development of nuclear 
weapons as intrinsically unacceptable, since their application in war cannot be 
effected in a manner consistent with the moral requirements encompassed in the 
principles of discrimination and proportionality. Hence, logic demands that the NCCK 
systematically object to all nuclear weapons development programs, irrespective of 
the nation making the effort. Despite this, the NCCK‘s stance against nuclear weapon 
development appears lax towards such programme in North Korea, ostensibly because 
they were convinced that the U.S. nuclear threat has encouraged the Northern regime 
to develop nuclear weapons of its own defence. Noh Jong-sun, NCCK committee 
member for reunification and reconciliation, asserts that North Korea has a right to 
defend itself, if necessary with nuclear weapons against any U.S. nuclear threats.544 
Thus, his solution on the nuclear issue is first to dismantle the currently deployed 
nuclear weapons by the major nuclear powers. He argues that ―discussing nuclear 
disarmament of North Korea is to be behind a discussion of the powerful states‘ 
nuclear weapons. It is wrong to point out only the problem of the weak country‘s 
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nuclear armament against the powerful countries.‖545 Then, he suggested signing a 
peace treaty between North Korea and the United Nations as a way to end the nuclear 
crisis in the region.546 If such a peace treaty was concluded, and then mutual respect 
among the states concerned is established, his suggestion would attain a greater level 
of cogency, if only because there would be no further national security objective to 
North Korea development of a nuclear arsenal. This of course presupposes that 
concerns of national security are the driving force behind DPRK efforts, a belief that 
the NCCK and Noh Jung-sun both share at least in their public pronouncements. 
 
However, many scholars and analysts are uncertain whether North Korea would ever 
abandon those nuclear weapons already in its arsenal.547 They believe that even if the 
northern regime is interested in limited political engagement with South Korea, it will 
not abandon its nuclear war-fighting capability, a programme into which so much 
effort and resources already have been invested. Professor Andrei Lankov, a Russian 
specialist in Korean politics, argues that ―The North Koreans will never give up their 
nuclear weapons. They thrive on tension and use it to prevent an opening of their 
country to the outside world.‖548 He lists three reasons.  
 
―Firstly, North Korea has learnt a lesson how strong the U.S. military power is from the Iraq 
War and Afghanistan operation. Thus, they do not easily give up the strategic value of the 
nuclear weapons as an absolute deterrent means. Secondly, without the nuclear weapons, 
North Korea, one of the poorest countries in the world, will have nothing to bargain its interest 
in the international society. And lastly, the North‘s nuclear weapon helps the regime prolong 
its lifespan. If the regime abandoned the weapons, the military-oriented regime would mar its 




Concurring with Lankov‘s view, Michael J.Mazarr likewise argues that North Korea 
would not readily abandon its nuclear weapons as he relates, ―Beginning in the late 
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1980s, officials in Pyongyang learned how useful an ambiguous nuclear capability 
could be in getting attention, wringing security concessions out of Seoul and 
Washington, and acquiring pledges of economic assistance and expanded diplomatic 
relations.‖550 Considering both scholars‘ arguments, maintaining the existing nuclear 
weapons would be more profitable for the northern regime, along with an ambiguous 
management of the nuclear issue; as long as same continues to effectively serve as a 
bargaining gambit to obtain concessions from the West over the long term. 
Understood in these terms, it is difficult to conclude that North Korea will drop its 
nuclear weapons programme neither on short term nor that easily. 
 
In light of the NCCK‘s ambivalence toward the DPRK nuclear weapons development 
program, as well as its silence regarding the regime‘s contributions to human 
suffering in North Korea, the church group‘s efforts at bringing about peace based 
solely on reconciliatory gestures toward North Korea will not guarantee a true peace. 
For it is only reconciliation encompassing all Koreans, even if some political 
reconciliation at government level were also to occur, that can bring about that peace 
theologians describe as shalom, thereby with decreased war prospects. As problematic 
as the NCCK‘s silence on such grave matters was, even more troubling was the 
NCCK‘s lack of forceful public response to human suffering in North Korea, a stand 
which risked compromising its identity as a faith community; identity based on Jesus‘ 
love and the grace He offers to all humankind. Regardless of policy priorities or for 
that matter the establishment of preferences in political debate, the Church is first and 
foremost of all a spiritual body, one that conducts itself in the belief that God—who 
grants primacy of place to the weak and suffering, and will surely punish those who 
afflict them or are indifferent to their affliction—is watching and judging; only 
secondarily, if at all, is it a political actor. 
 
Given all these considerations, the NCCK should not restrict itself to the role of 
political reconciler but rather it should actively engage in surmounting the difficulties 
currently experienced by North Koreans at the grass roots, even if such role would 
mean alienating the present-day DPRK leadership. ―Christian hope is not directed 
towards a happy end in world history,‖ argues Moltmann, ―false comfort is just as 
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dangerous as general despair.‖
551
 In this sense, a prophetic message as such, ‗any 
attempt to make a nuclear weapon at the price of human sufferings cannot be 
permissible under any circumstance and constitutes an intrinsic affront to God‘, 
should first be addressed to the North Korean leaders, prior to any further effort at 
national reunification. 
 
5.2. Evaluation of the CCK approach 
 
The CCK was neither apolitical nor purely religious, as they have clearly defined 
themselves as anti-communists and anti-North Korean. However, their direct 
participation in the political debate concerning the nuclear weapons issue did not 
appear until the emergence of a progressive government in South Korea and the 
disclosure of the HEU program in North Korea. However, as discussed above, the 
primary motivation was their security concerns for South Korea in the face of 
growing northern nuclear threat. 
 
The CCK‘s security concerns originated from the memories of individual members, 
especially those who had suffered persecution while living in the North. Pastors who 
attended CCK-hosted rallies used to say, ―[North Korean] Communists are the first 





In this manner conservative Christian leaders within the CCK have kept their hatred 
alive while sustaining a spiritual battle against a regime personified as the ‗evil one‘ 
for over half-a-century. Convinced that defeating the northern communists is 
compatible with their religious beliefs and will make Korea a better place for the 
Korean Church.  
 
The CCK believes that stronger physical and military power may deter, and even 
defeat, the North Koreans. Their interpretation of the term ‗security‘ is based not only 
on spiritual power, a consideration their fundamental faith regularly stresses, but also 
on physical power manifested in terms of military potential. Thus, spiritual strength 
and physical power combine reinforcing each other; such combination generates a 
synergy essential, in their eyes, to the maintenance of national security. Dependence 
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on superior weaponry is not regarded as impinging on their trust in God‘s almighty 
power, if only because they view these weapons as they may be permitted to use 
against an evil enemy and saving the lives of the good. Implicit in such a moral logic 
is the notion that such weapons—including nuclear armament in the hands of the 
just—are either morally neutral or even perhaps have divine approval. 
 
Such ideas are related to the realist concept of security, which defines the relationship 
between states as power politics and on-going conflicts. However, such a realist 
approach to security might not only prevent an outbreak of war, but may actually 
promote the possibility of war. As Joseph Nye argues, military superiority does not 
guarantee the achievement of goals set out prior to military engagement,  
 
―Military power is a small part of the solution in responding to threats on the bottom board of 
international relations. Even on the top board (where America represents nearly half of world 
defence expenditures), the military is supreme in the global commons of air, sea, and space, 




In this light, Dr. Shim Jae-kwon, South Korean peace theorist, argues that a sovereign 
state in the post-Cold War era could no longer guarantee its safety, given the anarchic 
and conflict-oriented understanding of contemporary international relations. Rather, it 
needs to consider an idea of common prosperity by searching common values among 
the nations because real security comes from cooperative and harmonious efforts to 




However, the CCK‘s thinking in the area of national security seems to remain a realist 
approach. For example, Reverend Kim Jin-ho, a peace theologian, claims that the 
CCK‘s support of the U.S. invasion into Iraq in 2003 shows their preference for 
reliance on military power even though there was room for reconsidering the U.S. 
invasion in terms of just war criteria, in particular jus ad bellum.
555
 Viewed from the 
biblical perspective, dependence on military power was not allowed for God‘s people. 
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According to moral theologian Roger Ruston,  
 
―Israel‘s sacred writers would never agree that Israel‘s wars were the king‘s wars, despite the 
attempts of the kings from David onwards to make them appear so. They were YHWH‘s wars 
on behalf of his people. In keeping with the Exodus tradition, it was YHWH‘s miraculous 
power that was to deliver Israel, not the power of a sacred king with his standing armies and 
his modern weapons. The power was ultimately with God, not with any superior power.‖
556
   
 
Nonetheless, it is the CCK membership that has infused faith with antagonism and 
ideological preference. They have consistently sympathised with South Korea‘s 
military build-up. Moreover, CCK leadership argues it would be inevitable for South 
Korea to either remain within the U.S. nuclear umbrella or would need to possess 
nuclear weapons, as long as North Korea keeps their own nuclear weapons arsenal. 
According to the ‗Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula‘, which was signed 
by the CCK president, former presidents and other conservative Christian leaders of 
the Korean Church,  
 
―Through North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and the execution of a nuclear test, the 
Korean Peninsula is facing its most serious crisis since the 1950 Korean War. North Korea's 





Even though the declaration was adamant in demanding that the North dismantle its 
nuclear arsenal, it made no comparable demand on South Korea, where a modest, tacit 
nuclear weapons research programme was still functioning.
558
 Nor did the CCK 
object to the initiation of any prospective major nuclear weapons development 
programme by the ROK in the event that the DPRK continuing its efforts. As argued 
in the chapter 5, it should be unthinkable because nuclear deterrence is based on an 
assumption of actual use. O‘Donovan explains why nuclear deterrence has mistakenly 
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been sought when he wrote, ―What is distinctive in modern deterrence is that the 
limitless evil which imagination can propose in relation to any determined threat has 
become a project for practical execution; and this is necessarily a modern 
development since the appearance of the limitless within the scope of practical 




The underlying problem however is that the CCK‘s definition of evil never points to 
nuclear weaponry itself. Rather, the evil they bear in mind is only embodied in the 
North Korean authorities, as their predefined and designated enemy. Gregory A Boyd 
cites American President Bush‘s remarks in order to show how a political leader can 
react to a mistakenly defined evil, ―Hence, the only way to end the conflict is to ‗rid 
the world of this evil,‘ as President George W. Bush said after the terrorist attack on 
the World Trade Centre. The ‗good‘ (our tribe) must extinguish the ‗evil‘ (their tribe), 
using all means necessary, including violence. This is the age-old ‗myth of redemptive 
violence.‖
560
 Even though the CCK‘s overall case does not exactly match the Bush 
argument, its position to vis-à-vis North Korea does. The CCK regards Kim Jung-il as 
an evil man, one who must and will be eradicated in the end. In this sense, for the 
CCK, any South Korean nuclear weapon development programme could be regarded 
as no more than a consequence of what the ‗evil man brought upon himself‘.  There 
is no doubt that he is a dictator who oppresses his people and ignores human rights in 
North Korea. He may be a dangerous political leader who would harm peace and 
stability in the region. He may still harbour the ambition of communizing South 
Korea—or, perhaps more accurately, establishing the DPRK doctrine of juche—
should he think the time was ripe.  
 
However, it does not mean that he is always evil. There is a problem if he should be 
treated as the incarnation of the Devil. Kwon Jin-kwan explains,  
 
―Generally speaking, political situations or circumstances are always complicated with evil 
and good. Evil and good are involved in any situation. Authentic theological politics aims at 
eliminating evil and increasing the goodness in the ongoing socio-political realities, although 
perfect goodness may not be possible in reality. However, there is no absolute evil in the form 
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of entities. Thus the labelling of North Korea as an axis of evil cannot stand. It is a habit of the 




In addition to this observation, once being so labelled in religious terms, the evil-
defined man becomes identified with an ‗anti-faith‘, which should be a target for 
eradication at whatever cost. If such identification were unquestionably accepted, a 
definer would be willing to consider any and all means to destroy him.  
 
On the other hand, the CCK might want to show their resolute will to dissuade Kim- 
Jung-il from his nuclear ambition through the possibility of the South‘s nuclear 
armament and/or establishing the U.S. nuclear umbrella. It would also be a 
problematic matter if their reaction to the northern nuclear weapons implied an 
invitation for South Korea‘s nuclear armament.  
 
However, this would be an even more serious problem if they fail to acknowledge the 
burden attached to a nuclear weapons build-up. In relation to the psychological aspect 
of nuclear deterrence, according to O‘Donovan, ―The seductive appeal of deterrence-
theory to thinkers of the realist tradition lies in its concept of the enemy as one who 
cannot be made susceptible to the codes of honour and rational political interest which 
generally govern relations among states.‖
562
 More so, Roger Ruston highlights the 
implication of dependence of the nuclear weapons by saying,  
 
―Consider the moral burden that nuclear deterrence lays on the shoulders of those who make it 
ready for battle – a burden that is shared by all of us who willingly live under its protection, 
even if we do not acknowledge our part in it. The practice of nuclear deterrence implies that 
there is no limit to the amount of destruction we should be prepared to commit in the state‘s 
service. It implies that we are ready, on orders from political or military superiors, to destroy 





In light of Ruston‘s observation, the CCK‘s concern for security may hamper the 
possibility of reconciliation with North Korean ‗minjung‘ in the future. Moreover, 
with no prudent consideration of the North‘s intention to opt for nuclear power, the 
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CCK‘s hard-line attitude may drive the situation into an even more dangerous phase. 
If its target were to deter the North‘s nuclear ambition, the defect of nuclear strategy 
for deterrence, should be considered first. In the absence of such a consideration, the 
CCK‘s security concern would be misguided, oblivious to unexpected results such as 
two equally nuclear-armed Koreas. Thus, consideration of a nuclear strategy as a 
counter-policy to the North‘s nuclear weapons program should not be permissible, 
given some elements of the Christian Just War perspective.  In particular, the view 
that a nuclear deterrent strategy may be regarded as a case to invite evil to end evil. 
 
It is this consideration that has troubled moral theologians. Opting for an intrinsically 
evil policy to defeat evil—or, perhaps redefining an intrinsically evil policy as a 
morally acceptable one under certain circumstances—has been found acceptable by 
many just war advocates. Roth describes the moral dilemma,  
 
―When faced with the question of how we would react to an actual threat to our lives, many 
contemporary Christians offer a response that does not differ in any significant way from what 
one might expect to hear from a modern non-Christian….If someone threatens to rob us of our 
possessions or our lives, then a lethal act of violence against the aggressor is justified. In other 
words, our own lives must be preserved at all costs even if it means forfeiting the life of 




However, one of the intrinsic attributes of nuclear weapons is that they are designed 
for exterminating all creatures, which completely contradicts God‘s grace. In a basic 
sense of Christianity, nuclear weapons cannot be a lesser evil to defeat a bigger evil 
because of their indiscriminate and destructive nature. In addition, Walter Stein, a 
distinguished Catholic just war thinker, claims that ―any reliance of these weapons as 
‗deterrent‘ must be wicked, since this not only involves risks of their eventual use but 
hypothetically commits us to murder here and now.‖
565
 Furthermore, international 
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In the end, we may conclude, firstly that CCK‘s perception of national security has 
not been different from the political realist perspective, which interprets the world 
order as a conflict structure and stresses the need of national defence. Such a 
perception made the CCK fail to develop a new concept of security that seeks 
common prosperity and peace and puts military options in a subordinate position. 
Secondly, its desperate effort to stop the northern nuclear project has resulted in their 
request for the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Considering the North‘s excuse to develop their 
own nuclear arms as a deterrent means, the CCK‘s searching for another nuclear 
deterrence is hardly distinct from the North‘s dependence on nuclear arms. And lastly, 
CCK‘s identity as a faith-oriented organization as equal to the NCCK, facing the 
northern nuclear threat by depending on purely spiritual power, has been weakened by 
its seeking morally unacceptable military power.  
 
An effective question is whether the CCK has adopted a position where they depend 




Quite obviously, the weapons development programme undertaken by North Korea 
has attracted attention from any number of parties, whether in the Korean Peninsula, 
in adjacent countries, or, for that matter in other continents. The reaction was also 
marked with significant divisions prevailing among members of South Korea‘s 
Christian community. 
 
The DPRK nuclear initiative challenged Christian thinking on a number of levels. At 
the most visceral, apprehension—extensive among South Koreans, irrespective of 
religious persuasion—mounted (and became crystallised) with the significant 
deployment of nuclear weapons, that should they actually be applied during hostilities, 
could ultimately threaten not only the continued existence of the republic but for that 
matter the Korean civilization itself. For those Christians who envisioned an 
eventually unified Korea as a geographic reflection of a Christian koinonia, both the 
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weapons program and the recently evolved juche philosophy that fostered it, raised 
the spectre of what could be termed as ‗anti-koinonia,‘ a unified Korea under juche 
principles rather than under those elucidated in the Gospels. 
 
For many conservative Christians, including the CCK, these developments in North 
Korea underlined their sagacity and prudence of avoiding active opposition to the 
Park regime and in a manner, its Chun successor. Whatever the faults of the military 
dictatorships, they were largely content to leave unmolested Christians who did not 
publicly oppose the regime and this tolerance had extended to freedom of worship. 
Furthermore, many Korean conservatives (from all religious traditions) argued that 
dictatorial government was a necessary precursor to economic development567 and as 
a consequence, a deterring factor to North Korean aggressive acts. For many, there 
was a vague belief (or even better, hope) that a strong economy would promote 
democracy at some time in the future and under such conditions, North Korea might 
then find peaceful reunification an attractive option.568  
 
From the NCCK perspective, nuclear weapons, while still important, are a lesser 
consideration. The NCCK looks to their elimination from the Korean peninsula, a 
policy that would likely be pursued by any democratic government with authority 
over the entire region. Secondly, the NCCK unification effort is legitimately defined 
as a political application of a fundamentally religious construct (a Korean koinonia). 
As noted in the discussion previously, it is not the NCCK‘s emphasis on unification 
that troubles most conservative Christians but rather its evident unwillingness to 
recognize the prospective danger in dealing with a regime that argues in favour of 
development of such weapons in terms of its self-identification.  
 
As a result, there are a number of subtle distinctions separating public figures in South 
Korea who jointly favour a more relaxed relationship with North Korea. Kim Dae-
jung, a devout Catholic on excellent terms with the NCCK, and democratically 
elected president of the ROK in 1997, is a case worth mentioning. Such friendly ties 
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may be explained by the fact that both parties recognised the necessity of 
reconciliation with—and indeed embracement of—North Korea. President Kim went 
so far as to avoid using terms (e.g., ‗unification‘) that could be interpreted as threats 
by the DPRK, preferring more innocuous expressions (e.g., ‗constructive 
engagement‘). However, as described,569 insofar as the North‘s continuing nuclear 
weapons development is concerned his efforts partially failed as the relaxed 
relationship with the DPRK did not, in turn, allow any progress on the nuclear issue.  
 
For the past few years the NCCK has suffered from internal dissension, much of it a 
function of the differing perceptions of member churches on the weight that should be 
placed on the DPRK nuclear programme and its implications for national 
reunification. This disagreement—or perhaps better described as difference in 
conceptualisation—may also point to a more profound difference, one reaching into 
the appreciation of a distinctive Korean Christianity. 
 
The NCCK model rests on a national koinonia that in turn, has its origins at least to 
some extent, in neo-Confucian thought. However, troubling is the fact that the NCCK 
model has an essentially asymmetric relationship with its DPRK counterpart. For the 
NCCK the apotheosis of juche into a species of state-sponsored paganism in which 
Kim Il-sung (and, later, Kim Jung-il) took on the character of a deified leader 
presented an institutional challenge, one that had its origins in the NCCK‘s increasing 
antipathy and public opposition to the Park dictatorship in the early 1970s. 
Nonetheless, as reiterated several times, the core spirit of this model has become 
diluted by the manner that the NCCK has dealt with the nuclear issue in North Korea, 
putting more weight on political and institutional reunification rather than 
encompassing minjung-oriented koinonia where people‘s human rights are protected 
and their integrity exalted. 
 
The possibility of a Korean koinonia rests on fundamental beliefs found in the 
Gospels and to some extent are understood through the prism of neo-Confucian 
thought. The North Korean model of Korean unification presupposes the 
establishment of juche, supplanting competing philosophical and religious modes of 
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thought. Of course, if national unification could be achieved in terms of genuine 
koinonia, that problem would be avoided but to date Kim Jong-il‘s regime remains 
attached to juche and for that matter envisions its nuclear arsenal as a means of 
securing continued and uncontested grip on political power. Finding some means of 





Chapter 6: Summary: Applying Just War to Korea Today 
 
1. Initial Considerations 
 
This chapter summarises the argument so far in the thesis and draws together the main 
strands of: the Christian Just War tradition; the specific situation in Korea since 1953; 
and, the development of the Korean Church, to explore both the current situation and 
options.  It reviews what could be said to be the current challenges to the goal of a 
Korea inspired by Gospel ideas, primarily the division between the DPRK and ROK 
and the presence of nuclear weapons.  It also suggests that the Korean Protestant 
community needs to base its response more on the Just War arguments than they have 
so far so as to provide the means to deal with these complex issues. 
 
This chapter also considers the answers to the key questions set out in the introduction, 
viz: 
 
The nuclear issue of North Korea is not a political or ideological matter, but a 
matter regarding an identity of the Christian Church in South Korea. 
 
 And the related questions of: 
 
 What historical and political events have brought Christian Churches in Korea 
to their actual respective postures on reunification and national security?  To 
what extent can these modern debates be related to the different ways the 
Protestant Community first came into the Korean peninsula? 
 What priorities have been established in the NCCK and the CCK in adopting 
their council stances towards political reunification?  How have they 
interpreted the Christian duty of Missio Dei in terms of their engagement with 
public life, and the changing politics, in South Korea?  
 What are the moral implications of just war in the contemporary war and 
security issues?  
 How much importance is attributed to national security in relation to nuclear 
weapons as a means of its attainment?  
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 What are both councils‘ theological stances in relation to the nuclear issue? 
 Which is the Korean Church‘s view of the State‘s role in the nuclear issue? 
 How does the Christian Church influence State political policy? 
 
To do this means to draw together the three main themes in this thesis: the Christian 
Just War tradition; how Christianity became part of Korean society; and, the current 
political situation in the Korean peninsula.  From this synthesis it then possible to 
move on in the final chapter to consider what practical steps and options exist that are 
compatible with the Christian Gospels. 
 
It is possible to see the Just War tradition as mainly forming a constraint on countries 
that might be seen to be the aggressor in any situation. Thus the expectations of Jus 
ad Bellum set out circumstances when it is deemed to be legitimate to start a war.  At 
no stage in the Christian era has Korea been in a position to undertake external 
aggression and this simple fact perhaps explains why Just War has not really featured 
in the debates within the Protestant Community so far.  The only war started by an 
element of the Korean community was the invasion by the DPRK in 1950.  In this 
case, for Christians in the ROK the need was to respond to what was effectively 
external aggression.  Against this historic background, the concepts of Missio Dei, of 
establishing a Korean state based on the gospel ideas and the older Korean concept of 
Koinonia have instead formed the core of the argument. 
 
However, this is no longer adequate as it is possible that the ROK could be the 
aggressor in any future war and, in any case, the community does need to consider its 
response in the terms of Just War because, as important as Jus ad Bellum, is the 
concept of Jus in Bello, practically just what is legitimate in a situation of armed 
conflict.  In this case, as of now, any armed conflict in the Korean peninsular could 
easily slip into the use of nuclear weapons by one or both sides.  Against this 
background there is a need for the Protestant community to ensure that its arguments 
and understanding are informed by the Just War concepts. 
 
The concept, argued by O‘Donovan of avoiding the deaths of the innocent becomes 
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particularly important once there is a risk of the use of nuclear weapons
570
.  He also 
sets an important second test, ―that the evil it (ie war) inflicts such be less grave than 
the evil it seeks to avert
571
‖.  O‘Donovan suggests that ―separating the innocent from 
the guilty is the object of judgement
572
‖.  Yoder, warns very clearly that ―just war 
thinking [discrimination and proportionality] easily degenerates into the justification, 
even sometimes the glorification, of war, violence and force, because it is assumed 
that, once the set criteria are met, the military action is no longer in any fundamental 
way questionable, deplorable or tragic.‖
573
   
 
Perhaps due to the circumstances at the time of its arrival in Korea, Korean 
Christianity has had a strong message of social justice, of a Korean identity, and 
within the Protestant community a commitment to seeing the Messianic Kingdom574 
both in concrete terms and in its achievement to be both a legitimate and reasonable 
goal. Historian and theologian Kim Yong-bok describes the mindset as,  
 
―[History] is the struggle between the politics of God and the politics of Satan. The world is 
dominated by godless pagan politics, which are the manifestations of satanic politics. But the 
politics of God is manifested in the politics of Israel and the politics of Jesus who was 
crucified. The politics of Jesus the Messiah is to conquer and overcome the politics of this 




There is no Hegelian synthesis at work in this thinking, rather it is one of unrelenting 
conflict; one in which only one side can ultimately prevail, and Christians promised 
they will ultimately prevail. Professor Kim‘s metaphorical reference to Israel is 
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particularly telling. His phrase—‗the politics of Israel‘—establishes the messianic 
parameters as such,  
 
―The biblical language, especially the language of the Book of Exodus, the Book of 
Revelation, the Gospels—the Stories of Jesus—became the historical language of Korean 
Christian koinonia. It was not ideology; it was not a political program for revolution. But, it 
was the parable, the metaphor, and the symbol system to interpret history, to perceive 




In a wider sense, the early Catholics identified with the social reform movement of 
their time.  The Protestant community took on this attribute, and during the Japanese 
occupation, also sought to defend Korean social identity by maintaining a school 
system and continuing their welfare work. Professor Kim describes how these themes 
are interwoven when he wrote,  
 
―[The] focal point of messianism is the general resurrection of the all the people (the minjung), 
for historical judgment against Evil and its followers. The general resurrection of all the 
people is a concrete vision of history in which the people their corporate subjectivity in 
participating in the Messianic Kingdom. The content of the Messianic Kingdom may be 
viewed as justice, koinonia, and shalom (peace or becoming whole). Justice is a faithful 
relation or faithful interweaving of the stories of the people and power so that there is no 
contradiction between them; koinonia is the content of the creative interaction that will take 





Thus to understand the situation facing the Protestant Community today we need to 
accept that these goals remain core with the aim of a unified Korean polity, one 
consciously organized to reflect the values of a Messianic Kingdom.  Nonetheless, at 
the moment Korea is divided, with nuclear weapons in place on both sides of the 
division.  Before moving on to consider the practical implications it is necessary to 
first restate the core aspects of Just War theory and also to understand what the 
concepts of Justice, koinonia, and shalom mean in the Korean Context. 
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2. Just War: Summarised 
 
2.1 The Historic Concept of Just War 
 
The Christian Just War model has developed (from earlier pagan roots) ever since the 
possibility of the Christian community (either as individuals or as an organised group 
or state) participating in armed conflict.  Essentially it has tended to reject the two 
clear positions of pacifism (war is never acceptable) or the view that the only 
constraint is not to lose a war (in other words any means are acceptable to this end).  
The tradition very early on set out two key tests of Jus ad Bellum (ie is the war 
justified) and Jus in Bello (ie are the actions undertaken during the war justified).  
Thomas Aquinas578 elaborated these basic considerations into three tests – of a lawful 
prince, of having a just cause for any aggression and that the goal is to either avoid 
evil or advance good.   
 
The practical problem, and this is to be heard in the current views of the CCK, is that 
these tests are themselves based on judgement.  Thus it is possible to argue that the 
ROK is a legitimate state, has just cause for war against the DPRK (the attempted 
assassination of President Park, development of nuclear weapons etc) and that war 
will avoid the greater evil (ie the continuation of the DPRK regime in the north, never 
mind its extension across Korea579).   
 
This approach also reflects a reading of biblical descriptions of holy war
580
, in other 
words of a war legitimised by God because those who conduct it are themselves 
believers.  The practical consequence of this moral simplification has been numerous 
wars and massacres justified in terms of religious norms.  The Czech satirist Jaroslav 
Hasek describes a mass before Austrian troops went to war with Russia in 1914 as:  
 
―Drumhead masses were generally celebrated … on the eve of some bloody massacre and 
carnage.  I remember that once when a drumhead mass was being celebrated an enemy 
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aeroplane dropped a bomb on us and hit the field altar.  There was nothing left of the 
chaplain … Afterwards they wrote of him as some kind of martyr, while our aeroplanes 




The early stages of the Christian community tended to pacifism (they had no state 
power, were an often persecuted minority and, often, were ineligible for military 
service)
582
.  This view has been preserved across the centuries of the Christian 
community
583
, and the spirit of non-violent resistance again has a resonance in the 
Korean Christian tradition.  In particular during the Japanese occupation, the Church 
sought to mitigate the ills of that period
584
, as much through its practical works and by 
preserving key aspects of Korean culture.  What it did not do, was to incite active 
rebellion against the Japanese. 
 
However, by the third century AD the Roman state also became a nominally Christian 
state with Christianity as its state religion
585
.  However, the change from Paganism 
to Christianity saw no decline in the level of both internal and external warfare that 
the empire engaged in.  What this did do, though was to place Christians in a new 
position – one where they, and their state, could be an aggressor in a war and as such 
the old purely pacifist tradition
586




This gap between the moral certainty of pacifism and the need to find some means to 
reconcile a faith based on precepts of peace with the practicality of a state and society 





Augustine effectively refined Aquinas‘ doctrine by identifying three elements 
essential to the establishment of just cause for war: defence, retaking something 
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wrongly taken, and punishment of evildoing, as well as the requirements of last resort, 
proportionality of good and evil done and the goal of peace.  He was also concerned 
that war must not be marked by giving into the evil forces that could be released, in 
particular a love of violence for its own sake.  Again, and as developed by the twelth 
century jurist Gratian
589
, this also argued that even in war the need to ‗love thy enemy‘ 
had not been superseded.  
 
War, however, remained common across the Christian world (both Catholic and 
Orthodox) and there were ongoing efforts both to set out when it was legitimate and 
what actions (or weapons) were legitimate.  One important distinction in many of 
these debates was the attempt to differentiate between a war between Christians 
(which was held to have some limits) and against pagans, heretics and believers in 
other faiths (especially Islam) where such constraints were often seen as being set 
aside590.  This again has an echo in the views of some CCK theologians who argue 
that the use of nuclear weapons against Japan was a clear statement of God‘s wrath 
against unbelievers591. 
 
However, a different strand of thought also arose in the early middle ages that quite 
deliberately made no distinction between warfare between Christians and warfare that 
involved pagans, heretics or believers in other faiths, for example at the Council of 
Constance in 1415
592593
.  This introduced an element of what could be called natural 
law into the development of Just War theology, and was further developed by Iberian 
scholars in a reaction to the excesses of the Conquistadors in the New World
594
.  
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Following on from this growing emphasis on Natural Law, Hugo Grotius 595 
effectively minimised the importance of Jus ad Bellum (ie deciding if a given war is 
right, although he argued for a retention of key criteria set out by Aquinas and 
Augustine
596
) and much more with Jus in Bello (ie what could be called the laws of 
war).  In this he placed emphasis on proportionality in the use of force and a clear 
ruling to avoid the killing of non-combatants.   
 
His development of Just War theory came at a period when the concept of the national 
state (even if it was multi-national and with shifting borders) became embedded in 
Europe at the close of the Thirty Years War
597
.  From then (the 1650s) to the French 
Revolution, warfare in Europe became essentially a matter of a struggle between two 
dynasties (the Hapsburg centred in Austria and Bourbon in France) for domination 
over territory such as Italy, Spain and Germany.  It ceased to be warfare for survival 




If the Europe in the period up to the wars of the French Revolution saw less emphasis 
on Jus ad Bellum, then the effect of the nationalist and revolutionary wars that marked 
the American and French revolutions, the national liberation struggles that followed 
the Napoleonic period in countries such as Italy and Germany all brought to the fore 
the concept of war waged by an armed citizenry rather than by a professional army.  
In turn the idea that the whole nation (not just its armed forces or political elite) could 
be a legitimate target
599
 led to a loss of much of the proportionality and 
discrimination set out in the Jus in Bello tradition.  The wars of the twentieth century 
saw the use of strategies and weapons deliberately designed to kill the civilians in 
opposing countries, the use of poison gas, the development of partisan warfare (with 
the practical horrors that brings) and of course the use of nuclear weapons.  
Effectively by 1945 it could be said that both the traditional bases of the Christian Just 
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War tradition had been undermined. 
 
2.2 Just War and Nuclear Weapons 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, at the end of the Second World War, both the Christian and 
Secular attempts at regulating warfare had been shattered.  The 30 years of warfare 
from 1914-1945 had seen the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, the deliberate 
targeting of civilian populations, all participants guilty of what would come to be 
called war crimes and all participants guilty of unprovoked invasions of other 
countries.  The secular response was to try to rebuild a structure to limit the recourse 
to war, and what would happen if it occurred, using the newly formed United Nations.   
 
Michael Walzer perhaps exemplified this legalist approach to regulating warfare
600
.  
His initial set of rules placed emphasis on states being sovereign within their own 
boundaries (thus very much in the tradition of the Peace of Westphalia
601
) and with a 
clear prohibition against aggression (and without which there was no just basis for a 
war).  However, this clear delimitation was weakened by then accepting that: the 
threat of attack; legitimate nationalist movements; or, removing a government that 
was terrorising its own population, as grounds for war.  These may be valid criteria 
but they are very judgemental, for example in defining what is and what is not a 
legitimate national aspiration and thus movement.  Few such cases are 
straightforward. 
 
However, the major change to any previous discussion of Just War was the presence 
of nuclear weapons.  By the mid-1950s these had reached an individual destructive 
power and both the USA and USSR had more than enough weapons not just to 
destroy the other but effectively to destroy all humanity.  Again, a secular response 
was reliance on the United Nations with various commitments to limit nuclear 
proliferation and ongoing attempts to convince the USSR, USA and other nuclear 
powers to reduce the number of their weapons.  Equally there were attempts to 
convince both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to adopt a ‗no first use‘ limitation on their 
                                            
600
 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 
601
 Michael W. Johnson argues that Walzer‘s criteria are actually quite close to the Westphalian model. 
Michael W. Johnson, Just War Theory and Future Warfare, p. 15 
196 
 
nuclear arsenals (something that NATO refused to accept). 
 
A number of political doctrines grew up around the possession of strategic nuclear 
weapons.  Both the USSR and the USA argued that their own missiles were 
essentially to deter
602
 an attack by the other side and that this deterrence was 
effective in limiting armed conflict between the two superpowers to proxy wars in 
Asia and Africa.  Equally, the concept of Mutually Assured Deterrence was held to 
be a factor in restraining either side from starting a war.  Smaller nuclear powers 
such as the UK and France argued they needed their own independent weaponry so as 
to deter a Soviet attack on their national territories that did not involve a direct attack 
on the USA.  There was also the fear that if one side disarmed, or reduced its 
weaponry to a level where it could all be destroyed in a ‗first-strike‘, it would then be 
vulnerable to blackmail and aggression by the other superpower. 
 
Equally the morality of nuclear weapons was debated from many viewpoints.  What 
was clear to all was the destructive power of even a single nuclear weapon and the 
consequences for humanity in the event of a major nuclear exchange between the 
superpowers. 
 




 made a distinction 
between strategic weapons and those designed for more limited use on the battlefield 
(and presumably away from centres of population).  O‘Donovan‘s concern was that 
the use of such tactical weapons would inevitably escalate (it would certainly had 
done so if NATO had used them in a war in Europe) but Ramsay argued that the 
problem with nuclear weapons was their potential lack of discrimination and this 
could be overcome by better design and use605.  Ramsay also argued that the 
possession of nuclear weapons was not essentially wrong, instead they forced states 
and individuals to think carefully about choices in matters of war, defence and 
aggression.   
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Others, such as Reinhold Niebuhr
606
 came to argue that the possession (and 
presumably use) of nuclear weapons was justified if it preserved Christianity from 
Soviet-style totalitarian rule.  In this there are strong echoes of Aquinas‘ earlier 
criteria that in waging war one must be seeking to avoid a greater evil – and to many 
Christian thinkers, the moral threat posed by the Soviet Union was such a greater evil.  
This line of thinking is still very present in the South Korean Protestant community 
today in terms of the DPRK which is seen not just as a malign state (with real if 
limited expansionist goals of its own) but as an evil that has to be resisted at all costs.   
 
Other thinkers, such as Yoder,
607
 from a pacifist tradition, take a view that any usage 
of nuclear weapons fails to meet the demands of the Jus in Bello criteria.  Jeffrey 
Stout608 argues that the deterrence argument itself is flawed, if it is illegitimate to use 
strategic nuclear weapons it is also illegitimate to threaten to do so.  John Stott
609
 on 
this basis, argues that the logic of deterrence is a clear breach of any concept of Jus in 
Bello since it implies a willingness to do something that is morally unacceptable (ie 
evil).  In this, those who argue for deterrence or the use of nuclear weapons to avert a 
greater evil (victory by the Soviet Union or the DPRK, or whoever is the enemy of the 
moment) ignore the essential redemptive element in the Christian message.  
Effectively Christians cannot forget that to them, the end does not justify the means. 
 
These are very conflicting interpretations of the Just War tradition in the light of 
nuclear weapons.  On the one hand, there is an argument that even at their most 
destructive (strategic thermonuclear weaponry) they can meet the requirement of 
avoiding a greater evil.  More subtle versions of this argue that the problem with 
nuclear weapons is their relative lack of discrimination and the solution lies in the 
development of more controlled weapons that will not have unintended side effects.  
On the other hand the original Christian tradition of pacifism has an equally clear 
logic in terms of nuclear weapons, that since war is unacceptable so are nuclear 
weapons.  However, critically, a final strand of argument takes the view that nuclear 
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weapons are unacceptable because their usage cannot be reconciled to the Christian 
message.   
 
2.3. Just War, Nuclear Weapons and Korea Today 
 
People today, at least in reasonably free polities, are free to lead lives that place the 
greatest emphasis on measuring up to the highest Christian ideals. However, as 
Reinhold Niebuhr made clear decades ago, to opt to such a lifestyle amounts to an 
abandonment of koinonia at large. ―In medieval ascetic perfectionism and in 
Protestant sectarian perfectionism (of the type of Meno Simons, for instance) the 
effort to achieve a standard of perfect love in individual life was not presented as a 
political alternative. On the contrary, the political problem and task were specifically 
disavowed.‖610 Under such circumstances, the accumulation of weapons and, for that 
matter their deployment in combat, remained a secondary concern—one that the pious 
monk would surely pray that they remain sheathed but nonetheless were no direct 
impediment to a life of prayer (at least provided that they were not deployed against 
him). The world might be given over to evil, but the ascetic stood as an example of 
the individual life as a symbol of the Kingdom of God that was at least theoretically 
attainable. Yet, as Professor Kim has laid out in his political paradigm directed toward 
the realization of the messianic kingdom, it is precisely koinonia‘s engagement in the 
political world that is essential if justice is to be to become normative. 
 
At first glance it may well be argued that the possession of nuclear weapons need not 
pose an insuperable barrier to the achievement of shalom, at least if they were reduced 
in number and solely deployed for defensive purposes. However, in the Korean 
context, this is almost certainly not the case. In a supposed Korean state, unified in 
terms of the benign messianic politics outlined by Professor Kim above, any such 
weapons would pose an intrinsic threat to koinonia. As Friesen expresses so bluntly, 
―the development of particular types of weapons systems is dangerous because of the 
increased insecurity and the increased danger of nuclear war they are likely to 
bring.‖611 If, as is generally agreed, nuclear weapons should never be used under any 
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realistic circumstance—as would almost certainly be the case with a unified 
democratic Korea—their possession grants no advantage and as a practical issue, only 
constitutes an ongoing danger to society. 
 
Moreover, the existence of the nuclear weapons is certainly problematic for Korean 
Christians who seek the ‗achievement of shalom‘. Hauerwas argues that Christians in 
favor of interim nuclear deterrence do not clearly differentiate between the church and 
the state in terms of which comes first: ―they want to be Constantinian pacifists fusing 
church and world so that they can speak to the world without the embarrassment of 
Christ‘s cross. Absent the cross, appeals to shalom cannot help but border on 




In this respect, two pacifist theorists, Augsburger and Curry, claim in the current 
Korean context,  
 
―[True] Christian thinkers cannot permit the issue of nuclear weapons to be politicized while 
avoiding the moral responsibility that the very existence of nuclear arms lays upon each of us. 
It cannot be made a partisan issue, for as adherents of the third way the Christian should have 





As examined, South Korea‘s Christian community has been in discord with each other 
in relations to the approach to cope with the nuclear weapons programme in North 
Korea.
614
 In this sense, what Korean Christians need to ask themselves is not whether 
a certain end for just cause could justify possessing or using nuclear weapons in spite 
of their evilness and immorality, but how to overcome the temptation of such a 
powerful weapon. Some of them may justify having nuclear weapons by 
distinguishing between a righteous purpose and a wrong intention. But such an 
approach cannot hide the existential threat and, most of all, its destructive character 
that those weapons carry, which is contrary to God‘s creation and love for humankind. 
 
3. Dynamics within Korean Christianity 
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3.1 The influence of how Christianity entered Korea 
 
As discussed in chapter four, Christianity entered Korea in two distinct phases.  
Elements of the educated elite adopted Catholicism from the late 18
th
 Century and 
Protestantism arrived in the late 19
th
 Century.  Both aspects of Christianity 
effectively had to respond to the dynamics of foreign occupation and in turn both 
identified themselves with a wider reform movement, the goals of Korean nationalism 
and the desire for good governance.  Thus Christianity was traditionally seen as 
having a concern with social justice and adopted a clear Korean identity.  Equally 
both religious traditions were embraced by members of the traditionally Confucian 
yangban class615 and this gave Korean Christianity a particular set of characteristics. 
 
An early difference, between the two traditions was that Catholicism mainly appealed 
to elements within the small educated elite.  The Protestant community sought to 
attract a much wider swathe of Korean society.  Also the conditions prevailing at the 
time of its introduction meant the Protestant missionaries placed considerable 
emphasis on providing health care, education and other social works.  They also, as 
discussed above, had a messianic616 interpretation of the Protestant tradition.  This 
also saw the adoption of aspects of the biblical story of exodus and suffering to 
explain the Korean people‘s oppression under Japanese rule
617
.  Thus they were able 
to place their resistance to Japanese occupation in terms of their own faith. 
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, in the period since the armistice in 1953, the 
Korean protestant community has split into two elements.  Both stress, and draw on 
for inspiration, the traditions of the community (social works, social inclusion, 
education, a messianic interpretation of scripture) but from this common core have 
developed very different priorities in terms of what needs to be done to realise the 
goal of united Korea that shares a common faith. 
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Central to the Korean Protestant tradition has been a strong concept of justice.  In the 
Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas states,  
 
―It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with 
others: because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to 
say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in reference of one thing 
to some other. On the other hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which 




Thus Aquinas puts considerable emphasis on the intrinsic equality of men. The fact 
that certain individuals enjoy authority (e.g., ―the prince who is placed over the people, 
and acts in its stead‖619) is beside the point. Indeed, such individuals, precisely 
because they are privileged with special authority, had grave obligations to assure that 
their performance of public duty was proper in all respects. It appears that men of 
good conscience seek to do that which is right and, conversely, to deride the acts of 
others that fail to meet this reasonable standard.  
 
3.2 The Strands of Korean Koinonia 
 
‘Koinonia’ may be understood as ‗participatory communion‘ or ‗activist fellowship‘, 
and is a concept common across Korean society regardless of an individual‘s religious 
identity.  It can find expression in the formal celebration of the Eucharist or for that 
matter in a meal shared by friends at home. It is reflected in the abstract desire of an 
individual, encouraged by God‘s love, to do good for all. For that matter, it is 
expressed in efforts by members of the Christian community to achieve a highly 
specific goal (e.g., build a school or a hospital). However, in recent decades, koinonia 
has been understood in the context of political activism. As described by Professor 
Kim, koinonia is ‗the content of the creative interaction that will take place among the 
people.‘ But that ‗creative interaction‘ is one that risks all too easily, being perverted 
from its legitimate objectives. For Korean Christians, principal among the legitimate 
political objectives has been national unity—ending the division of the Korean people 
that has prevailed since 1945.  
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In his discussion of politics and messianism, Professor Kim makes a crucial 
distinction between messianic politics and political messianism. Simply stated, the 
latter is a perversion of the former. Kim identifies the legitimate exercise of 
messianism in the political sphere as arising from the people (or minjung).  
 
―The most dramatic manifestation of minjung messianism in Korea was the March First 
Independence movement of 1919. Korean historians have carefully documented this 
movement and show the minjung to be its motive power. They also show that the messianic 
traditions of Buddhism, Donghak religion, and Christianity joined together to form a minjung 
messianic religious foundation… This movement produced an axial transformation in the 





Understood in these terms, ‗popular messianism‘ may be accounted a modest 
reflection of Jesus‘ gift to mankind in coming into the world; overcoming the effects 
of original sin and providing the vehicle for salvation. Thus, popular messianism 
(messianic politics) places the locus of political authority in the hands of the people, 
that graces bestowed on the people through Jesus‘ sacrifice may more likely find 
expression in or at least animate public policy for people who wants to live together 
through peaceful koinonia, irrespective of ideology or religious difference, without 
political oppression or security threat by weapons of mass destruction. 
 
3.2.1. Koinonia under Attack: Political Messianism 
 
Conversely, political messianism is said to remove the locus of authority from the 
people and instead place it in unworthy hands. Political messianism, in one form or 
another, is probably as old as civilization itself. Ancient rulers who accounted 
themselves deified—and governed in those terms—fall into that category. And the 
tyrants of the Twentieth Century (e.g., Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, Kim Il-sung and Kim 
Jung-il) demanded officially sponsored public adulation regularly described as ‗cult of 
the personality‘. Professor Kim identifies three historical instances of political 
messianism visited upon the Korean people – government by Imperial Japan, 
totalitarian government in North Korea, and (interestingly enough) a tacit deification 
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of modern technology in South Korea (a reckless faith in that technology will 
somehow resolve all the nation‘s social problems). One more case can be added, in 
the development of nuclear weapons as a specific deification of modern technology. 
Deterrence by the nuclear weapon is, as discussed in the former chapter, a typical case 
example of how people can try to secure their lives at the cost of a possibility of 
civilization annihilation. Professor Kim concludes that. ―These three manifestations of 
political messianism have common characteristics, not only in their totalitarian and 
absolutist character, but also in sharing a common theory of contradiction. Their view 
of history is that there are two powers which are struggling against each other, and 
that one must destroy the other.‖621  
 
However, perhaps unique in the History of Christianity, it is Korea‘s Christian 
koinonia that has provided what amounts to a ‗vocabulary of modern political thought‘ 
to the nation at large.  
 
―[The] process of internalization of the Christian message was closely related to the social and 
political experiences of the Korean people. The Christian messianic language was related to 
the historical experiences of the people… [Of the factors at work, the first] was the medium of 
communication. The fact that the Christian literature, especially the Bible, was translated and 
written in Korean vernacular script had a significant implication in the shaping of the 
language of the Korean Christian koinonia… The second factor was the nature of the message 
itself… The vernacular language was concrete, metaphorical, and symbolic rather than 
conceptual and theoretical. This meant that the Bible itself was the best form of presentation 




To the extent that ‗the medium is the message,‘ the vocabulary of Christianity 
supplied the vocabulary of political freedom that would be a motive to form an 
idealised Korean koinonia. 
 
Quite obviously, nonetheless, the proper ordering of society has been perverted in at 
least two ways. In the first place, the ultimate authority of God—in the Korean 
context, understood in neo-Confucian terms as the Holy Spirit both operating through 
history and, as the Third Person of the Trinity, spiritually joining heaven and earth—
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has been arrogated or misplaced. Secondly, the Holy Spirit as Paraclete—understood 
in Augustine‘s sense of ‗spirit of truth‘—is sent to the people, not specifically those in 
authority. Herein, as Professor Kim describes it, does the error find expression, ―The 
justice of god (theodicy) is alleged to be immanent in the established political regime, 
be it that of Emperor, a communist leader, or the military technocracy.‖623 
 
3.3. Shalom and Korean Protestant Identity 
 
Shalom, is effectively the final strand of the Korean Christian identity.  In his 
discussion of just war, theologian Duane Friesen outlines the social function of the 
Christian Church saying,  
 
―The activity of the church is carried out in the world in a broad arena of activity, such as 
giving shape to the ethos of society, demonstrating justice and nonviolence through example, 
serving by organizing institutions to meet human need, seeking to influence and shape public 





‘Shalom’ is regularly translated from Hebrew as ‗peace‘—as in the popular greeting, 
‗shalom alekem,‘ or ‗peace be with you.‘ However, in its ethical and theological 
context it is perhaps better understood as that species of well-being that arises when 
all components of the whole are present and in place, or when all members of a group 
(e.g., koinonia) are in accord, working for the betterment of all. 
 
Shalom is often equated with peace, in the sense of an absence of violence. In a 
perfectly organised society this would be a reasonable correlation. However, it is 
closer to an affirmative vision of a society inspired by Jesus‘ teachings. Here, the lines 
of thinking of the late Nineteenth Century American theologian Lyman Abbott 
provides illumination when he wrote,  
 
―Christ used force to defend others, but never to defend himself. The fundamental principle in 
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Christ‘s teaching is this: Love may use force,
625
 selfishness may not… [However,] our lives 
are so intertwined that it is often impossible to tell whether one is defending [one‘s self] or 
another. It is spirit, nor rule or regulation, which Christ prescribes, and this is the spirit: Love 




Hence, the rightly enlightened koinonia may act for its collective defence against 
malevolent forces. This same thinking however, leaves space for heroic sacrifice by 
any one given individual. American Mennonite theologian John Yoder describes this 
as the motivation of many of the Church‘s martyrs, ―They cultivated a worldview 
marked by trusting God for survival, a willingness to suffer rather than to sin, and an 
absence of any cynical utilitarianism in their definition of the path of obedience.‖627 
Here, again, a distinction between justice and charity may be at work. The refusal to 
act defensively—an act otherwise permitted in terms of justice—may be interpreted 
as a response to a ‗counsel of perfection.‘ Such acts of self-sacrifice, often undertaken 
for the ultimate benefit of the transgressor as well as the edification of others, are part 
and parcel of the History of Christianity since its earliest years. And for Korean 
Christians, whose antecedents affirmed their faith in Christ and suffered in thousands 
for their testimony that history serves as a wellspring for both personal courage and 
the desire to participate in the good works of the koinonia. 
 
4. Contemporary Dynamics in Korea 
 
In his essay, ‗Moral Clarity in a Time of War,‘628 George Weigel makes a particularly 
cogent point, perhaps one that many pacifists might find unsettling. Regarding the 
former Soviet Union and its massive nuclear arsenal, Weigel observes, ―Nuclear 
weapons were not the primary threat to peace, communism was. When communism 
went, so did the threat posed by the weapons… [Events in Eastern Europe] that 
eventually led to the demise of the USSR itself [resulted in] the risks of nuclear war 
[being] greatly diminished and real disarmament [could] begin.‖629 
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Perhaps much the same dynamics could be at work in the Korean Peninsula. In reality, 
however, it is not clear whether the nuclear issue will be resolved peacefully without 
further crisis or political turmoil in the region. There are many factors—the political 
interactions among concerned countries, each country‘s domestic problems, different 
acknowledges of the current international order, etc—surrounding the northern 
nuclear issue. In this sense, conversely if the involved parties believe that ending the 
nuclear issue would be most profitable for themselves, it is perfectly possible for 
some surprising end of the nuclear issue to occur.  In turn this would lead to results 
such as the U.S.‘ peace treaty with, lifting economic sanctions to, and a treaty of 
diplomatic relationship with North Korea.  
 
For the Korea Church the nuclear issue is more than a political matter, it is also a 
matter of the church itself. Although the two representative Korean councils, the 
NCCK and the CCK, have made efforts to resolve this issue according to their 
different positions, both have failed to raise a voice that only the church, a faith 
community that admits God‘s sovereignty, could have. As discussed, it is due to their 
approaches to the issue, which seem to be no different from those of the other secular 
political groups, or from political strategies of concerned states. 
 
Christian love, peace and justice may not be implemented effectively as long as the 
church does not make an unequivocally clear objection to nuclear weapons. In this 
regards, for the Korean Christians seeking nuclear disarmament are not achieved by 
political compromise or a certain interest. Rather, it is achieved by their confession 
that the nuclear weapons issue is a litmus paper to probe how firmly Christians are 
able to live with a belief in God in an ‗uncertain world,‘ in which unfaithful people 




As this thesis was developed, world events have contributed new elements affecting 
the Korean peninsula, and it has become even more clearly evident that Korean 
Christianity has an important role to play towards attaining peace and stability not 
only in a reunified Korea but also in the future participation of a renewed state in 
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world affairs.  The dynamics between the DPRK and the rest of the International 
Community seem to be in a constant state of flux depending on their current approach 
to acquiring more nuclear weapons or testing even more advanced missile technology. 
 
However, even so, there is no inherent reason why Korea should not find itself 
happily reunited and nuclear-free in a decade or so. Korea‘s reunification remains the 
main issue. Korean politicians cannot, however, sit down to negotiate while ignoring 
the very essence of the roots of both existing regimes and the links to ideological and 
religious principles on either side of the 38
th.
 Parallel. While South Korea has 
developed a unique Christian conscience, Christians in the North have had to 
subrogate their beliefs to juche fabricated to the image of a decadent leader that not 
only rejected Christianity but likewise partly shunned his adopted Marxist doctrine. 
 
Given current conditions in North Korea—a regime dependent on the threatened 
continuation of the development and procurement of nuclear weapons in order to 
secure favourable treatment from western nations—it appears that its prospects, at the 
best, are precarious. Certainly these are even less promising than those of the USSR a 
decade before its collapse. This in turn, raises a number of fundamental issues for the 
Korean people, in their capacity of koinonia seeking shalom. 
 
It is easy to predict that a sudden collapse of the DPRK would result in massive social 
dislocations with people fleeing to South Korea or China and effective social collapse. 
Under such circumstances, the Korean Christians would face challenges unlike those 
faced by any Christian collective in the past. The German experience after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the communist German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) should be instructive enough. Despite the fact that East Germans 
were collectively the most prosperous inhabitants of the (now defunct) Warsaw Pact, 
in comparison with their western cousins they lived penurious lives. With the 
extinction of the GDR, enormous demands—at their core, moral ones—were imposed 
upon the Federal German Republic in to efforts undertaken at equalization. Such an 
effort might well be understood in terms of Thomas Aquinas‘ sense of justice as the 
establishment of moral equality. Despite the relatively advanced physical assets of the 
former East Germany, it is now estimated that it will take at least a quarter century of 







The economic and social breach between the two Koreas is far greater than the 
German scenario. Should the DPRK indeed collapse in much the same manner as the 
former USSR or GDR, it is likely that efforts at reconstruction and provision of public 
services on a par with those now enjoyed in the ROK could take too many decades to 
turn into reality.
632
 This, perhaps more than the existence of nuclear weapons, poses 
the adamant moral challenge to koinonia. For once, instead of simply discussing 
prospective courses of action, koinonia would be faced with the immediate 
responsibility to apply measures with significant sacrifices to ensure minimally 
acceptable conditions for their less fortunate northern neighbours. Such sacrificial act 
of giving would be long term, not something that could be resolved in weeks or 
months but much rather in decades or even the course of a full century. 
 
Should the foregoing actually come to pass—and to be reasonably fair, it is an 
unlikely prospective scenario in the short-term, Korean Christians or should we say 
all Korean citizens from both sides of the 38
th.
 Parallel, will have been granted a 
magnificent divine gift, that of the opportunity to put shalom into practice; acts of 
charity on a mass scale and selflessness. 
 
In this sense, with a reunified Korea, spurious investments on nuclear weapons 
development should be stopped, redirecting all economic investments towards much 
needed improvement of infrastructures and means of communications in the northern 
territory. Furthermore, educational schemes must include awareness campaigns to 
bring North Korean citizenry to the reality of the 21
st.
 Century, updating their know-
how to levels required for their labour and social integration into a democratic society. 
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Then, southern progress can be shared to the extent of technology implementation in 
new production and processing installations on northern territory. Such coordinated 
actions would be not only a steady but significant move toward national koinonia, and 
also impede an avalanche of would-be refugees in any case of sudden unification. It 
will be precisely Christian congregations closer to the grass roots that could contribute 
to an orderly reorganisation of a probably otherwise uncontrollable situation. 
 
Thousands of years ago, the people of Israel were called upon to be ‗a light unto the 
gentiles,‘ in hope that the latter might model their behaviour unto that of God‘s chosen 
people. Through Christ‘s sacrifice we have all become heirs to the promises originally 
made to the Jews. Given the workings of the Holy Spirit through History and as an 
ongoing inspiration to Christians everywhere, it is not inconceivable that should 
Korean koinonia meet up to its moral responsibilities, that same koinonia likewise be 
a light to all nations. 
 
5. Final Comments 
 
The final chapter of this thesis takes the themes summarised in this chapter around 
Just War, the Korean Protestant tradition and the barriers to the goal of Korean 
unification and considers just what should be the response of the Korean protestant 
community.  Effectively this means being aware of the issues embedded in the Just 
War tradition and also adopting that as a whole rather than the selective approach 







This thesis has used the Christian concept of Just War Theory, and its ramifications, to 
consider the Korean dilemma of how to achieve a return to a single unified state 
despite the presence of nuclear weapons in the DPRK. The core approach has been to 
place the arguments within the scope of contextual theology which, as Duncan 
Forrester argues
633
, is synonymous to political theology. 
  
The Korean confrontation caused by the two Korea‘s ideological and political 
divergence has been analysed in the context of political theology, to the extent that 
each government‘s stance has been examined to uncover its political, military, 
economical and social motivations. The opacity of information from within the DPRK 
has made it difficult to interpret the motives of that regime but it does seem plausible 
that at least one of the options is for them to adopt the role of developing and selling 
weaponry on the international stage.  This might allow the elite to remain in power 
without needing to take account of the needs of the ordinary people of North Korea. 
 
The uneven Christian response, as this work has established, is not due to different 
Christian criteria in expression of faith according to the teachings of Christ but rather 
that Christian communities, or more precisely their leaders, have assumed politically-
inclined postures with little reflection of Christian principles in their attitudes.  In 
this both the CCK and the NCCK have taken an approach to the unification question 
(and the existence of nuclear weapons) that takes, at best, only partial note of the 
Christian tradition of Just War. 
 
In spite of the common cause in the search of peace amongst South Korean Christian 
churches, in both the progressive and the conservative, several relevant politically 
strategic issues have led to discrepancies as to the approaches towards attaining such 
goals. This thesis has clearly demonstrated such grievances and analysed some of the 
consequences of such standpoints. Chief amongst these is the nuclear weapons issue. 
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Here lies a possible contradiction: despite the apparent converging reunification 
intentions of both North and South, both are also seeking armament for warfare in 
order to ensure their separate national security. If the main purpose of both present-
day adversaries is peace in a reunified Korea, how then can the contenders explain 
their search of national (each regime considered separately) security through 
possession of nuclear armaments?  If on the other hand, the DPRK no longer 
actively seeks unification (in terms of its victory or as a ‗one state – two systems‘ 
model) but is seeking an independent future (within its current boundaries) as an 
international provider of weaponry then what should be the response of Christian 
community? 
 
The thesis has examined these key factors with emphasis on the security issue from 
the Christian vantage point and identified a correlation between cause and effect from 
a political theologian‘s point of view.  The multiple dynamics of unification, nuclear 
weapons and human rights are factors in understanding the different responses of the 
governing leaders both in state and church. 
 
It has become evident that contextual theology is fundamental in order to comprehend 
aspects in which classical theology may find limitations insomuch as universal and 
general reasoning cannot be justified without placing the thoughts of the individual in 
his own native environment and context. For the Korean people bent on becoming a 
single nation, and for that matter a reunified state, the nuclear issue cannot be seen as 
a separate issue. The issues of unification, human rights and nuclear weapons are 
interlinked but many declarations of different Korean Church leaders would imply 
differently.  Thus the CCK was relatively silent about human rights abuses in the 
ROK under the Park dictatorship and the NCCK has not made human rights a major 
issue in its engagement with the DPRK. 
 
From this, and in lieu of the most recent events, this thesis serves as the basis to 
advance a practicable interpretation of Christian actions in the context of political and 
religious exercise within the scope of the Korean situation, irrespective of the political 
or religious criteria of the individuals or collectives. The work offers a clear 
perspective towards a better understanding of long-standing and recently formulated 
postures, but likewise reflects on the necessity for realism in the time horizon between 
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now and potential re-unification. Such reflections have led to the conclusion that 
North Korea‘s juche has no viability in a modern-time structure of a Korea in the New 
Millennium and that there is no reason for either Korea to seek nuclear weapons to 
relieve their security concern as such weapons increasehatred and suspicion against 
the opposite party, and, at the same time, decrease any chance to allow ordinary (grass 
root) people across the two countries to discuss their own destiny. Thus, this thesis 
recommends that the role and responsibility entrusted to Korean Christians is to make 
every effort to decrease the hatred and suspicion between two Koreans, and to stop 
any attempt to procure nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula.  
 
The distinct history of the Korean Christianity was about promoting national identity 
and practising peacefully to secure it during the Japanese rule. Such unique features of 
the Korean Christianity will be assets that they are able to and should do effectively 
its role in achieving the national Koinonia based on shalom in the Korean Peninsula. 
 
As previously said, the opacity of the North Korean regime and the scarcity of 
information about Christians in the DPRK, means their voices cannot be reflected in 
this comparative examination of Christian positions towards war and the security 
issue. However, the ideas and themes of this thesis will help provide at least one 
means to understand and judge some of the unexplained behaviours amongst 
supposedly Christian-inspired citizens of the North in their support of nuclear 
armament and war as a means of Korea‘s reunification. 
 
Nonetheless what is important is that the current response by the Christian 
communities in the ROK is clearly based on the gospel message and Christian 
tradition of Just War. 
 
Perfect shalom may be far from reality. We do not know how effectively the church 
making a firm objection to nuclear weapons could help to resolve the North Korean 
nuclear problem in reality. However, we may, at least, insist upon what Jesus really 
wants and try to live like Him. This is the church‘s way since ―the battle between the 
fallen and sinful powers that rule the world, and the angel and spiritual powers that 
reign in heaven has already been fought and won in the death and resurrection and 
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To play such role, Korean Christians of all congregations must firstly assume the 
moral responsibilities of the current nuclear issues based on misconception of national 
security, and also practice their faith demands of those involved in the defence of 
human rights. All these efforts must reflect Christ‘s teaching on love and peace toward 
shalom. Only by setting living examples of their beliefs can Korean Christians make 
aware those other citizens of the merits of this manner of living, and does induce them 
to embrace both Christianity and the democratic way of life.
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